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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Growing consumer concerns about food safety have put pressure on agricultural 
commodity markets to pay more attention to produce quality (Auriol and Schilizzi, 
2003). Commodity quality assurance begins at the farm, where smallholders 
continuously make production decisions that influence food safety. Cocoa is Ghana’s 
most important agricultural commodity and cocoa beans exported from Ghana are 
known for their consistent quality. However, at farm level, there is evidence to 
suggest that farmers, mainly smallholders, can do more to enhance the quality of 
their produce (Laven et al., 2007, Osei, 2007). Most policy and programme effort to 
get smallholders to enhance the production of quality commodities like cocoa have 
focused on development and transfer of agricultural technologies (Röling, 2009). 
This approach does not always yield the desired outcomes because it disregards 
institutional factors that often inhibit uptake of technologies by smallholders 
(Hounkonnou et al., 2012). 
This thesis argues that the adoption, by farmers, of quality-enhancing 
technologies is hampered by the rules (or institutions) that govern interactions in the 
internal cocoa market of Ghana. The argument is presented in five empirical chapters 
that are divided into two parts (Figure 1.4). The first part (Chapter 2 and 3) provides 
a general background and demonstrates how market-related institutions influence 
farmer behaviour. The second part (Chapter 4 to 6) experiments with alternative 
institutional mechanisms that might nudge smallholders to consistently supply 
quality cocoa beans. In this introductory chapter, the process of problem 
identification, relevant gaps in literature, research objectives, and methods of 
analyses are discussed. At the end, the structure of the thesis is presented. 
1.2 Study Context 
1.2.1 Cocoa production in Ghana 
Cocoa (Theobroma cacao L.) is a perennial tree crop that thrives well in humid 
tropical forest conditions. Typically, a cocoa tree has an average economic life of 25-
30 years. The tree bears an ovoid fruit of about 15–30 cm long and 8–10 cm wide. 
Each cocoa pod contains between 20 and 60 seeds (referred to as cocoa beans 
throughout this thesis) from which cocoa butter and other chocolate base products are 
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extracted (Wood and Lass, 2008). In Ghana, the crop grows over two seasons – the 
main crop (October to June) and the minor crop (July to September). Cocoa beans 
produced in the main crop season are bigger in size (Baker et al.,1994). After the tree 
is planted, farmers must carry out a number of cultural practices to maintain the 
fertility of the soil, prevent pests, manage diseases, and control shade conditions for 
effective yield. On harvest, pods must be carefully broken to extract the cocoa beans. 
The beans must then be fermented for about 6 days, dried and polished before they can 
be sold (Anim-Kwapong et al., 2007).  
 
Figure 1.1 Map of southern Ghana showing the cocoa belt 
Cocoa was introduced into Ghana two centuries ago by Dutch Missionaries 
(Acquaah, 1999). Commercial production is however believed to have begun when 
Ghanaian farmer Tetteh Quarshie returned from Fernando Po (now Bioko in 
Equatorial Guinea) with some cocoa pods in 1897 and started a commercial farm 
(Anthonio and Aikins, 2009). Since then, the crop has expanded throughout southern 
Ghana and has become Ghana’s main agricultural export commodity (Hill, 1997). 
Figure 1.1 shows a map of southern Ghana depicting the cocoa-growing belt, which is 
marked in green. Cocoa is mainly cultivated by smallholder farmers in six of the ten 
administrative regions in Ghana that have forest agro-ecological conditions. These are 
the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Central, Eastern, Western, and the Volta Region. 
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Cocoa is one of Ghana’s most important national export commodities (Anang, 
2011). The crop’s contribution to Ghana’s economy in terms of trade balance, 
employment, infrastructure, as well as social services like education and health, is 
considerable (Leiter and Harding, 2004; Williams, 2009; Vigneri, 2007). At the 
national level, cocoa drives Ghana’s trade balance by contributing over 20% of the 
total annual export revenue (Figure 1.2). Taxes on cocoa exports have been a major 
source of government revenue since independence (Breisinger et al., 2011). In 
addition, revenues from cocoa have been used to fund several infrastructural goals of 
the state such as schools, hospitals and road networks. At the household level, cocoa 
provides a means of livelihood for over six million households comprising farmers, 
farmhands, produce buyers, processors, haulers, researchers, and staff of COCOBOD 
(Kolavalli et al., 2012).
1
  
Ghana’s cocoa sector has been described as an African success story because 
over the years, the country has sustained its status as one of the worlds’ leading 
suppliers of the crop (Williams, 2009). From early 1911 to 1960, Ghana became the 
leading supplier of cocoa beans, exporting up to 40% of the total world output. A 
general economic decline, unstable real producer prices, excessive taxation, and 
political instability resulted in lowered producer incentives and hence a decline in 
production. Consequently, beginning from 1960, Ghana’s share in the total world 
output declined from 35% to about 15% in 2011 (Figure 1.3). 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Trends in percentage contribution of cocoa to export revenue, 1988-2012 
Source: Bank of Ghana (2012) 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this thesis, COCOBOD refers to Ghana Cocoa Board, the state marketing board that coordinates all 
activities of Ghana’s cocoa sector.  
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Beginning from 1984, a number of liberalization reforms were introduced into 
the cocoa sector with the objective of halting the decline in production. These reforms 
included restructuring of the oversight organization (COCOBOD), changes in 
extension structures, state-funded pest management programmes, replanting (or 
rehabilitation of old farms), and market and pricing reforms (Essegbey and Ofori-
Gyamfi, 2012). With these reforms, Ghana witnessed a sharp increase in cocoa 
production from less than 300,000 metric tons in 1990 to the present annual average 
output of close to 1,000,000 metric tons. Another indicator of the success of Ghana’s 
cocoa sector over the years is the consistent supply of the bulk of the world’s best 
quality produce. Cocoa from all other origins is therefore measured against the 
standard of Ghana cocoa. Amoah (2008) notes that due to this consistent quality 
performance, cocoa beans from Ghana sell at a premium compared to produce from 
other countries. Kolavalli et al. (2012) suggests that Ghana earns a quality premium of 
about 5% more than other countries. This is said to constitute an average of US$ 200 – 
250 per tonne over the prevailing international cocoa price (Barrientos et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 1.3 Share of Ivory Coast, Ghana and Indonesia in total world cocoa output, 1961-2011 
Source: FAO 
A number of studies have attributed this consistent performance in terms of 
output and quality to institutional factors (Essegbey and Ofori-Gyamfi, 2012; Knudsen 
and Fold, 2011; Kolavalli et al., 2012; Williams, 2009). Institutions here, and 
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throughout this study, refer to laws, regulations, policies, cultural norms, and 
organizations that shape human interactions (Eaton et al., 2008; Edquist, 1997; Nelson, 
2008; North, 1990). For example, Leiter and Harding (2004) have mentioned that, 
throughout the 200 year history of cocoa in Ghana, successive governments have 
deliberately controlled the production and export of cocoa through implementation of 
a number of legal and political instruments.  
Even though cocoa laws and policies have evolved over the years they have 
carried out similar functions. Essentially, cocoa laws and policies have been used to 
regulate production practices by farmers; the organization of cocoa trading in Ghana, 
including prices and export duties (taxes); the control of insect pests and management 
of diseases; and how quality is to be controlled.
2 
In addition to the political 
institutional environment, mention has been made of the positive impact of several 
other institutional factors such as cooperative societies and producer networks 
(Cazzuffi and Moradi, 2010; Young et al., 1981), land tenure contract arrangements 
(Takane, 2002), and social norms like reciprocity, trust and inheritance systems 
(MacLean, 2010), which have all worked together to shape the cocoa sector of Ghana.  
1.2.2 Why focus on quality? 
Notwithstanding Ghana’s strong performance, in recent years, the same institutional 
setting has placed a number of constraints on smallholder livelihoods. In the 
framework of the research programme “Convergence of Sciences – Strengthening 
Innovation Systems” (CoS-SIS), Dormon and Sakyi-Dawson (2009) conducted an 
exploratory study to identify some of these constraints for smallholder cocoa farmers.
3
 
The study concluded that: (1) the organization of the internal cocoa bean market does 
not provide incentives for farmers to supply higher volumes of quality cocoa beans; 
(2) farmers are not sufficiently organized to take advantage of the opportunities 
offered by high value niche markets, in particular those of organic produce; and (3) 
land tenure and land use contracts are often to the disadvantage of farmers. As a result, 
smallholders do not always meet their profitability goals (Dormon and Sakyi-Dawson, 
2009). 
                                                 
2
 See Acquaah (1999) for a chronicle of the evolution of legal and political instruments that were used 
to coordinate the cocoa sector before liberalization reforms took place in 1984. Other authors have 
amply described post-liberalization institutions and their impacts (Amoah, 1998; Laven, 2010; 
Essegbey and Ofori-Gyamfi 2012; Kolavalli et al. 2012). 
3
 The studies reported in this thesis were funded by the research programme “Convergence of Sciences 
–Strengthening Innovation Systems (CoS-SIS)”. See Appendix for a summary of the CoS-SIS 
research programme. See also www.cos-sis.org. 
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These findings were discussed by a panel of experts made up of scientists, 
farmers, extension officers, and policy makers at a conference at Elmina in Ghana, in 
October 2009 (van Huis and Youdeowei, 2009). One of the objectives of the workshop 
was to prioritize key research concerns as identified by Dormon and Sakyi-Dawson 
(2009). Sustaining Ghana’s premium cocoa quality position on the international cocoa 
market was, during this conference, considered critical for improving smallholder 
livelihoods (Aneani and Takrama, 2006). This is because, as a result of consistent 
export of quality cocoa beans, Ghana is able to sell about 70% of the produce in 
forward markets. The forward sale of cocoa beans ensures a fairly stable producer 
price regime. Therefore, when the quality of Ghanaian cocoa beans is compromised, 
farmers’ economic position will likely be jeopardized. Additionally, resolving 
problems that undermine the production and export of cocoa bean quality is likely to 
address the other concerns identified by Dormon and Sakyi-Dawson (2009). Hence, an 
investigation of the institutional factors that tend to undermine Ghana’s current 
premium quality reputation was prioritized at the workshop as an entry point for this 
thesis. This investigation was carried out in 2010 through a diagnostic study (Chapter 
3).  
1.3 Problem statement 
1.3.1 Problems with production of quality cocoa beans  
In Ghana, “quality cocoa” is defined as cocoa beans that are well fermented; of 
uniform size; and free from broken, smoky, and insect damaged beans. Additionally, 
cocoa beans must have a moisture content of maximum 7.5% and be free of foreign 
matters including insects (Mikkelsen, 2010). The first stage towards export of quality 
cocoa beans is the farm, where farmers must continuously enhance the quality of their 
produce and make sure the beans do not fall below certain minimum standards. A 
review of the recent cocoa literature points to a trend of concerns with the quality of 
cocoa beans produced by Ghanaian farmers. For instance, Laven et al. (2007) posits 
that average quality of cocoa beans produced in Ghana seems to have suffered a slight 
decline after the introduction of market liberalization policies in 1984. Hainmuller et 
al. (2011) project that about 34% of potential annual crop is lost to insect damage and 
disease. Kolavalli et al. (2012) explain that the problem with the quality of cocoa 
beans at the production level is caused by an increase in the proportion of purple 
beans, arising from poor harvest and post-harvest practices.
4
  
                                                 
4
 Cocoa of good quality has brownish cotyledons. Beans with purple cotyledons are called purple 
beans.  
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License cocoa buying companies (LBCs) therefore have to select good quality 
cocoa beans from the bulk purchased from farmers at their own cost before they can be 
sold up the supply chain. Williams (2009) indicates that rejection of low quality cocoa 
beans for the export market is common after the purchase from farmers. According to 
Osei (2007) there is a need to develop mechanisms against the rising cost of bean 
rejection and the overall quality control in Ghana. In Chapter 3 of this thesis, it is 
pointed out that, among other things, institutional factors, especially the organization 
of the cocoa market, give rise to a situation where farmers have more information 
about their production activities and hence the quality of their cocoa beans than LBCs. 
This asymmetric information problem arises because LBCs are typically unable to 
distinguish between farmers in terms of the grade of cocoa beans they supply. It 
explains why cocoa beans of all quality grades receive the same price from LBCs. The 
absence of pay-for-quality pricing, however, lowers the motivation of farmers to 
enhance the quality of their cocoa beans beyond current levels.   
1.3.2 Theoretical perspectives 
Institutions and asymmetric information  
Under information asymmetry, average quality of produce declines. According to 
Akerlof (1970), institutions arise to counteract the negative effect of asymmetric 
information. By reducing the uncertainty surrounding technology use, costs of 
transactions and safeguarding property rights, institutions provide incentives for 
economic agents to behave in certain ways which are beneficial to them (Klein, 1996, 
Williamson, 2000). For instance institutions either lead buyers to directly obtain 
information or induce farmers to provide the information by themselves. This thesis 
draws on the New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to analyse how institutions 
can address the problem of asymmetric information in the cocoa sector of Ghana.  
The NIE framework operates at two levels of analysis: macro and micro. 
Institutions that operate at the macro level form the institutional environment (Menard 
and Shirley, 2005). The institutional environment encompasses a variety of concepts. 
Aspects of the institutional environment in agriculture include public quality 
standards, policies, governing organizations, extension structures, social networks, and 
the general legal and regulatory framework. At the institutional environment level, this 
thesis analyses the impact of extension approaches and the rules governing cocoa 
pricing on farmers’ motivation to enhance the quality of their cocoa beans. At the 
micro level, NIE identifies specific institutions that govern the relationships among 
transacting agents (governance structures). Asymmetric information between buyers 
and farmers is a major source of transactions costs in agricultural markets. This is 
because when faced with asymmetric information, buyers and farmers have to spend 
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extra resources to distinguish opportunistic from non-opportunistic behaviour ex ante 
(Williamson, 1979). Economic agents therefore select governance structures that best 
minimizes their transactions cost.  
Three categories of governance structures are discussed by Eaton et al. (2008) 
based on whether interactions among economic agents are governed solely by prices, 
authority (through integration of separate economic agents into a firm or organization), 
or a hybrid of both. First, spot markets that involve one-off trading between parties 
who are unknown to each other. Here price is the main governance mechanism. 
Second, hierarchies where up-chain actors vertically integrate with producers are 
identified. In hierarchies, the main governance mechanism is the use of authority. The 
third form of governance structure is the hybrid arrangement, which combines 
elements of both price and  authority to coordinate interactions among agents (Eaton et 
al., 2008). In this thesis, two distinct governance structures are examined with respect 
to the incentives they provide for farmers to enhance the production of quality cocoa 
beans. One is certification, which is an example of a hybrid governance structure, and 
the other is price differentiation with a test-cum-fee option, which is more close to 
price governance. 
Farmer education institutions  
Farmers’ knowledge about agricultural technology has been associated with adoption 
(Conley and Udry, 2010). However, there is debate about the best approach to improve 
farmer knowledge. A spectrum of farmer training methods that range from “top-down” 
technology transfer to more participatory approaches have been discussed in the 
literature (Black, 2000). The technology transfer approach has been criticized for not 
being demand driven and hence failing to meet the needs and opportunities of farmers. 
Also, the indigenous knowledge, skills and adaptive capacities of farmers are ignored 
in the development and transfer of technologies under this approach. Recent discourse 
on extension assumes that farmers learn better if they are involved in the creation of 
knowledge. Hence, participatory technology development methods that are inclusive 
and demand-driven have been demonstrated to have positive impacts on farmers’ 
knowledge (Dalton et al., 2011). 
Cocoa extension in Ghana has evolved from a state-run structure that focused 
on commodity development and service delivery to a public-private sponsored system 
that concentrates on assisting farmers to develop business models while learning about 
recommended technologies (Laven, 2010). In spite of the change in the management 
structure and focus, cocoa extension methodology in Ghana is still based on the much 
linear technology transfer approach. Farmers are still considered as mere end users of 
technology instead of co-creators. A number of studies have showed that cocoa 
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9 
farmers in Ghana accumulate more knowledge and adopt yield-enhancing technologies 
faster if they learn through more participatory methods (Dormon, 2006). One issue that 
is inadequately addressed in the literature is whether participatory methods also 
encourage similar or higher rates of adoption of quality-enhancing technologies than 
the current technology transfer extension approach. This issue is particularly 
interesting given the current organization of the cocoa market, in which farmers 
receive the same price for all quality of cocoa.  
Mechanism design theory 
The challenge for policy makers and cocoa buyers is deciding on what governance 
structures can address the asymmetric information problem and thus motivate farmers 
to increase the effort they apply to enhance the production of quality cocoa beans. 
Mechanism design theory provides insights on how to overcome this challenge 
(Hurwicz, 1973; Maskin, 2008; Myerson, 2008). The idea of mechanism design theory 
is that since policy makers or cocoa buyers are not able to match different bean quality 
characteristics to specific farmers, they can nudge them to reveal their private 
information by offering them a “menu” of trading options. The purpose of the menu is 
to attract farmers with different bean qualities to sell their produce under different 
trade arrangements. For instance, Ghana accepts two quality grades of cocoa beans, 
Grade I and Grade II. The theory suggests that policy makers and buyers can design 
alternative market arrangements for these grades. The challenge is to ensure that each 
farmer benefits by selecting the appropriate market outlet for his or her produce 
(Hurwicz, 1973; Maskin, 2008; Myerson, 2008). 
Economists have proposed two categories of governance structures that can 
shape the interaction between farmers and buyers to address the asymmetric 
information problem. One is that buyers may try to sort farmers or their produce into 
different quality grades by using a screening device before purchase (Stiglitz, 1975). 
Related to agricultural markets, a much discussed screening device is certification or 
labelling (Stiglitz, 1975; Jahn et al., 2005). The second category of governance 
structures comprises self-selection devices. A self-selection device is a pricing scheme 
that combines rewards and punishments in a way that causes the farmer to reveal 
truthful information about the quality of his or her produce to the buyer (Guasch and 
Weiss, 1981; Salop and Salop, 1976). 
Mechanisms of screening: Certification programs 
Evidence from several commodity markets across world the suggests that certification 
is an effective governance structure to resolve problems of asymmetric information 
(Barham and Weber, 2012; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Bolwig et al., 2009; Buehler 
and Schuett, 2012; Dorr and Grote, 2009; Jena et al., 2012; Kleemann and Abdulai, 
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2012). In many Ghanaian communities, farmers can choose between certification and 
the uncertified mainstream market. These two markets are governed differently. Some 
studies have mentioned that Ghanaian farmers organized under certification have 
higher productivity (Gockowski et al., 2013; Kleeman and Abdulai, 2012). Whether 
certification addresses the asymetric information problem and also attracts farmers to 
supply better quality cocoa beans is a subject of debate. It is also unknown how 
certification programs differ from the mainstream market in terms of motivating 
farmers to supply quality produce. Some studies suggest that paying price premia is 
the most effective incentive mechanism of certification programs (Lohr and Park, 
1992; Valkila, 2009). Other studies point to non-price incentive mechanisms, such as 
farmer training, supervision of production, and social control through farmer 
organizations (Dorr and Grote, 2009). The literature on certification however focuses 
on yields and production methods and largely ignores the quality dimension of the 
produce. Specifically, the literature fails to address the issue of which incentive 
mechanisms certification schemes employ to elicit the high level of effort they require 
of smallholder farmers to produce crops of sufficient quality. 
Mechanisms of self-selection: Test-cum-fee pricing 
Hueth et al. (1999) propose that measuring quality before purchasing agricultural 
produce and paying a price based on quality grades may motivate farmers to supply 
good quality cocoa. However, simply testing the quality of cocoa beans and paying 
according to grades may not be sustainable. This is because the cost of the quality tests 
may be too high for the buyer given that farmers will supply both high and low quality 
grades. Self-selection devices or pricing strategies that induce farmers to reveal 
truthful information about themselves (Padilla, 2003). An example of a self-selection 
device is test-cum-fee pricing. A test-cum-fee pricing rule works in a similar way to 
the “carrot and stick” format (Mirrlees, 1997). The buyer offers a higher price for 
better quality grades on condition that farmers pay a fee to have their cocoa beans 
tested. When their cocoa beans are graded as high quality, farmers are paid a price that 
is over and above the test fee; otherwise the fee becomes their cost. In this thesis, the 
response of farmers to a menu of prices with two options, regular producer price and 
test-cum-fee pricing, is analysed in terms of supply of quality cocoa beans.  
Test-cum-fee policies have been found to induce self-selection in the labour 
market sector. Employers willing to attract highly qualified workers sometimes require 
prospective employees to undergo a costly recruitment process. Guasch and Weiss 
(1981) demonstrate that this mechanism discourages disqualified workers from 
applying for jobs (Titman and Trueman, 1986). Similar positive results have been 
found in the educational sector with prospective students who have to bear the cost of 
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writing an entrance exam and/or pay application fees. An important hypothesis of this 
study is that when faced with a price differentiation with a test-cum-fee mechanism 
farmers will have the incentive to supply the best quality cocoa beans, as such 
reducing the cost of upgrading after purchase. There is, however, no empirical 
evidence in the literature to support this hypothesis.  
1.4 Research objectives 
Following the above-mentioned gaps in the theoretical and empirical literature 
discussed in Section 1.3, the overall objective of this study is to gain an insight into 
which institutional mechanisms can provide effective incentives for Ghanaian cocoa 
farmers to enhance the production of quality cocoa beans. Specifically, the following 
research questions are addressed: 
1. to what extent did price-related institutional reforms in Ghana’s cocoa sector 
favour farmers? 
2. which institutional factors constrain smallholders from enhancing the production 
of quality cocoa beans? 
3. how do farmers who learn about quality-enhancing technologies through 
participatory methods differ, in terms of knowledge and patterns of adoption, 
from those who learn through conventional extension? 
4. what are the effects of the incentive mechanisms designed by certification 
programs on farmers’ effort to enhance the quality of cocoa beans they produce? 
and 
5. to what extent will  farmers respond to price differentiation with self-selection in 
terms of supply of quality cocoa beans? 
1.5 Overall approach to the research 
1.5.1 Convergence of science research program  
The research work presented in this thesis forms part of a Dutch-government funded 
inter-disciplinary research programme (2008-2014) called “Convergence of Sciences: 
Strengthening Innovation Systems” (CoS-SIS). CoS-SIS is a follow-up of an earlier 
research programme (2001-2006) “Convergence of Sciences” (CoS), which focused on 
the use of participatory technology development (PTD) to improve smallholder 
livelihoods (van Huis et al., 2007). A major conclusion of the CoS research program 
was that PTD significantly improved farmers livelihoods in specific communities 
(Dormon, 2006). There are, however, institutional factors above the control of farmers 
that hinder opportunities for smallholders to capture the gains of PTD (Hounkonnou et 
al., 2012). CoS-SIS therefore focuses on experimenting with how institutional change 
might open windows of opportunity for farmers to capture the gains of PTD. Inspired 
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by concepts of CoS-SIS, this study proceeded in two-steps: problem identification and 
empirical investigation. 
1.5.2 Methods of problem identification 
During the problem identification stage, two studies were conducted. 
The first, diagnostic study employed time series data ranging from 1960 to 2012 
to investigate the impact of price-related institutional reforms on cocoa producer 
incentives in Ghana. Co-integration and error correction modelling were used in this 
analysis. This study revealed how reforms of the organization that set cocoa producer 
prices in Ghana and also changes of the adopted pricing rule over time improved 
producer incentives (research question 1; Chapter 2). 
Having assessed the importance of institutions for producer incentives at the 
macroeconomic level, the second diagnostic study tried to identify institutional factors 
that act as a disincentive for smallholder farmers to enhance the production of quality 
cocoa beans at farm-level (research question 2; Chapter 3). A multi-stage random 
sampling technique was employed to draw out respondents from farmers, cocoa buyers 
and COCOBOD officials in four agro ecological zones in Ghana for interview. Data 
were obtained from the respondents using focus group discussions, key informant 
interviews, participant observation, and semi-structured questionnaires. The study 
identified three categories of factors which undermine produce incentives: asymmetric 
information, inadequate knowledge of recommended quality-enhancing farm 
technologies, and insufficient incomes. So far, cocoa policies in Ghana did little to 
address these problems, especially the asymmetric information problem.  
1.5.3 Methods of empirical investigation 
The findings of the diagnostic studies were discussed with stakeholders of the cocoa 
sector through workshops, seminars, and one-on-one interactions. Following 
discussions with stakeholders and a systematic review of relevant literature, an 
empirical study was designed to identify the best learning method for improving 
farmer knowledge and adoption, given the existing market conditions where all cocoa 
beans above a minimum quality standard receive the same price (research question 3; 
Chapter 4). 
This study was conducted in the Suhum cocoa district, using a quasi-experiment 
approach. Two sets of farmers were trained in Good Agricultural Practices for 
enhancing cocoa bean quality. One group was trained by with the farmer participatory 
research (FPR) approach, while the other group was under the regime of conventional 
extension methods. The impacts of the two different learning approaches on farmer 
knowledge as well as on the likelihood of actual adoption were estimated through 
Chapter 1 
13 
descriptive statistics and difference-in-difference (DiD) regressions. A salient finding 
of the experiment was that farmer education is necessary but not sufficient to motivate 
producers to enhance the production of quality cocoa beans. In the absence of pay-for-
quality pricing, farmers adopted technologies that improved their yield more than 
those that improved the quality of their produce.  
Two subsequent empirical studies were therefore conducted to experiment with 
how alternative rules and organization of the internal cocoa market may address the 
asymmetric information problem that hampers pay for quality. First, the effect of price 
and non-price incentive mechanisms of certification programs on farmers’ effort to 
enhance quality was investigated (research question 4; Chapter 5). This study was 
carried out in the Oyoko cocoa district of the Eastern Region of Ghana, where an 
organic cocoa certification program runs alongside the mainstream market. Data were 
collected from a sample of 161 certified and 161 independent farmers. The data also 
allowed us to investigate factors that influence farmers’ decision to participate in 
certification. Descriptive statistics involving means and frequencies, as well as 
propensity score matching techniques, were used to analyse the data. Farmers’ 
decision to join certification programmes depend on their preference for more income 
or less effort. Certification schemes pay a higher price to producers in addition to a 
number of non-price mechanisms, such as bean testing before purchase and 
traceability, to elicit higher efforts from farmers. As a result of these mechanisms, 
farmers in certification programmes demonstrated significantly more effort in 
enhancing the quality of their produce than independent farmers. 
The final empirical study tested a governance structure that assumed 
individuality, in an atomistic way, and economic rationality on the part of farmers. 
Over a period of two cocoa seasons, 60 farmers were subjected to a menu of prices 
with two options. In the first option, farmers could sell any quality grade above the 
minimum standard at the regular producer price. In the second option, farmers were 
offered a higher price if their cocoa beans met a certain quality standard. However, 
they were to subject their beans to a fixed pass-fail quality test which required an entry 
fee. The behaviour of farmers under this test-cum-fee pricing mechanism was 
compared to a control group of farmers who were not treated with a menu of prices. 
Farmers exposed to a menu of prices improved the average quality of their produce. 
Furthermore, they selected and improved the quality of a significantly higher 
proportion of their produce and sold it through the test-cum-fee option. This self-
selection behaviour under test-cum-fee implied that cocoa buyers spent less on 
upgrading cocoa beans before onward sales. Hence a price differentiation with test-
cum-fee options presents a win-win opportunity for farmers and buyers to address 
concerns about produce quality at farmgate. 
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1.5.4 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters (Figure 1.4). Chapter 2 chronicles reforms in 
the organization which determines producer prices and how they changed the price-
determination rules since 1960. An assessment of the impact of these price-related 
institutional changes on produce incentives in Ghana is presented. Chapter 3 
identifies salient institutional factors that act as a disincentive for farmers to enhance 
the quality of their cocoa beans. In Chapter 4, the linkage between farmer knowledge 
and adoption is examined. Chapter 5 is dedicated to analyses of certification as an 
alternative market governance structure to address the problem of asymmetric 
information in Ghana’s cocoa sector. The chapter begins with an assessment of 
certification activities in Ghana’s cocoa sector before going on to estimate the impact 
of the specific programme we evaluated. In Chapter 6, the impact of a self-selection 
mechanism (i.e., test-cum-fee) on farmers’ production activities is investigated. This 
analysis is preceded by a test-cum-fee theoretical model. In this chapter, also a 
historical overview of different mechanisms used to motivate farmers to enhance the 
production of quality cocoa beans is presented. Chapter 7 synthesizes the findings of 
the various studies and then distils conclusions and policy implications. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Did the price-related reforms in Ghana’s cocoa sector 
favour farmers?

 
 
2.1 Introduction 
To keep up with the growing global demand for sustainable cocoa, smallholder 
farmers in Ghana need to increase their investments in productivity and quality-
enhancing farm activities (Laven and Boomsma, 2012; Afari-Sefa et al., 2010). 
Farmers are motivated to do so if they expect to be compensated in the future by 
sufficiently high and stable cocoa prices (Hattink et al., 1998; Ashitey, 2012). A higher 
share of the export price and more protection against fluctuations of world prices 
would support investments in sustainable cocoa and also improve the livelihoods of 
smallholders (Greene and Baron, 2001; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010). 
Since World War II, Ghana’s internal cocoa market has been characterized by 
institutional price setting rather than market pricing. The Cocoa Board, or COCOBOD, 
the cocoa governing organization in Ghana, has taken several steps to improve the 
price incentives for smallholder farmers (Acquaah, 1999, Gilbert, 2009). In particular, 
it has implemented a number of producer price-related institutional reforms. These 
reforms covered two aspects: changes in the organization that set producer prices and 
changes in the price setting mechanism or rule itself, that is, in how producer prices 
were calculated (Amoah, 1998; Lundstedt and Pärssinen, 2009; Laven 2010; Kolavalli, 
Vigneri et al., 2012; Laven and Boomsma, 2012). The objective of this chapter is to 
assess whether these reforms have managed to improve the price incentives for 
farmers. Specifically, we study how fast and to what extent world prices have been 
transmitted to Ghanaian farmers, and also compare the stability of the prices they 
received under the different reforms. 
The literature shows mixed and incomplete evidence on the impact of Ghana’s 
price-related reforms of the cocoa sector. Some studies  suggest that producer prices 
were improved over time by the reforms (Laven, 2007; Ton et al., 2008; Vigneri, 
2007). Other studies also find a general increase in cocoa prices and report a positive 
supply response from Ghanaian farmers (Gyimah-Brempong, 1987; Abdulai and 
Reider, 1995). However, based on data from 1970 to 1995, Baffes and Gardner (2003) 
find that farmers did not receive a significant price increase under the general cocoa 
                                                 

 

This chapter is submitted to the International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability as Quarmine, W., 
Haagsma, R., Huis, A.V., Sakyi-Dawson, O., Asante, F. & Obeng-Ofori, D. Did the price-related reforms in 
Ghana’s cocoa sector favour farmers? 
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sector reforms in Ghana. Apart from this inconclusive evidence, there are no studies 
that pay systematic attention to the impact of the various reforms on the level and 
stability of producer prices. This chapter tries to fill this gap by assessing how much 
the specific price-related institutional reforms in the cocoa sector have increased prices 
and price stability and, hence, have contributed to the increase in cocoa production 
during the period 1960-2011. To lay the foundation for this exercise, we first try to 
identify to what extent total cocoa bean supply in Ghana actually responds to the 
producer price farmers expect and to the uncertainty about this expectation as captured 
by the variance of producer prices. This analysis is followed by determining the 
proportion of world prices that was transmitted to cocoa farmers over the years. 
Finally, we compare the price setting regimes with respect to whether they managed to 
stabilize producer prices over time. 
Apart from addressing a gap in the literature, this chapter contributes to a 
growing recent discussion about how to structure incentives for sustainable cocoa 
production in Ghana (Laven and Boomsma, 2012). At the moment of writing, the 
Convergence of Science-Strengthening Innovations Systems (COS-SIS) Research 
Programme is involved in experimentation with innovation platforms. These 
experimental platforms bring together various stakeholders to create institutional 
reforms. In the particular case of Ghanaian cocoa, the COS-SIS platform is interested 
in lobbying for more reforms in the price formulation process (Hounkonnou et al., 
2012; Röling et al., 2012). This chapter also seeks to provide input for the activities of 
this COS-SIS platform. 
In the next session, a brief discussion of the relevant institutional reforms in 
Ghana’s cocoa sector is presented. This is followed by a description of the methods 
employed in this chapter. The findings are then presented, and we round of with a 
discussion of the results and conclusions. 
2.2 Price-Related Institutional Reforms 
Following the economic crises between mid-1970s and early 1980s, the government of 
Ghana instituted a series of liberalization reforms beginning from 1984. As part of the 
reforms, the cocoa sector was reorganized. A number of these reforms were price-
related and involved changes in “who sets prices” and “how prices are set”.  
2.2.1 Reforms of the price-setting organization  
Prior to 1945, producer prices were determined through negotiations between farmer 
cooperatives and multi-national cocoa buying companies (Young et al., 1981). This 
changed when World Wars I and II brought in their wake a number of plummeting 
prices on the international market. Because these price falls were passed on to 
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producer prices, farmers suffered income losses and started upheavals. The British 
colonial governments in West Africa addressed this problem by establishing marketing 
boards. The central objective of marketing boards was to stabilize producers’ incomes. 
In theory, when world prices are unstable, a marketing board is able to save (dis-save) 
during periods of high (low) world prices and in this way can stabilize prices for 
farmers (Cardenas, 1994). 
 
Table 2.1 Summary of price-related institutional changes in Ghana’s cocoa sector, 1960-2011 
Period Objective of 
price policy 
Who sets the price How are prices determined (rules) 
1960-1983 Maximize 
government tax 
revenue 
Mainly COCOBOD CPRICE Mechanism: 
Based on World price, Farmers 
expectations, government revenue 
target etc. 
    
1984-1998 Achieve positive 
real producer 
prices  
Multi-stakeholder 
Producer Price Review 
Committee (PPRC) 
COP Mechanism: 
Estimation of average cost of 
production (COP) and setting price 
to ensure 20% profit margin 
    
1998-2000 Maintain positive 
real producer 
prices  
Multi-stakeholder 
Producer Price Review 
Committee (PPRC) 
Negotiation:  
Farmers negotiate prices with 
PPRC based on previous amounts 
received 
    
2001-2012 Maintain net 
FOB price of 
more than 70% 
Multi-stakeholder 
Producer Price Review 
Committee (PPRC) 
FOB Mechanism: 
Industry costs are deducted from 
net COCOBOD revenue. A 
proportion of the remainder, net 
FOB, is paid to farmers 
 
Since 1947, Ghana’s cocoa sector has been managed by COCOBOD (Laan, 
1987; Alence, 1990; Alence, 2001; Ruf, 2009). One of the central functions of 
COCOBOD was to determine the producer price for farmers. Until 1984, cocoa 
pricing decisions were carried out solely by COCOBOD, though subject to the 
approval of the government (Amoah, 1998). In 1984, as part of national reforms 
initiated after the economic crises, the government decided on using a multi-
stakeholder process and employing a more scientific approach to producer price 
determination. The objective was that producer prices should have a closer relation to 
the costs in the supply chain, and also be at a level that farmers would motivate to 
produce higher volumes of quality cocoa beans. This would further improve their 
livelihoods. The government thus set up a multi-stakeholder platform called Producer 
Price Review Committee (PPRC), which comprised farmer representatives, 
government officials, university scientists, members of the Ministry of Finance and 
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Central Bank, licensed cocoa buyers, hauliers, and COCOBOD. Together they had to 
determine producer prices and the margins of other industry stakeholders like hauliers, 
input suppliers, and licensed buyers. Today, the PPRC is still the legally mandated 
organization that determines minimum producer prices.  
2.2.2 Reforms of the price-setting process  
Since the institution of COCOBOD, there have been three mechanisms of determining 
producer prices. The first mechanism, which lasted until 1984, had producer prices 
mainly set by COCOBOD’s technical staff subject to government approval. Hereafter, 
this approach is referred to as CPRICE. The main objective of this mechanism was to 
set producer prices such that they maximized government tax revenue. Amoah (1998) 
mentions that COCOBOD developed an efficient system of forward sales that could 
guarantee maximum export revenues even if world prices showed high volatility. 
Based on current and expected export revenues, the technical staff of COCOBOD 
could estimate the optimal producer prices that maximized expected tax revenue. The 
key variables in the price setting process were tax revenue targets, world price trend, 
and farmer expectations. A major drawback of this mechanism was that it ignored to 
compensate farmers for changes in macroeconomic conditions such as trends in 
inflation. The real producer price therefore declined and fell below the level required 
to generate a higher supply response (Franco, 1979; Ofosu-Asare, 2011). 
Eventually the CPRICE mechanism turned out to be a failure, largely because it 
discouraged farmers from cocoa production (Koning, 1986). However, during the 
CPRICE period, COCOBOD had developed a good database on cocoa production, 
which could be eventually used to improve the price setting mechanism (Amoah, 
1998). One purpose of the establishment of PPRC in 1984 was to get all the 
stakeholders together in order to apply a more realistic approach to price setting based 
on appropriate data. A technical sub-committee was created within the PPRC to base 
producer prices on estimations of average production costs. Hereafter referred to as 
COP, this mechanism consisted of setting a producer price that compensated for this 
calculated average cost and moreover paid a 20% profit margin. In 1998, some 
stakeholders, especially farmers and licensed buyers, began to kick against the COP 
approach because of its unrealistic assumptions about the cost of production (Kolavalli 
et al (2012).  
The PPRC responded by slowly abandoning the COP mechanism. In the years 
1998 and 1999, the PPRC asked farmers and other stakeholders to negotiate for prices 
and margins on the basis of what they had received in the previous year. Hence the 
negotiations were still based on the COP approach. From the year 2000 onward, the 
new government in Ghana sought to increase the share of the world price farmers 
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received. The PPRC therefore introduced a new price determination mechanism that 
implied the payment of a percentage of the net freight on board (net FOB) price 
COCOBOD received when exporting cocoa. The calculation of the percentage 
involved projecting the gross revenue of COCOBOD and then deducting a number of 
industry-related costs (such as mass spraying of farms for pest and disease control, jute 
sacks, fertilizer fund, scholarship funds, child labour mitigation, anti-smuggling, etc.). 
The calculated percentage of the FOB price paid to the farmer was considered to be 
enough to cover the remaining costs and leave him some profit. The target of the 
PPRC has been to pay up to 70% of the net FOB price as producer price. An important 
difference between the COP and FOB mechanisms is that while the former focused 
directly on the actual costs of farmers, the latter considers all industrial costs and by 
doing so only indirectly deals with the costs of farmers. 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Effect of producer prices on output 
Basic economic theory suggests that cocoa production by farmers should depend 
positively on the producer price they expect and, granting that farmers are risk averse, 
negatively on the variance of the producer price. As a first exercise, we verified this 
implication by estimating a double-logarithmic model where cocoa production in year 
t (Qt) is regressed on current and lagged producer prices    
  , a producer price 
variance (   
 
), and a number of control variables, including the price of maize (  
 ), 
time trend (T) and land area put to cocoa production (   : 
          
        
        
       
      
             (1) 
Here it is assumed that farmers base their price expectation on a certain combination of 
current and previous prices, (i.e,   
 
,     
  ,     
 
). The variance series of the producer 
price were calculated by relating the current and two previous prices to their 
(unweighted) average. Variance variables using more than two time lags in prices did 
not lead to significant outcomes. Current prices were added to the variation formula 
because prices are announced about four months into the season, hence, much of the 
farm investment is done on anticipation of the current price. Since maize is a major 
staple that competes with cocoa for farmers’ labour, the price of maize (  
 ) is 
expected to have a negative relation with cocoa output. Land area under production is 
expected to have a positive relation with output. All prices are in constant US dollars 
per metric ton. Equation (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) methods. 
The main null hypotheses tested here are            and     . 
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2.3.2 Transmission of world price to producer prices 
Having identified how to verify the importance of producer prices for cocoa 
production, we investigate the impact of price-related institutional reforms in Ghana 
on the transmission of world price to producer price. For this, the co-integration and 
error correction approach employed by Baffes and Gardner (2003) was employed. It 
involves three steps. The first step was to investigate whether a long-run relationship 
exists between world price and producer price by specifying the following equation: 
  
         
         
                 (2) 
(also in double-log form). Parameters    and     represent the percentage change in 
producer price     
   resulting from a one percent change in world price    
  , before 
and after the introduction of a specific institutional reform, respectively.     is a 
dummy variable with value 0 if t is a reform year and 1 otherwise. As before, prices 
are expressed in US dollars per metric tonne to eliminate the effects of exchange rate 
(Mundlak and Larson, 1992). The hypothesis of a long-run relationship is tested using 
the Engel and Granger approach. Equation (2) is first estimated with OLS methods. 
The error term series (  ) were generated and subjected to unit root (stationarity) tests 
based on the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) procedure. A stationary error term 
implies that producer prices and world prices have a long-run relationship (Engle and 
Granger, 1987).  
The second step is to employ an error correction model to establish the short-
run relationship between producer and world prices. This involves the introduction of 
lags in equation (2) and imposing the homogeneity restriction:        , on the 
slope parameters (see Hendry et al. (1984)). The implication of this restriction is that 
equation (2) can be transformed to:  
   
      
              
      
             
      
           
     
      
           
      
               (3) 
Parameter    is an estimate of the proportion of a given change in the world price in 
the current year that is transmitted to the current producer price; i.e., the short-run 
effect. Parameter    measures how much of the difference between world and producer 
price (referred to as mark up in this study) in the previous year is transmitted to the 
current producer price.  
The third and final step in the price transmission methodology addresses the 
question: how long does it take for the producer price of cocoa to adjust to a given 
change in world prices within a given time period? Let At be the amount of adjustment 
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that takes place in t years, then the speed of adjustment can be calculated as (see 
Appendix): 
                 
         (4) 
(Note that, because of the dummy variables, the subscript i has either i = 1 or i = 2). 
The closer the estimated parameters,    and   , are to unity, the higher the rate of price 
transmission,   . Equations (2) and (3) were estimated with OLS methods. The 
estimations are carried out in logs so that the parameters can be interpreted in terms of 
percentage changes. Co-integration and error correction methodology requires that all 
variables in a regression have similar properties to avoid spurious regression results. 
Before estimations are conducted, we therefore run Augmented Dickey Fuller tests of 
unit roots on producer and world prices to be sure that they have similar stationarity 
properties. The impact of price-related institutional reforms is captured by introducing 
dummy variables into equations (2) and (3).  
2.3.3 Stability of producer and world prices 
The variability of prices is estimated around the best-fit time trend. This is done by 
estimating the following regression: 
  
                     (5) 
where   
  denotes either world or producer prices. Equation (5) is estimated for both 
world and producer prices. The variance of the model with respect to the time trend, 
∑  
      ⁄ , is used as a measure of the stability in prices over time. If there is no 
significant time trend, the variance is calculated relative to the mean of the prices.  
2.3.4 Sources of data  
Annual world and producer cocoa price data series from 1960 to 2011 are employed 
for the analyses. World cocoa prices were obtained from the International Cocoa 
Organization (ICO) data files and represent an average of the daily price per metric 
tonne of the first three positions on the terminal markets of New York and London. 
Producer prices, which represent the price per metric tonne paid to cocoa farmer by 
COCOBOD captured in US$, were obtained from COCOBOD annual reports. The 
exchange rate employed in this study is the official exchange rates published by the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics publication (IMF-
IFS). Yearly data on land area put to cocoa production is obtained from the database of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAOSTAT). Price of maize is obtained from 
the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Ghana. 
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2.4 Results 
In this section we summarize the econometric results based on equations (2), (3), (4) 
and (5).  
2.4.1 Producer prices and output  
Table 2 details the results of a linear regression analysis of producer price and 
producer price variance on annual cocoa bean output for the period 1970-2011 
(Equation 2). The R-squared statistics reveal that the variables of the regression 
explain about 88.0% of the variation in cocoa output. The regression only slightly 
suffers from autocorrelation (see Durbin Watson statistic). Producer price has a 
significant positive effect on cocoa production and price variation a significant 
negative effect. Other things being equal, a one percent increases in the price of cocoa 
results in a 0.15% increase in the production of cocoa beans. If the variation in prices 
increases by one percent, however, production will be expected to drop by about 
0.01%. The price of maize shows a significant negative sign on cocoa production. 
When the price of maize increases by one percent, farmers are likely to reduce cocoa 
output by about 0.44%. Table 2.2 further confirms a significant positive effect of the 
amount of land put in cocoa.  
 
Table 2.2 Results of regression of producer price on cocoa output, 1970-2011 
 Coefficient t-statistics 
Constant 12.250 11.391 *** 
Producer price 0.1527 2.191 *** 
Producer price lagged one year  0.0211 0.259  
Producer price lagged one years -0.053 -0.854  
Producer price variation -0.012 -1.855 ** 
Price of maize -0.441 -8.305 *** 
Land area 0.126 1.859 ** 
Time trend 0.117 6.237 *** 
 Regression diagnostics 
R-squared 0.878 
Adjusted R-squared 0.852 
F-statistic 33.810 (0.000) 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.498 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
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2.4.2 Transmission of world prices to producers 
A central question of this chapter is: to what extent do producer prices follow world 
prices and does this differ by institutional regime? A first impression is given by 
plotting the time profiles of world and producer prices. Figure 2.1 shows natural 
logarithms of world and producer prices - US$/metric tonne from 1960 to 2011). 
Throughout this period, producer prices have often followed changes in world prices. 
Producer prices have moved closer to world prices particularly since the institution of 
the PPRC in 1984. The correspondence is closer between 2000 and 2011, when the 
PPRC adopted the net FOB approach to price setting, as compared to the periods when 
prices were determined by COP (1984-1999) and CPRICE (1960-1983). 
The relative producer price, i.e., the ratio of producer price and world price, has 
changed for farmers under the various periods of reforms (Figure 2.2). Prior to the 
institution of PPRC in 1984, producer prices as a proportion of world prices dropped 
from 0.65 in 1960 to 0.05 in 1984. The introduction of price-related reforms in 1984 
was a turning point for the position of farmers. The relative producer price rose 
gradually from 0.05 to about 0.71 in 2011. This suggests that the institution of price-
related reforms has improved relative prices from the farmers’ perspective. The kink in 
1980-83 just before the reforms can be attributed to the depreciation of the cedi in 
these years. Whereas the CPRICE period (1960-1983) resulted in a free-fall of farmers 
relative producer price, both the COP and FOB periods altered this trend (Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.1 Time profile producer and world prices in US$ per metric tonnes, 1960-2011 
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Whereas the time profiles in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 suggest a co-movement 
between world and producer prices, co-integration procedures give a more rigorous 
estimation. First, we carried out ADF tests for both price series in logs (Table 2.3). 
Both price series were non-stationary (i.e., they contained unit roots) in their levels, 
but became stationary after first differencing. This means that they both have the same 
statistical properties. Having ascertained this, the long-run relationship between 
producer and world prices was tested with the ADF tool. Three separate regressions 
based on equation (2) are presented in Table 2.4. Model I summarizes the results for 
the pooled sample without imposition of reforms. Model II introduces the major 
institutional reform, viz. the establishment of PPRC. Model III distinguishes between 
the three price-setting mechanisms. From the results of an ADF test on the error term 
of each regression, the null hypothesis of no co-integration (no long-run relationship) 
between world price and producer price is rejected. Hence, before and during the era 
of all the reforms, producer prices have indeed followed world prices, just as 
suggested by Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.2 Time profile of log of relative prices (world price divided by producer price), 
1960-2011 
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Table 2.3 Unit root tests for log of world and producer cocoa bean prices  
 
Variable 
Data in levels  First differenced data  
Conclusion ADF MCV         ADF MCV 
Producer price -1.847 -0.292  -5.897 -2.923 I(1) 
World price -3.084 -2.923  -7.690 -2.922 I(1) 
ADF represents estimated Augmented Dickey Fuller statistic. MCV denotes critical values based on 
MacKinnon (1996) one-tailed p-values. I (1) indicate that the variable being examined becomes 
stationery after first differencing.  
 
Given the long-run relationship between the two prices, the extent of 
transmission from world price to producer price is closely examined on the basis of 
equation (3), using the three different models (Table 2.5). In Model I, where we leave 
out any institutional reform, 33% of the variation in producer prices is explained by 
changes in world prices in the short run. We see that there is significant transmission 
of world prices to producers. A one percent increase in the world price leads to a short-
run improvement of the producer price by 0.54%. The adjustment coefficient reveals 
that 0.25% of the change in the previous year's mark-up (difference between world and 
producer prices) was transmitted to producer prices annually. In addition, within one 
year, producer prices moved closer to world prices at a rate of 65.5%. 
 
Table 2.4 Long-run relationship between world and producer price 
 Period of regression  Regression 
Coefficient 
 (t-value)  
 
Residual (error tem) 
 diagnostics 
Model   R
2
 ADF MCV  
I All data (1960-2011) 0.75668 (11.779)*** 0.730 -3.445 -2.920 I(0) 
II Before PPRC (1960-1983) 0.00029 (4.394)***  
0.55 -3.676 
 
-2.920 
 
I(0) During PPRC (1984-2011) 0.00012 (7.987)*** 
III CPRICE (1960-1983) 0.00011 (4.023)***  
0.58 
 
4.582 
 
-2.920 
 
I(0) COP (1984-1999) 0.00002 (5.378)*** 
FOB (2000-20012) 0.00004 (8.461)*** 
Dependent variable is the log of producer price. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. Results represent ADF test of unit roots on the error term generated from 
Equation (2) with data under different institutional reform periods. MCV denotes critical values based 
on MacKinnon (1996) one-tailed p-values. I (0) indicate that the residual variable do not need 
differencing to become stationery hence the null hypotheses of no long run effect is rejected 
 
In Model II, the short-run price transmission is compared before and during the 
era when PPRC set producer prices. Table 2.5 shows that in both periods, short-run 
price transmission was significant. It can be observed however that the difference in 
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short-run transmission between the two periods was only marginal. A one percent 
increase in world prices resulted in a significant improvement in producer prices by 
0.55% and 0.54% before and after the institution of PPRC, respectively. Adjustment-
coefficient results from Model II show that while 0.25% of the change in the mark-up 
in previous year was passed to farmers annually before PPRC, this increased to 0.28% 
after the establishment of PPRC. Comparing the speed of adjustment estimations in 
Model I, we observe only a slightly faster rate of price transmission in the period under 
PPRC (67.3%) compared to the period before (66.0%). 
 
Table 2.5 Results of Error Correction Model for world and producer cocoa prices under 
different institutional regimes  
 Coefficients  
1 year 
speed of 
adjust- 
ment (At) 
Regression diagnostics 
Constant 
variable 
Adjustment  
variable 
     
      
 
  
Short-run  
variable 
   
      
   
 
 
Adj  
R2 
 
 
DW 
 
F 
Stat 
Model I  
All data  
-0.198 
(2.075)* 
0.250 
(2.667)* 
0.540 
(4.831)* 
0.655  
0.330 
 
1.72 
 
13.3* 
Model II Before 
PPRC  
-0.212 
(-.064)* 
0.249 
(2.523)* 
0.547 
(4.747)* 
0.660 0.303 1.71 6.4* 
During 
PPRC  
0.284 
(2.256)* 
0.543 
(4.454)* 
0.673  
Model III CPRICE  -0.165 
(-.060)* 
0.367 
(2.667)* 
0.071 
(1.742)* 
0.412 0.230 1.77 3.5* 
COP -0.020 
(-1.412) 
0.091 
(2.069)* 
0.073  
FOB  0.561 
(2.098)* 
0.247 
(3.811)* 
0.670  
For each model the dependent variable was the first difference of the producer price in natural 
logarithms    
 
     
 
 . t-values are in parenthesis*, indicates significance at the 5% level. DW 
denotes Durbin Watson statistic.  
Model III summarizes the short-run price transmission under the different price-
setting regimes considered in this chapter. The short-run transmission of world price to 
producers was positive significant under each of the compared price-setting regimes 
(Table 2.5). Short-run transmission was by far the highest under the FOB mechanism. 
Specifically, a one percent increase in world price leads to a significant change in 
producer prices by 0.07%, 0.09%, and 0.25% under the CPRICE, COP, and FOB price 
mechanisms. The adjustment coefficient in Model III reveals that under the CPRICE 
mechanism, about 0.37% of the change in the mark-up in previous year was passed to 
farmers annually. Under the COP mechanism, the adjustment coefficient was not 
significant, indicating that changes in mark-up were not transmitted to farmers. Under 
the FOB mechanism, however, about 0.56% of the change in mark-up was passed to 
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producer prices. Comparison of the one-year adjustment under each regime shows that 
producer prices adjusted faster to world prices under the FOB (67.0%) compared to the 
CPRICE (41.2%) and COP (7.3%) producer price regimes. 
2.4.3 Producer price stability under the different reforms  
Comparing the variances before and after the establishment of PPRC, variations in 
world prices during both periods were higher than variations in producer price (Table 
2.6). Producer prices have been more unstable after the establishment of the PPRC 
than before. Before 1984, producer price variation as a percentage of world price 
variation was 7.1% while during the reform it increased to 24.6%. Thus, with the 
establishment of PPRC more of the world price variation has been passed on to the 
farmer. With regard to reforms in the price-setting mechanism, later regimes 
experienced more stable world prices. Under CPRICE, world price variation reduced 
from 1,065,329 to 258,067 in the period of COP, and further to 159,932 in the FOB 
era. However, producer price variation did not follow this pattern. While the 
proportion of producer and world price variation was only slightly different between 
the CPRICE (7.1%) and COP (6.0%) period, under FOB it was considerably higher 
(65.6%).  
 
Table 2. 6 Variances of world and producer prices 
Periods of institutional reform Variation around trend  
World prices 
(A) 
Producer prices 
(B) 
Proportion  
(B/A) 
 Before PPRC (1960-1983) 1065329.27 75390.90 0.071 
During PPRC (1984-2011) 582227.69 143052.92 0.246 
     
 CPRICE (1960-1983) 1065329.27 75390.90 0.071 
COP (1984-1999) 258066.57 15348.51 0.059 
FOB (2000-20012) 159932.30 104994.30 0.656 
 
2.5 Discussion and conclusions 
The main purpose of this study was to investigate the extent to which institutional 
reforms in Ghana’s cocoa sector influenced the price incentive for farmers during the 
period 1960-2011. The study began with assessing the impact of producer price 
expectations and the related uncertainty about future producer prices on total cocoa 
bean supply. The chapter then probed the transmission of world prices to producer 
prices and the extent to which the latter were stabilized under different institutional 
reforms in Ghana. Two aspects of the institutional reforms were emphasised: changes 
in the price-setting organization and changes in the price-setting mechanism.  
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Consistent with economic theory, cocoa producers in Ghana respond positively 
to producer prices and negatively to price instability. Earlier studies, which used 
somewhat different methods to estimate price elasticities of supply, also found positive 
relations between prices and cocoa output over the years (Gyimah-Brempong, 1987; 
Abdulai and Reider, 1995). We have contributed to the discourse on supply response 
by capturing and demonstrating the importance of producer price uncertainty to 
production. 
With the introduction of various reforms, the fall in producer price as a 
proportion of world price was not only halted but turned into an upward trend in 
1983/4. Relative prices have subsequently increased above the 1960 position. The 
reforms led not only to higher producer prices, but also a faster rate of transmission of 
world prices to producers. These findings are in line with the results from other 
countries where agrarian reforms have been implemented (Krivonos 2004; Mundlak 
and Larson 1992). In this chapter we have contributed to the literature by applying the 
techniques of Baffes and Gardner to a longer time series and found significant impact 
of the reforms on producer prices contrary to their earlier findings of no impact. 
Furthermore, this study has made a distinction between the effects of different pricing 
rules on producer prices (Mundlak and Larson, 1992; Baffes and Gardner, 2003; 
Krivonos, 2004). 
The rather positive impact of the establishment of the PPRC on producer prices 
as compared to the period before the reform can be explained, first, by the greater 
transparency of the price setting process. Compared to the period before the reform 
(also termed CPRICE), farmers were more involved in the process and so could 
negotiate for better prices. Second, the price setting process could be based on more 
realistic assumptions because of the availability of a richer data set collected at an 
earlier stage (Amoah, 1998). Third, the PPRC was introduced at a time when the 
government had decided to improve and stabilize the producer price in terms of US 
dollars, so that, given the then upward trend in world prices (in US$), it was easy for 
the PPRC to recommend higher producer prices (in cedis, which had a constant 
decreasing value against the US$). A final reason is that the introduction of the PPRC 
coincided with reorganizations of the management and operation of COCOBOD. 
Some of the subsidiaries of COCOBOD had been shut down, the staff size had been 
cut, and input sale as well as bean trading responsibilities of COCOBOD had been 
reduced (Essegbe and Ofori-Gyamfi, 2012). This meant that COCOBOD transactions 
costs had declined over time and so more of the world price could be passed on to 
farmers.  
Comparing the impacts of the three different price-setting mechanisms, we 
think that the lack of a statistically significant price transmission under the COP 
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regime must be explained by the rigidity in the price setting process. By adopting a 
price rule where producer prices were based on production costs, producer prices 
became disconnected from developments in world prices. The pricing rule seems in 
contradiction with the objective of PPRC to pay higher prices to farmers. The latter 
were frustrated that higher world prices could not improve their livelihoods anymore, 
which explains the agitation of farmers against the COP regime. 
Our evaluation of the net FOB pricing mechanism suggests a win-win situation 
for both COCOBOD and farmers. Under the FOB regime, the transmission of world 
prices to producer prices was largest. A probable explanation lies in the flexible 
method of price setting and in political factors. Farmers received both compensation 
for some costs of production (albeit indirectly) and a proportion of the world price, 
without compromising COCOBOD’s revenue expectations. Moreover, the PPRC was 
often pressured politically to transmit larger shares of the net FOB price to producer 
prices (Kolavalli et al., 2012). At present, some studies suggest that farmers do not 
have enough political clout to countervail COCOBOD current prices (Anang et al., 
2011; Lundstedt and Pärssinen, 2009). However, historically, cocoa farmers have 
always been a delicate group for politicians to manage due to the welfare 
consequences of cocoa prices for millions of rural households (Milburn, 1970; Ton et 
al., 2008). In the colonial era farmers had boycotted the sale of cocoa beans. In the 
more recent times they ignored the cocoa farms. Eventually successive governments, 
recognizing the influence of cocoa farmers, often urged the PPRC to pass more of the 
net FOB price to farmers.  
This impressive price transmission has, however, occurred at the expense of 
price stability. As has been demonstrated in this chapter, throughout the study period, 
producer prices were more stable than world prices. Nevertheless, the establishment of 
the PPRC did not lead to better price stabilization. We have indicated that producer 
price variation has been largest under the FOB, as compared with the COP and 
CPRICE regimes. While higher producer prices present an opportunity for small 
farmers to increase investments, unstable prices thwart planning, make investments 
more risky and, hence, discourage expanding production. This ultimately means that 
farmers lose the opportunity to improve their incomes (Duncan, 1991; Rezitis and 
Stavropoulos, 2012; Robison and Barry, 1987). 
These findings question the effectiveness of COCOBOD’s price stabilization 
policy, which is to sell cocoa beans in forward markets in order to protect producers 
from world price fluctuations (Gilbert, 2009). The stability of producer prices under 
FOB has been the weakest, again because of the focus of the pricing rule on changes in 
world prices. The transmission of a larger proportion of the world price comes along 
with more uncertainty. Note, however, that the estimated elasticity of producer price is 
Price-related institutional reforms and producer incentives 
32 
 
higher than the relatively small elasticity of price variation (Table 2). It suggests that 
the shortcomings of the price stabilization policy under the FOB regime did not have 
so much consequence for cocoa production as it might have had for the stability of 
farmer incomes and livelihoods. 
We have shown that expected prices and the uncertainty about them are 
important determinants of farmer output. Institutions, viz. price-setting organizations 
and their policy rules are important for meeting farmer expectations of stable prices. 
Also, in an agricultural sector where prices are not competitively set on the open 
market, a transparent multi-stakeholder price-determining organization is better suited 
at setting prices that provide incentives for investment in sustainable production. The 
more flexible FOB approach adopted by the PPRC presents a better mechanism for 
cocoa price determination in Ghana compared to the rigid rule of the COP method. 
The positive impacts of the FOB approach are re-enforced by the multi-stakeholder 
price-setting environment. Farmers are able to negotiate for better prices depending on 
world price trends, having in mind that some of their production costs will be 
compensated for. This, added to the minimum stabilization farmers receive from 
forward sales of cocoa, has motivated higher production since the reforms. One issue 
which requires the attention of policy makers and further research is the trade-off 
between higher producer prices and stable prices which has been identified in this 
chapter. Price-related reforms were partly based on liberalization policies. With the 
liberalization of the market, farmers have received better prices as expected, but their 
need for protection against the price fluctuations on the world market has probably 
grown. 
This far, we have observed that producer price changes depend on trends in 
world prices. With the introduction of the FOB pricing rule, producer prices have also 
depended on the level and stability of industry costs. If producers are to continue 
receiving a higher proportion of FOB price, industry costs needs to decline. Questions 
about the determinants of industry costs and their impact on the cocoa sector therefore 
require further investigation. This is one of the important issues which the Cocoa 
Domain of CoS-SIS has been addressing since 2009. For instance, the mass spraying 
component of industry cost has been investigated by the CoS-SIS cocoa CIG platform. 
The platform has proceeded to engage with several industry stakeholders for further 
institutional reforms in the management of mass spraying and other industry costs in 
the interest of smallholder farmers (Adu-Acheampong 2010). These activities of the 
CoS-CIG cocoa CIG are likely to lead to further reforms in the producer pricing rules 
and potentially to improvements in smallholder livelihoods. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Incentives for cocoa bean production in Ghana – 
Does quality matter?

 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Cocoa beans exported from Ghana attract a substantive quality premium compared to 
cocoa from other countries (Jano and Mainville, 2007; Wahyudi, 2008). These quality 
premia partly explain the high revenue Ghana earns from cocoa, totalling about 30% 
of Ghana’s total export revenue and about four percent of GDP1. Ghana’s status as a 
supplier of premium quality cocoa is a result of strict post-production quality control 
measures (Williams, 2009). The volume of high-quality beans can further be increased 
if farmers would be motivated to enhance the quality of harvested cocoa beans (Kotey 
et al., 2008; Kpodo, 2006; Laven, 2007; Osei, 2007). 
The question is why cocoa farms in Ghana do not reach their full yield and 
quality potential. It is thought that institutional factors hinder farmers’ incentives to 
enhance the quality of the cocoa beans they produce (Dormon and Sakyi-Dawson, 
2009). The Convergence of Science – Strengthening Innovation Systems (CoS-SIS) 
research programme, of which this study forms part, proposes to tackle the quality 
concern in Ghana’s cocoa sector through experimenting with institutional change 
(Geels, 2002, 2004; Hounkonnou et al., 2009; Kemp et al., 1998; Rip and Kemp, 
1998). The CoS-SIS approach involves identification and facilitation of institutional 
changes that might provide incentives for Ghanaian cocoa farmers to enhance the 
quality of the cocoa beans they produce. Quality cocoa here refers to cocoa that is well 
fermented, dried, and free from disease, contamination and other physical defects.  
Because the kinds of change that might achieve this quality objective are 
complex and cannot be known in advance, industry stakeholders acting together in a 
Concertation and Innovation Group (CIG) have been convened to identify, develop 
and implement institutional experiments to discover which options work best. In the 
cocoa domain, the success or otherwise of the CoS-SIS approach will depend on how 
thoroughly the issue of farmers’ incentives to enhance cocoa bean quality is 
understood. This chapter is based on a diagnostic study of the institutional factors that 
                                                 

This chapter is published as Quarmine, W., Haagsma, R., Sakyi-Dawson, O., Asante, F., van Huis, A., & 
Obeng-Ofori, D. (2012). Incentives for cocoa bean production in Ghana: Does quality matter? NJAS - 
Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences, 60-63(60-63), 7-14 
1
 Bank of Ghana Annual Report, 2009 
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have been identified as constraining farmers’ practices to enhance the production of 
quality cocoa beans. Other studies that analyse the cocoa sector of Ghana from an 
institutional point of view do not pay much attention to the incentive structures which 
might motivate smallholder farmers to enhance the production of quality cocoa beans 
(Abenyega and Gockowski, 2003; Asenso-Okyere, 1990; Baah, 2008; Bateman et al., 
1990; Takane, 2000). 
The objective of this chapter is to identify the institutional factors that act as a 
disincentive to farmers to enhance the quality of their cocoa beans. Specifically, the 
chapter addresses four issues: (1) How do the key actors of Ghana’s cocoa sector 
define quality? (2) What is the state of cocoa bean quality in Ghana? (3) What are the 
institutional and socio-technical reasons underlying the cocoa bean quality problem? 
and (4) What institutional or policy alternatives are likely to address the quality 
problem in the cocoa sector in Ghana?  
The study was based on two assumptions: (1) the quality of cocoa beans 
produced and exported from Ghana depends on the actions and interactions of all the 
actors in the cocoa sector; and (2) institutions shape the incentives for these actions 
and interactions (Woodhill, 2008). Institutions are “...the set of common habits, 
routines, established practices, rules or laws that regulate the relations and interactions 
between individuals and groups” (Edquist and Johnson, 1997; Hall et al., 2006). 
Actors in this study refer mainly to those individuals or organizations involved with 
the physical handling of cocoa beans from production to export. They include farmers, 
Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) which buy cocoa beans from farmers on behalf 
of the third-party actor, and the Cocoa Board (COCOBOD). The latter is a parastatal 
that governs the industry and also handles all cocoa bean exports. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Study context 
CoS-SIS selected the cocoa sector as one of its research domains because of this 
sector’s importance to the national economy. Problem identification for the cocoa 
domain of CoS-SIS programme was carried out in three phases. Firstly, a scoping 
study was conducted which identified the main concerns in the cocoa sector of Ghana 
(Dormon and Sakyi-Dawson, 2009). Secondly, stakeholder workshops were held 
throughout the cocoa belt to identify and prioritise the possibly inadequate incentives 
for farmers to enhance quality. This chapter relates to the third phase, and reports the 
findings of a follow-up diagnostic study of the prioritised problem. The analysis is 
conducted mainly from the perspective of the cocoa farmer. Such a perspective is 
appropriate since it is the farmers’ response to any institutional improvement that is 
likely to enhance the quantity and quality performance of the sector. 
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3.2.2 Sampling procedures 
The study was carried out from June to September 2010, comprising 38 ‘cocoa 
districts’ that coincide with the administrative districts of Ghana as indicated in Figure 
1.1 (See Chapter 1). Data were collected at three levels of aggregation: village, district, 
and national level. Multi-stage cluster sampling was employed to select respondents at 
the village and ‘cocoa district’ levels. At the village level, data were collected from 
farmers and the purchasing clerks of the LBCs. At the district level, data were obtained 
from the staff of Quality Control Company, Cocoa Extension Coordinators of 
COCOBOD, and District Officers of the LBCs. Convenience sampling was used to 
select one key informant from each relevant organization at the national level, 
including COCOBOD, cocoa processors, and input companies.  
In order to select respondents from village and district level, the 38 districts 
were clustered into four cocoa agro-ecological zones, based on the assumption that 
climatic factors may affect cocoa bean quality (Oluyole, 2010). One cocoa district was 
selected randomly from each zone: Assin Foso from the coastal savannah, Suhum 
from the deciduous rain forest, Wassa Akropong from the rain forest, and Dormaa 
Ahenkro from the transitional zone. Next, simple random sampling techniques were 
used to select three cocoa-growing villages from a list of villages in each of the four 
districts. Nkranfuom, Ayitey, and Wura Kesse were selected from the Assin Foso 
district; Anum Asuogya, Duodukrom, and Kuano from the Suhum District; 
Nkrankwanta, Esikesu, and Diabaa from the Dormaa Ahenkro District; and Bogoso, 
Donkor Krom, and Oppong Valley from the Wassa Akropong District (Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1 Sampled districts and villages 
Ecological zone District Villages 
Coastal savannah Assin Foso Nkranfuom, Ayitey, Wurakese 
Deciduous rain forest Suhum Asuogya, Duodukrom, Kuano 
Rain forest Wassa Akropong Oppong Valley, Bogoso, Donkorkrom 
Transitional zone Dormaa Ahenkro Essikeso, Diabaa, Nkrankwanta 
Source: Field data 2010/2011 
A two-stage sampling procedure was used to select farmers in each village. In 
the first round, five cocoa farmers were purposively selected in each village and 
invited to participate in focus group discussions. They were selected because of their 
general knowledge of the sampled communities, and helped us to draw up a tentative 
list of cocoa farmers in the village. In the second round of sampling, 10 cocoa farmers 
were randomly selected from each village using this tentative list as sampling frame, 
making a total sample of 120 farmers. In addition, in each village, further information 
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was obtained from two purchasing clerks of LBCs and two members of the 
government’s mass cocoa spraying gangs.  
3.2.3 Data collection and analytical procedures 
A semi-structured questionnaire was used to collect data from the 120 farmers. A 
checklist was used to guide the focus group discussions and key informant interviews 
with the institutional actors. Further information was obtained from desk review of 
official documents from COCOBOD. Descriptive statistics involving frequencies and 
percentages and content-analyses were used to analyse quantitative and qualitative 
data, respectively. Quantitative data was analysed using SPSS. The socio-technical 
root system tool was used to analyse the technical and institutional causes of poor 
cocoa bean quality. This tool helped us first to identify the central problem and then to 
provide biological or technical explanations for the problem, before going on to 
unravel the institutional cause of the technical reasons identified (Leeuwis, 2004).  
Findings from the diagnostic study were further validated during meetings of 
the Cocoa Concertation and Innovation Group (CIG). Key findings were presented at a 
meeting of the CIG where participants made their input into the study. This meeting 
was attended by representatives from Quality Control Company, Ghana Standards 
Board, Cocoa Inputs Company, Kuapa Kokoo (LBC), Cocoa Research Institute of 
Ghana (CRIG), University of Ghana, and the Ministry of Finance.  
3.3 Findings and Analyses 
3.3.1 Definition and perceptions of cocoa bean quality 
The international cocoa market defines quality in four main ways, as applied and 
certified in exporter-buyer contracts: (1) physical quality; (2) bio-chemical quality; (3) 
process quality; and (4) origin quality (Asuming-Brempong et al., 2008; Poulsen et al., 
1996).  
Physical quality relates to the moisture content, disease infestation, 
defectiveness of beans, mouldiness, and the presence of foreign matter (Dand, 1999; 
Sukha, 2003). Both the domestic and the international market enforce physical quality 
standards because it is easier to assess prior to export. COCOBOD sets and enforces 
minimum physical quality standards that are higher than the international market 
standards. These higher standards are imposed because of the likelihood of cocoa 
beans to deteriorate in transit from farms to the final market destination. By Ghanaian 
standards, a bag of cocoa beans is graded Grade I cocoa if it is well fermented, has up 
to 7.5% moisture content and not more than 3% of cocoa beans with any of the other 
defects. Grade II cocoa is comparable with premium quality standards worldwide. It 
tolerates 4-8% of cocoa beans with any of the other defects, in addition to good 
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fermentation and up to 8.5% moisture content. Moreover, all cocoa bags must contain 
cocoa beans of uniform size. While all other actors in Ghana’s cocoa sector have 
accepted the physical quality standards of the COCOBOD, the farmers interviewed 
were generally unaware of these specific standards.  
Bio-Chemical quality focuses on butter content, flavour chemicals, heavy 
metals, poisons, and the level of chemical residues left on the bean (Gilmour, 2009). 
Ghana is known for the production of cocoa beans of a high chemical quality. 
Recently, however, concerns have been raised about the chemical residues on its 
beans. On two occasions, cocoa beans from Ghana have been rejected from Japanese 
and American markets, because they exceeded the minimum chemical residue 
requirements. With the exception of COCOBOD, the parameters of the chemical 
quality standards appear to be unknown to most cocoa actors. Nevertheless, key 
informant interviews revealed that COCOBOD acknowledges the importance of 
chemical quality and has taken steps to control chemical usage in the cocoa sector. 
COCOBOD is also in the process of setting up laboratories to test for the presence of 
chemical residues on cocoa beans prior to export. 
Process quality refers to the production process of cocoa: whether organic or 
inorganic methods are employed; whether child labour is used; and whether the 
production process and subsequent rewards benefit the farmer and his community (fair 
trade) (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005). The farmers and the LBCs interviewed did not 
consider that process quality was an important component of cocoa bean quality. 
COCOBOD is, however, interested in maintaining Ghana’s good quality image on the 
international market and has taken steps to include process-quality control into its 
policies. For instance, child labour on cocoa farms in Ghana has been minimized. 
Some cocoa districts have been marked as organic cocoa zones, while Kuapa Kokoo 
Ltd has been certified as a fair trade LBC. 
In general, however, the results from the interviews with farmers revealed that 
the majority of the respondents (71%) acknowledged the importance of cocoa bean 
quality to the development of the sector (Table 3.2). Also, all of the LBC staff 
interviewed regarded cocoa bean quality as being important to the sector. This 
perspective of farmers and LBCs is in line with COCOBOD’s vision to “Encourage 
and facilitate the production and processing of premium quality cocoa....”2. 
3.4 State of cocoa bean quality in Ghana 
Given the current area under production, cocoa farms in Ghana have the potential of 
producing up to 1,000,000 MT of premium quality cocoa annually, yet actual 
                                                 
2
 Source: The mission statement of COCOBOD 
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production has not exceeded 750,000 MT (Breisinger et al., 2008). One explanation 
for this is that a great proportion of the cocoa output of farmers suffers from diseases 
and poor handling prior to purchase by LBCs, and are thus regarded as cocoa waste 
(Osei, 2007). National data on cocoa waste are available, but these data do not provide 
the total volume of cocoa going waste on farms because they capture official cocoa 
waste purchased by licensed cocoa waste buyers only in specific parts of the country. 
Yet, information gathered from various editions of COCOBOD’s annual reports 
suggests that cocoa waste as a percentage of annual production has increased from 
about 1.5% in the 1999/00 season to about 7% in the 2008/09 season. Although these 
figures represent official records of cocoa waste purchased in just a few communities, 
there is no reason to expect that these figures will be very different in other 
communities. Therefore, these percentages give a clear indication that farmers can do 
more to increase the volume of quality cocoa beans they sell. 
The study found during key informant interviews with COCOBOD officials and 
LBCs that even the cocoa beans bought by LBCs sometimes failed COCOBOD’s strict 
quality control procedure at district depots. Sometimes bags of cocoa beans fail quality 
tests because the beans are not well dried, not of uniform size, or simply defective. If 
cocoa beans are not well dried, then LBCs are asked to dry the beans to the appropriate 
moisture content. Defective, small, or infested beans are either thrown away or, if 
possible, sold to licensed cocoa waste buyers. 
 
Table 3.2 Percentage of farmers who agree with the statement: “Bean quality is 
important for Ghana’s cocoa sector”. 
 
Suhum 
(n=30) 
Dormaa 
Ahenkro 
(n=30) 
Assin 
Foso 
(n=30) 
Wassa 
Akropong 
(n=30) 
Total 
(N=120) 
Strongly disagree 10.0 3.3 10.0 0.0 5.8 
Disagree 20.0 13.3 20.0 33.3 21.7 
Neutral 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Agree 10.0 46.7 10.0 26.7 23.3 
Strongly agree 60.0 33.3 60.0 40.0 48.3 
Source: Field data 2010/2011 
 
It is reported for instance that in the 2004/05 season, after six weeks of 
purchases, only 15% of all cocoa purchased by the Produce Buying Company (an LBC 
subsidiary of COCOBOD) met minimum quality standards (Kpodo, 2006). In the 
2005/06 and 2006/07 seasons, even less than 10% of the cocoa purchased by LBCs 
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could meet international premium quality standards, because the percentage of cocoa 
beans with purple instead of chocolate colour was too high (Anim-Kwapong et al., 
2007).  
 
Table 3.3 Proportion of light crop and small beans purchased in Ghana, 1999 to 2009 
 Season Main Crop Light Crop Small beans 
1999/2000 87.92 10.50 1.58 
2000/2001 84.27 10.86 4.87 
2001/2002 88.67 10.28 1.05 
2002/2003 76.71 18.83 4.46 
2003/2004 71.15 26.59 2.26 
2004/2005 68.68 28.41 2.90 
2005/2006 70.13 28.25 1.62 
2006/2007 81.07 11.44 7.49 
2007/2008 82.45 9.91 7.64 
2008/2009 98.25 1.58 0.16 
Source: COCOBOD, Unpublished data 
In Table 3.3, data from COCOBOD on the different categories of cocoa beans 
purchased in Ghana are outlined. Main Crop cocoa beans are bigger in size, while 
Light Crop and Small Beans are too small for export. The table shows that over the last 
ten years, at least 10% of the total volume of cocoa beans purchased from farmers 
annually are too small to be exported and are, therefore, sold at a discount to domestic 
manufacturers. The proportion of light crop and small beans was higher between 
2002/03 and 2007/08 averaging 25% per annum. It is unclear what explains the very 
low percentage of light crop and small beans for 2008/09.  
3.5 Main causes of the cocoa bean quality problem 
Figure 3.1 gives a diagrammatic representation of what we think, after analysing 
responses from interviews, are important technical and institutional causes of the 
quality concerns mentioned in the previous section.  
3.5.1 Technical explanation of quality problem 
Our findings suggest that inappropriate pre- and post-harvest activities are the main 
technical cause of the quality problem. Table 3.4 presents the views of the sampled 
farmers on the practices that result in cocoa beans that could not be marketed. Even 
though the choice of  variety of cocoa planted affects the biochemical quality (Dongo 
et al., 2009), only 7% of the farmers thought that the variety of cocoa tree determines 
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the final quality of cocoa beans. Table 3.4 also shows that most farmers acknowledged 
the importance of farm maintenance (95%), appropriate harvesting (89%), good pod 
storage (83%), fermentation (84%), and drying (71%) in enhancing the quality of 
cocoa beans they produced. They explained, however, that carrying out all the 
necessary farm practices required extra costs in terms of time and inputs. It is not 
always possible for farmers to meet these costs because they do not have adequate 
incentive to do so.  
3.5.2 An information problem 
The main reason for this inadequate incentive appears to be that the Ghanaian 
domestic cocoa market suffers from a number of information asymmetries. Farmers 
tend to have more knowledge about the production and post-harvest practices they 
apply, and hence about some aspects of the quality of their cocoa beans prior to sale, 
than LBCs and COCOBOD. At the same time, farmers lack information about 
important aspects of bean quality requirement that is generated and shared at levels far 
above them in the cocoa chain.  
Table 3.4 Percentage of farmers who agree that different practices result in poor bean 
quality 
Farm practices Suhum 
(n=30) 
Dormaa 
(n=30) 
Assin Foso 
 (n=30) 
W. Akropong 
(n=30) 
Total 
(N=120) 
Variety type 6.7 13.3 6.7 0.0 6.7 
Poor farm sanitation 96.6 100.0 83.4 100.0 95.0 
Type of chemicals used 76.7 76.7 46.7 70.0 67.5 
Frequency of harvest 96.6 96.6 76.7 86.7 89.2 
Length of pod storage 90.0 93.3 70.0 80.0 83.3 
Poor pod breaking 93.3 90.0 76.7 100.0 90.0 
Poor fermentation  83.4 90.0 76.7 86.7 84.2 
Inadequate drying 60.0 66.7 90.0 70.0 71.7 
Source: Field data 2010/2011 
The asymmetries persist partly because the LBCs and COCOBOD do not have 
effective mechanisms for monitoring the production process of farmers. High cost of 
monitoring each farmer’s activities could explain the absence of such procedures. The 
only time farmers’ practices are monitored is during the government’s mass spraying 
of cocoa farms, where the supervisors of spraying gangs ensure that farmers have 
carried out their farm maintenance activities, such as weed removal and pruning of 
trees, before the farms are sprayed against insects (capsids) and fungal disease (black 
pod).  
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Figure 3.2 Biological and institutional causes of the sub-optimal quality performance of 
cocoa farmers 
Source: Diagnostic Study, 2010/2011 
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Prior to the 1980s, when cocoa farmers were better organised, the farmers’ 
organizations had rules for monitoring members’ practices. The collapse of the farmer 
organisations throughout the cocoa growing communities arose from political 
interference, poor organization, and mistrust among farmers that increased during 
prolonged periods of political turbulence (Ton et al., 2008). Though there is an 
umbrella cocoa farmers’ organisation, called the Ghana Cocoa Coffee Sheanut 
Farmers Association, the association is active only at national level.  
Another explanation for the observed information asymmetry is that in Ghana’s 
cocoa industry, cocoa beans are not graded prior to purchase by the LBCs. It is only 
after the purchased cocoa beans are bulked, sorted, and evacuated from the farms to 
district depots, that the strict quality control procedures of COCOBOD takes effect. 
Meanwhile, because of high competition among the LBCs for farmers’ beans, LBCs 
buy all the cocoa beans offered to them by farmers and recondition them later through 
drying and sorting. Farmers thus have a high incentive to reduce their costs of 
production by shirking some of the recommended practices. 
3.5.3 A knowledge problem 
From the analyses of the focus group discussions with farmers it was observed that, 
apart from the information asymmetries between farmers and the LBCs, farmers find 
the linkage between COCOBOD policies and cocoa bean quality to be ambiguous. 
Farmers did not receive enough training and feedback on many aspects of quality 
control standards. The merger of the Cocoa Service Division of COCOBOD, which 
was in charge of the dissemination of information, with the Agricultural Extension 
Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (what became known as the 
unified extension system) marked the beginning of the collapse of advisory services to 
cocoa farmers. Extension officers under the unified extension system were not 
sufficiently resourced to carry out their information task (Dormon, 2006).  
COCOBOD has recently partnered with private sector organizations like 
Cadbury Plc. to provide extension services to farmers. It is too early to assess the 
impact on farmer knowledge. However, there is a concern that even with this 
intervention, the farmer-extension worker ratio remains high. For example, at the time 
of this study, none of the Cocoa Offices in the sampled districts had more than seven 
extension agents. This is woefully inadequate, considering that each of these districts 
had no less than 90 cocoa growing villages.  
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Table 3.5 Percentage of farmers who are satisfied with different aspects components 
of COCOBOD’s price policies  
Price policy 
Component 
Suhum 
(n=30) 
Dormaa 
(n=30) 
Assin Foso 
(n=30) 
W. Akropong 
(n=30) 
Total 
(N=120) 
The price (amount)  60.0 83.3 13.3 70.0 61.6 
General price increase 90.0 90.0 76.6 90.0 86.7 
Timing of announcement 13.3 30.0 16.6 10.0 17.5 
Cocoa bonus 70.0 70.0 60.0 80.0 62.5 
Source: Field data 2010/2011 
Most farmers interviewed were generally satisfied with COCOBOD’s price 
policy (as is shown in Table 3.5). Apart from the amount paid per bag of cocoa, the 
expectation of annual price increments gives the farmers the assurance that their 
demands are being recognized even though they were mostly not comfortable with the 
inconsistent timing of price announcement. As part of their price policy, COCOBOD 
insures farmers against world price volatility by selling cocoa in forward markets. 
Windfalls are paid to farmers as bonuses. Farmers do not see the current bonuses paid 
to them as in any way related the quality of their beans.  
3.5.4 An income problem 
A seemingly favourable price policy environment notwithstanding, farmers are faced 
with an income problem that sometimes makes them reluctant to invest into quality-
related activities. It is instructive to illustrate this economic problem confronted by 
farmers by way of a numerical example. In line with the data from our survey and 
other national estimates, suppose an annual output of 250kg per hectare and an annual 
labour requirement of 80 working days per hectare (Abenyega and Gockowski, 2003; 
Opoku-Ameyaw et al., 2010; Teal et al., 2006). Also suppose that, again in agreement 
with what we found, about 40% of this labour requirement is hired at the cost of US$ 
3.57 per day; 10% of this labour requirement comes from non-paid sources like family 
and reciprocal labour; and the remaining 50% is farmers’ own labour.  In the 2010/11 
season, the price per kg of cocoa beans stood at US$ 2.23. Since the government 
provides chemical spraying for crop protection throughout the cocoa belt, the farmer 
pays only for the cost of hired labour. 
Suppose a farmer crops one hectare of cocoa farm. There are three types of 
farmers: those who own their land (owner farmer), tenants, and caretakers. Each of 
them earns the same revenue:  
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The accounting profits – revenue minus explicit costs (out-of-pocket costs) – 
depend on the type of farmer. 
Owner. Since 40% of his labour requirement is hired (i.e. 32 days), we find for 
his accounting profit (AP) 
 
  (     )                                 
 
Tenant Farmer. He is always tied to the Abunu (fifty-fifty share cropping) land 
use contract. His explicit costs include payment for hiring of labour and, under the 
Abunu land use contract, half of his output as rent. Therefore, 
 
  (      )                         ⁄                     
 
Caretaker. He is always contracted under the Abusa land use contract where 
they earn a third of the output. His explicit costs are even larger, since under the Abusa 
land use contract two-third of the output is paid as rent, so 
 
  (         )                  ⁄                    
 
However, the relevant income yardstick is not accounting profit but economic 
profit, which also takes account of implicit costs for farmers. Implicit costs are 
captured by the wage income a farmer could have earned by working on someone 
else’s farm or in another form of employment. Since 50% of the farm labour 
requirement consists of farmers’ own labour, each type of farmer has an implicit cost 
of 
                     
 
Moreover, an owner could also rent out his land, so he has an additional implicit cost 
of 
 
 ⁄                     
 
if he rented his land under the Abunu system, and 
 
 
 ⁄                     
 
under the Abusa system. 
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In sum, if we assume that farmers always have the opportunity to hire 
themselves out or to rent out their own land, then an owner farmer earns an economic 
profit of U$ 21.71 (443.26 - 142.80 - 278.75)  if he would give his land for rent under the 
Abunu system or, in the case of the Abusa system, an economic loss of US$ 71.21 
(443.26 - 142.80 - 371.67) . A tenant farmer earns an economic profit of US$ 21.71 
(164.51 - 142.80) ; whereas a caretaker always make an economic loss of US$ 71.21 
(71.59 – 142.80) The example illustrates the fragile basis of farmers for undertaking 
quality-related investments. Although the assumptions may be oversimplified, it 
illustrates the fact that without adequate price and non-price incentives most farmers, 
who are tenants and caretakers, will be unable to carry out the recommended practices, 
although they may know what these are.  
This constraint arises from the financial losses farmers seem to be making due 
to relatively low revenue compared to other uses of their labour and high cost of 
renting land. Also poor financial services to cocoa farmers, because of the perceived 
high risks associated with lending to farmers, and the absence of alternative sources of 
income during off-season periods affect farmers’ financial position and contribute to 
this income problem.  
Two other key issues can be mentioned that affect the financial position of 
farmers. First, during the interviews and focus group discussions, it emerged that the 
timing of announcement of producer prices was not consistent, and often prices are 
announced too late in the year. Cocoa purchases are halted in June each year. A 
Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC) announces the new prices that will be paid 
at the commencement of cocoa bean purchases between September and October each 
year. Farmers begin harvesting by end of July and sometimes have to sell their cocoa 
beans at the prices of the previous year between July and October due to delays in 
announcement of new prices. This represents a considerable loss of income to them 
since the new prices up till now have always been higher. 
Secondly, rent-seeking activities of competing LBCs affect farmers’ financial 
position. An example is the adjustment of weighing scales in order to obtain more 
cocoa beans from farmers at the going price. Some farmers and LBCs interviewed 
mentioned that there is the so-called “official Accra weight”, which is the Producer 
Price Review Committee’ (PPRC’s) unit of 64kg per bag, and the “village weight” 
used by the LBCs, which varies between 65kg and 70kg per bag. Farmers have not 
been able to negotiate their way out of this unfortunate position, probably because they 
are weakly organised. LBCs argue that the extra revenue accrued from the adjusted 
scales covers the risk they have to bear when they purchase cocoa beans of low quality 
from farmers. 
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3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
3.6.1 Institutions and actor interactions towards quality 
Problems related to commodity quality are often attributed to information asymmetry 
(Akerlof, 1970; Hueth et al., 1999; Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001). The information 
asymmetry problem is easier to understand when one analyzes the interactions among 
the three main sector actors who ensure the movement of cocoa beans from the farm to 
the chocolate manufacturer – Farmers, LBCs and COCOBOD.  Hueth et. al. (1999) 
posit that when incentive problems affect the quality of agricultural commodities, then 
input control, field visits, quality measurement, and general price increases are the best 
institutional mechanisms to coordinate the interaction between actors in order to 
ensure quality (Holmström and Milgrom, 1994; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Two 
interactions seem to be particularly important here: between COCOBOD and farmers, 
and between LBCs and farmers. 
The relation between COCOBOD and farmers can be best described as 
paternalistic. The farmers consider themselves as the recipients of policies, 
technologies and inputs from COCOBOD, and have minimal participation in the 
decision making processes. Because farmers do not supply cocoa beans directly to 
COCOBOD, the latter relies solely on reciprocity by designing a number of benefiting 
policies and hope that farmers will respond by supplying quality cocoa beans. 
COCOBOD regulates all the chemical inputs imported into the country for use on 
cocoa farms even though sometimes, unapproved chemicals have found their way to 
the market for farmers’ use. Also, COCOBOD uses part of the export revenues from 
cocoa to carry out mass-spraying of all cocoa farms in Ghana at least twice per season. 
The mass-spraying exercise has been expanded since the 2008/09 season with the 
introduction of chemical spraying of folial liquid fertilizers, in addition to pesticides 
and fungicides. The mass-spraying policy helps to reduce the information problem 
because the majority of cocoa farms are treated with the right chemical at least once a 
year. However, the chemical application exercise does not effectively tackle the pest 
and diseases aspect of cocoa bean quality because it is calendar-based and not need-
based. It was also observed during this study that the mass-chemical-spraying policy 
faces such challenges as fraudulent diversion of approved chemicals, inefficient 
application techniques by spraying gangs, use of chemical application schedules that 
does not follow COCOBOD recommendation and political interference among others.  
Price policy has been used to coordinate the interactions between COCOBOD 
and farmers. Pricing is used to structure incentives in the cocoa sector because cocoa 
supply responds positively to prices. The PPRC, which has the responsibility of fixing 
cocoa producer prices has problems with making the voices of the farmers heard even 
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though farmers are represented on this committee (Vigneri and Santos, 2008). Farmer 
representatives have indicated that they are sometimes not adequately briefed about 
the methods used to determine prices. Over the years, there have been two modes of 
setting cocoa prices in Ghana. Prior to cocoa sector reforms in the 1990s, the price 
policy involved payment of a price that was equivalent to the estimated cost of 
production plus a profit margin. Presently, the pricing is based on a calculated 
percentage of the freight on board (f.o.b) price that Ghana receives from exporting 
cocoa beans. Even though the PPRC has increased the price paid to cocoa farmers 
from 23.3% of the f.o.b price in 1983/84 to up to 73% in 2008/2009, it is not known 
which of the two modes provides sufficient motivation to farmers to want to enhance 
quality of cocoa beans further. 
Under the current price policy, the information problem in the cocoa sector 
seems difficult to solve. In principle, a combination of testing and price differentiation 
could initiate a self-selection process where farmers would be discouraged to supply 
low-quality beans and encouraged to produce and sell high-quality beans. From the 
perspective of COCOBOD, quality is factored into the pricing formulae since its 
licensed buyers purchase only premium quality cocoa. Furthermore, the two quality 
grades from Ghana are marketable as premium cocoa on the international market. 
Hence, COCOBOD does not seem to have the incentive to differentiate prices as long 
as they can be sure of a sufficient volume of quality beans. It is true that the LBCs may 
have an incentive to differentiate prices in order to increase the volume of quality 
beans they buy from farmers, yet the cocoa marketing rules do not give much room for 
LBCs to implement such a price policy. This is because LBCs do not receive a 
differentiated price from COCOBOD.  
There are other policies introduced by COCOBOD to provide incentives to 
cocoa farmers to improve their production. These include an input credit programme 
(the so-called hi-tech scheme), a 45% fertilizer subsidy, annual scholarship grants for 
about 2,600 children of cocoa farmers and staff of COCOBOD, and flexible house 
mortgage schemes. These policies, however, do not help to reduce the information 
asymmetries in the sector. Also, the majority of farmers are not able to access benefits 
of these policies because they either are smallholders or do not own the cocoa farms 
they crop (sharecroppers). House mortgage schemes are for instance too expensive for 
smallholder sharecroppers. Apart from the fact that only 40% of farmers’ children 
benefit from scholarships, some of the criteria for accessing cocoa scholarships are 
often not favourable for farmers’ children. For example, examination results of 
children in village schools in Ghana, which are attended by farmers’ children, are 
often too poor to meet the pass mark to access cocoa scholarships.  
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Information asymmetry is more persistent in the interaction between farmers 
and LBCs, than between farmers and COCOBOD since farmers supply their beans 
straight to LBCs. Prior to the reforms of the 1990s, only the Produce Buying 
Company, a subsidiary of COCOBOD, purchased cocoa beans. While this monopoly 
had its socio-economic concerns, it was accompanied with a mechanism where 
farmers’ cocoa beans were closely inspected and a premium was paid for quality. This 
partly explains the high quality status Ghana enjoyed in the years preceding the 
reforms. The introduction of more LBCs since the reforms brought a weakening of the 
mechanism for bean quality checks and enforcement in villages. This provided room 
for rent-seeking activities of LBCs and undermined the usefulness of quality premia. 
Presently LBCs have little or no mechanisms to ensure that farmers stick to 
recommended practices. The real concern with farmer-LBC interaction is that LBCs 
are merely profit-seeking agents of COCOBOD. Since the rules regarding marketing 
cocoa beans give the LBCs little room to independently tackle the information 
problem, they have not done much in this regard.  
3.6.2 Institutional gaps and opportunities for future experimentation 
Carrying out a diagnostic study on the institutions governing the interactions in a 
public-interest sector like cocoa is often characterized by difficulties in data 
acquisition. Also, it is difficult to point out some of the shortcomings of the sector 
when Ghana has a high reputation for export of quality beans. These difficulties 
notwithstanding, the study has showed that COCOBOD’s policies have provided some 
incentives to farmers towards enhancing quality, but these policies only partly reduced 
the information asymmetries among cocoa farmers, LBCs, and COCOBOD. This is 
the real reason why some farmers shirk the responsibility of adopting the 
recommended production and postharvest management practices. 
Currently mechanisms that will expose farmers who do not stick to 
recommended practices are simply missing. These gaps in policy represent 
opportunities for institutional change that could help reduce the information problem 
and at the same time provide cocoa farmers remunerative rewards for their activities. 
The original entry point of the COS-SIS cocoa domain research was sustaining the 
quality of cocoa beans produced in Ghana through improvement in the incentive 
structures. This diagnostic study suggests that the appropriate development of self-
selection mechanisms, such as quality testing with price premia at farm gate, could 
overcome the negative impact of the existing information asymmetries in the cocoa 
sector. It is also suggested that future studies take into account the influence of farmer 
organization and networks on member farmers’ production practices.  
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Another possible institutional change is to make the cocoa price policy 
formulation process more transparent and to reduce the ambiguities in the relation 
between pricing and quality. Exploration of the economic, social and quality impacts 
of different modes of pricing can also provide useful insights into price policy options 
to enhance cocoa bean quality. As these sort of institutional changes are above farmer 
level, they should be tackled by activities such as the Concertation and Innovation 
Group (CIG) on cocoa that is convened by the CoS-SIS programme. 
Above farmer-level institutional changes will require evidence and feedback 
from the farmer-level experimentation. Experiments with alternative incentive 
structures for farmers, which could be part of our on-going (PhD) research, could 
provide information about cost-effective strategies for enhancing cocoa bean quality. 
Experimentation will also provide insights on how farmers will respond, in terms of 
quality and quantity, to the introduction of alternative pricing mechanisms into the 
local cocoa market. As demonstrated in this chapter, one missing element in Ghana’s 
cocoa market is a self-selection mechanism (price differentiation with test-cum-fee) at 
farm gate. 
3.6.3 Conclusions  
This chapter reports on the findings of a diagnostic study conducted on the cocoa 
sector in Ghana to investigate which institutional factors act as a disincentive for 
farmers to enhance the quality of cocoa beans. The concept of cocoa bean quality is a 
complex phenomenon, encompassing socio-economic, physical, and bio-chemical 
properties as well as the process of cocoa production. Due to the relative ease of 
observing physical characteristics, both domestic and international markets place 
emphasis on physical quality.  
The study has highlighted the fact that Ghana exports only premium quality 
cocoa beans. However, the volume of high quality beans can further be increased if 
farmers would be motivated to enhance the quality of harvested cocoa beans. The 
study found that sometimes farmers are unable or unwilling to invest resources into 
recommended farm practices because there are often little or no incentives to do so. 
The key explanation of this lack of incentives is that the interaction among 
farmers, LBCs and COCOBOD is characterized by problems of information 
asymmetry. The absence of farm monitoring, grading, and strong farmer organizations 
explain this information problem. Also, farmers are faced with an income problem off-
season that hampers investment of any kind, and the fact that farmers have only little 
knowledge of recommended farm practices and of COCOBOD policies with respect to 
quality further acts as a disincentive. 
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Current policies of COCOBOD have not adequately addressed the problem of 
low incentives, especially in the interaction between farmers and LBCs. This policy 
gap presents an opportunity for socio-economic, biological, and institutional 
experimentation with alternative policies at farmer level and above-farmer level that 
might lead to institutional improvements in the cocoa sector of Ghana. Such 
institutional changes are likely to open windows for farmers to remuneratively 
enhance the quality of the cocoa beans they produce. 
 
 Chapter 4 
 
Farmer participatory research and adoption in 
smallholder Ghanaian cocoa farming 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Consistent export of premium quality cocoa beans has given Ghana an excellent 
reputation in the chocolate and confectionary market. However, sustaining the delivery 
of this premium quality has proven to be a challenge. Ghana’s cocoa governing board 
(COCOBOD) upgrades its quality standards periodically, and expenditure on quality 
control activities has increased by over 35% in the last decade (Amoah, 1998; 
Pinnamang-Tutu and Armah, 2011; Kolavalli et al., 2012). In spite of these efforts, the 
question remains whether at the current production level, farmers can do more to 
enhance the quality of their produce (Adzaho et al., 2010; Williams, 2009; Laven, 
2010).  
Scientists have recommended a number of specific farm and post-harvest 
practices that aim to improve cocoa bean quality, collectively referred to as Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAPs) (Anim-Kwapong et al., 2007; Gilmour, 2009). The rate 
of adoption of the recommended GAPs by Ghanaians farmers is below expectation 
(Aneani F. et al., 2012; Ayenor et al., 2004). Literature suggests that if farmers have 
adequate knowledge about these recommended innovations, they are more likely to 
adopt them (Assis and Mohd, 2011; Erbaugh et al., 2001; Jalal-Ud-Din, 2011; Rogers, 
1995; Shahnaj, 2010; Tripp et al., 2005). It is further argued that a participatory 
approach to innovation development can significantly improve farmers’ knowledge 
and increase the adoption of jointly developed technologies (Biggs, 2007; De Jagger et 
al., 2004; Röling, 2009; Röling and Wagemakers, 1998). Contrary to a linear 
conventional extension (CE) approach, where farmers are only end-users of 
technology, participatory methods allow farmers to contribute their indigenous 
knowledge to the development of new technologies and test and adapt them to their 
own conditions (Bartlett, 2008; Lilja et al., 2011). In this chapter, we evaluate the 
effectiveness of farmer participatory research relative to conventional extension 
methods with respect to increasing the knowledge of farmers about GAPs and the 
likelihood of farmers to adopt these practices. 
Generally, farmer participatory research methods have been found to 
significantly influence farmer knowledge and adoption behaviour (Dalton et al., 2011; 
Daniel et al., 2011, Misisko et al., 2008). Regarding Ghana’s cocoa sector, only a few 
studies have dealt with the impact of participatory research. E.g. Wiredu et al. (2011) 
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found a positive relationship between adoption of recommended practics and 
involvement in participatory research programmes. Braun et al. (2006) and Soniia and 
Asamoah (2011) found that farmers who participated in farmer field schools improved 
their knowledge on cocoa practices and afterwards adopted some innovations they had 
learned. Ayenor et al. (2007) challenged the extent of farmer involvement generated 
by farmer field schools and explored the effectiveness of Local Agricultural Research 
Committees (LARC) (see also Ashby et al., 2000). Here cocoa farmers in an 
experimental learning group are actively engaged in a systematic evaluation of 
alternative innovations on their own fields, and provide feedback to the rest of the 
community. They found that, compared with non-exposed farmers, LARC and 
exposed farmers significantly improved their knowledge, adoption and diffusion of 
technologies.  
Farmers’ participation in agricultural research has not always yielded positive 
adoption results (Bentley, 1994; Hall and Nahdy, 1999). Hounkonnou et al. (2012) 
argued that adoption by participating farmers is usually limited by institutional factors 
that tend to be beyond their control. Dormon et al. (2007) demonstrated that 
institutional bottlenecks prevented participant cocoa farmers in Ghana from adopting 
even the most profitable technologies. 
A peculiar institutional bottleneck in Ghana’s cocoa sector is the organization 
of the cocoa market, where cocoa is not graded when purchased from farmers and, 
hence, all quality grades attract the same price (Quarmine et al., 2012). Economists 
argue that under such market conditions farmers will have little incentive to improve 
the quality of their cocoa beans if that would require more effort from them. 
Sociologists contend, however, that even if market conditions are unfavourable, 
farmers may be willing to adopt quality-improving technologies so long as it suits 
some social objective, such as enhancing their reputation or social status (Leiter and 
Harding, 2004; Long, 2001; Granovetter, 1985). The question which then arises is: 
given that cocoa is not graded when purchased from farmers and sells a uniform price 
for all quality grades, will farmers who have taken part in participatory research 
activities enhance their cocoa bean quality, and if so, why? 
To address this question, we conducted a farmer participatory research (FPR) 
experiment in the Suhum Cocoa District between February 2011 and February 2012, 
where farmers and other stakeholders collectively tried recommended cocoa bean 
quality-enhancing GAPs. The following research issues were addressed: (1) How 
effective are recommended GAPs in improving cocoa bean quality? (2) Do farmers 
learn more about recommended GAPs through participatory methods (FPR) compared 
to conventional extension (CE)? (3) Are farmers who took part in FPR more likely to 
adopt recommended GAPS than those involved in CE training? 
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4.2 Materials and Methods 
4.2.1 Experimental set up 
The FPR experiment was two-tiered. First, we tested the effectiveness of a set of 
GAPs, as recommended by Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana, with respect to their 
ability to enhance cocoa bean quality and their economic desirability in terms of costs 
and benefits. If farmers are to adopt any technology, they need to verify its 
effectiveness for themselves. This was done jointly with farmers on a proportion of 
their own fields in ‘FPR communities’. It involved comparing outcomes (yield and 
quality) from plots managed with GAPs and plots of farms using conventional 
approaches, i.e. Farmers’ Practices (FPs). 
The second tier of the experiment compared the knowledge and bean quality of 
farmers who took part in FPR (FPR farmers) with that of farmers who learned GAPs 
with conventional extension methods (CE farmers). The latter farmers were drawn 
from communities assigned as ‘CE communities’, where conventional extension 
officers were teaching GAPs (but not using participatory learning plots) during the 
FPR experiment. Note that at the start of the FPR experiment, new extension officers 
had been freshly assigned to the various communities after almost a decade of 
breakdown of public extension services in Ghana (Dormon, 2006; Laven, 2010). 
Hence, the CE and FPR farmers were comparable in terms of their exposure to 
extension services. 
4.2.2 Study area 
The research was carried out in the Suhum Cocoa District. The district was selected 
because of its potential for cultivating cocoa with low-external-input technologies. It is 
characterized by a bi-modal rainfall pattern with an average of 1,270 mm to 1,651 mm 
per year, an average daily temperature between 24°C and 29°C, and a relative 
humidity between 87% and 91% (Dormon, 2006).  
4.2.3 Experimentation process  
The FPR experiment began with a series of key informant discussions with officers of 
the Cocoa Extension Unit of the Suhum Cocoa Office. These meetings helped to 
understand the structure of the district and the characteristics of its cocoa communities. 
With the aid of extension officers, ten communities with at least one established 
farmer based organization (FBO) were purposively sampled. The new extension 
officers worked either with already existing FBOs or with FBOs they had initiated 
themselves. Hence, for comparison purposes, we worked with farmers organized in 
FBOs in both FPR and CE communities. Next, a series of meetings were held with the 
selected (new or old) FBOs, where the question of low farmer knowledge was 
Participatory research, farmer knowledge and adoption 
54 
 
discussed. At these meetings, current Farmer Practices (FPs) were identified and also a 
suitable system of quality-enhancing GAPs was constructed, based on ideas from 
farmers, staff and documents from Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG), and the 
literature (see Table 4.1). In the end, six FBOs -- one per community -- were selected 
for the experiment. Five of the FBOs were already established while one of them was 
in the process of formation. They were chosen on the basis of having at least 30 
members who were willing to participate in the experiment. The six selected 
communities were at least 5 km apart to avoid contamination. The ‘FPR communities’ 
selected for the experiment were in the villages Duodukrom, Kuano and Asuogya, 
while the ‘CE communities’ were in the villages Tei Mensah, Tete Kasum and Otwe. 
 In each of the three CE communities farmers learned GAPs through the 
conventional extension system. In this system, extension officers formed or identified 
FBOs and subsequently trained all members during group meetings on GAPs as 
recommended by Ghana’s Cocoa Research Institute. The CE training method also 
included field visits to interact with individual farmers and to address their specific 
technical information needs. 
In each of the three FPR communities, we set up six 90 meter square plots 
reasonably distant from each other. Three of these plots were randomly assigned to 
GAPs and the other three to FPs. The FBO selected the farms where these six plots 
were to be demarcated based on their own internal democratic procedures. The biotic 
characteristics of the 18 plots were similar. Plots were jointly treated and reviewed 
regularly from February 2011 to February 2012 by all stakeholders in the experiment – 
farmers, research scientists, extension officers, and cocoa buyers – under controlled 
experimental conditions. After plot treatments and discussions, farmers were expected 
to try, on their own farm, specific practices that they found useful and maybe wished 
to adopt in the future. Researchers and extension officers took care not to interfere 
with the decisions of farmers to do these try-outs. Regarding our strategy for 
measuring adoption, we did not expect farmers to have fully gone through the adoption 
process over the one-year period of the experiment. However, we assumed that 
farmers would be in the initial stages of such a process when they would try out 
recommended technologies under their own conditions, make adjustments, and bring 
up any issues for discussion at FBO level where other stakeholders could make 
suggestions. The assumption here was, therefore, that the more novel practices a given 
farmer tries out on his/her own field, the more likely this farmer will adopt GAPs in 
the near future. 
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Table 4.1 Description of Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) and Farmer Practices (FPs) 
Treatment Stage Activities 
GAPs Pre-harvest NPK fertilizer; IPM
(i)
; discard all black pods outside 
farm; regularly prune, remove chupons and mistletoes 
monthly; weed four times per season; harvest 
fortnightly, harvest only ripe pods 
  
Post-harvest Two days pod storage, discard all unhealthy beans, 
ferment for seven days with two turnings, dry and 
polish to 8% moisture.  
   
FPs Pre-harvest CODAPEC folia fertilizer only; CODAPEC
(ii)
 spraying 
of insecticide only; leave black pods on the ground on 
farm; prune, remove chupons and mistletoes twice in 
the season; weed twice per season; monthly harvest; 
harvest both ripe and unripe pods  
   
 Post-harvest Four days pod storage; healthy and unhealthy beans 
can be fermented together; at most five days 
fermentation; no strict rule for turning fermentation 
heap; dry to any moisture content of choice 
Notes: (i) Integrated Pest Management (IPM) is, in its simplest form, a control strategy in which a variety of 
biological, chemical, and cultural control practices are combined to give stable long-term pest control (Ramalho, 
1994).  (ii) CODAPEC denotes a cocoa disease and pest management programme that involves mass-spraying of 
all cocoa farms in Ghana at least once in a year.  
 
To evaluate the impact of research participation on farmer knowledge and 
subsequent use of these technologies on their fields, FPR farmers were compared with 
CE farmers. The FPR approach to farmer learning differed significantly from CE 
because it enabled farmers to learn GAPs hands-on in a participatory environment and 
be directly involved in creating the knowledge. Through an interactive process, 
farmers in FBOs, extension officers, research scientists, and cocoa buyers collectively 
discussed, selected, tried and evaluated appropriate technologies that could improve 
yield and crop quality. 
4.2.4 Data from the field survey 
Two sets of data were collected for this study. First, plot-level data from the FPR 
communities were collected. For both GAPs and FPs plots, we recorded quantitative 
information on plot bio-physical characteristics, yields, cocoa pod health, cocoa pod 
counts, and cocoa bean physical quality, and also qualitative information on treatment 
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activities throughout the experiment period. Second, panel data on demography, farm 
practices, knowledge, and cocoa bean quality related to 60 FPR and 60 CE farmers 
were collected using a semi-structured questionnaire before and after the experiment. 
Sampling of the 120 farmers started with clustering the members of each of the six 
FBOs by land use contract of their main cocoa farm. Using simple random techniques, 
six owners, seven abunu, and seven abusa farmers were selected from each FBO.
1
 
Land use contract was used as a clustering criterion because it is likely to influence 
farmer behaviour (Takane, 2000). 
4.2.5 Empirical analyses 
Descriptive statistics, involving means, were used to compare the cocoa bean 
yields and quality scores from FPs and GAPs plots in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of GAPs. To assess the economic desirability of cropping cocoa with 
GAPs, we compared the total profits of GAPs and FPs per hectare, expressed in US$ 
(1 US$ = GH¢1.72 in February 2011). Since we are considering smallholder farmers, 
these profits are unlikely to vary with the number of hectares. For calculating the 
revenues per hectare, the cocoa price was set at US$ 1.86. Total costs per hectare 
related to hired labour time and any chemical inputs used on both fields. Labour costs 
were calculated by using the daily wage of a hired worker (US$ 4.09).  
We measured the difference in knowledge and cocoa bean quality (from own 
plots) between FPR farmers and CE farmers as follows. The active participation of 
farmers in the treatment of experimental plots and the joint review of outcomes with 
other farmers and researchers was expected to increase FPR farmers’ knowledge about 
GAPs more than their CE counterparts. Similarly it was expected that FPR farmers 
would try out more novel practices on their own plots than CE farmers, and so would 
produce a higher bean quality. Factors that could have had confounding effects on 
farmer knowledge and self-produced bean quality were demographic and FBO 
characteristics, so we controlled for them. The change in knowledge (or in bean 
quality) of farmer i after the learning process was modelled as 
∆ Yi = α + βPi + γXi + δZi + µi      (1) 
where ∆Yi is the change in target variable (knowledge score or bean quality score) 
before and after a farmer i participated in the experiment. Pi is a dummy variable, 
being equal to 1 if i was an FPR farmer and 0 if he or she was a CE farmer. Xi and Zi 
represent vectors of personal and FBO characteristics. Coefficients α, β, γ and δ  are 
                                                 
1
 Owners are farmers who own most of the lands they cropped. Abunu farmers are tenants who share 
their produce equally with the owner of the land they cropped. Abusa farmers are hired workers or 
caretakers who are paid a third of the produce from the farm. 
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regression parameters to be estimated; µi is a random error term. Coefficient β captures 
the impact of learning through FPR on outcome variables. We tested the null 
hypothesis, 0  : learning through FPR or through CE does not make any difference 
with respect to what is learned and what is applied on own fields.  
Knowledge scores were obtained by asking farmers a set of thirteen equally 
weighted questions about how to obtain good quality beans and calculating the number 
of correct answers as a percentage of the total number of questions. Bean quality 
scores was measured by taking the proportion of non-defective cocoa beans. Cocoa 
beans ready for sale should not be mouldy, slaty (dark-grey), germinated, purple in 
colour, insect-damaged, decayed, chipped, or too small in size. In addition, quality 
cocoa beans ought to be well fermented and thoroughly dry (Dongo and Sogwa, 2009). 
On monthly basis, a sample was taken from the ready-for-sale beans on each GAPs 
and FPs plots as well as CE and FPR farmers. This monthly sample was divided into 
four lots, and from one, 100 beans were randomly selected without replacement and 
cut into two halves. One half of every cut bean was assessed for defects. The other half 
of each bean was discarded. The number of bad beans (purple cotyledon, slaty or 
black, mouldy, germinated, insect-damaged, cut seed coat, etc.) were counted and 
deducted from 100 to determine the percentage good quality score. The process was 
repeated three times for each farmer and the average is recorded. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Effects of GAPs on Cocoa Yields and Quality 
Concerning the GAPs trials on the plots in the FPR communities, quantities and mean 
cocoa bean quality scores from FPs and GAPs plots are compared in two cropping 
seasons: 2010/11 (February 2011 to June 2011) and 2011/12 (July 2011 to February 
2012) (Table 4.2A). During the 2010/11 cocoa season, when we started the 
experiment, yields from GAPs and FPs plots were 355 KgHa
-1
 and 290 KgHa
-1
, 
respectively. After one calendar year of experimentation, GAPs plots yielded a total 
output of 1104 KgHa
-1
compared with 743 kgha
-1 
on FPs plots. The following cropping 
season (2011/12), yields from GAP plots (749 kgha
-1
) were higher than FPs plots (453 
kgha
-1
). Mean quality scores from FPs plots remained almost constant over the 
experimentation period between 68%, and did not significantly differ from the baseline 
score (Table 4.2A). Mean quality scores from GAPs plots increased from 68% to 85% 
over the experimental period, and differed significantly in both seasons from the FP 
plots with scores of 71%. The main physical quality problem resulted from cocoa 
beans with purple-coloured cotyledons. Cocoa beans that are properly grown, 
harvested, fermented, and dried should give brown-coloured cotyledons instead of 
purple. Other physical defects like slatiness (darkened cotyledons), insect damage, cut 
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bean coats, mouldiness, and germination appeared in less than 3% of the total sample 
for both GAPs and FPs.  
 
Table 4.2A Total yields and mean quality scores from FPR experimental plots 
  GAPs FPs 
Yield (kg ha
-1
) 2010/11 season (Feb. – June 2011) 355 290 
 2011/2012 (July 2011 – Feb. 2012) 749 453 
 Total yield after one calendar year 1104 743 
Average Quality
(1)
   Baseline (Jan. 2011) 68.4 68.6 
 2010/11 season (Feb. – June 2011) 84.9 71.4* 
 2011/2012 (July 2011 – Feb. 2012) 85.2 71.0* 
Notes: (i) Average quality is a score between 0 and 100.  
* Significant (p < 0.05) differences between GAPs and FPs 
 
 
Table 4.2B Yields and mean quality scores from plots in FPR plots and farmers own fields 
Yield (kg ha
-1
)  FPR farmers CE farmers Difference 
 Before experiment 189.4 229.3 39.9 
 After experiment 237.8 246.9 9.1 
 Difference 48.4 17.6 30.8* 
Average Quality  Before experiment 69.9 68.8 1.1 
 After experiment 74.9 70.7 4.2* 
 Difference 5.0 1.9 3.1* 
Notes: (i) Average quality is a score between 0 and 100.  
* Significant (p < 0.05) differences between rows FPR and CE farmers 
 
Comparing profits per hectare of producing cocoa over one calendar year, 
revenues with GAPs were almost double that of FPs, because of higher yields (Table 
4.3). Yet labour costs with GAPs were almost twice as high as those with FPs, and the 
former practices also required large expenditures on chemical inputs. It implies that 
total costs with GAPs were more than two and a half times higher than total costs with 
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FPs. Which production technology provides the highest profits, therefore, critically 
depends on the prevailing price of cocoa, and the actual costs of labour and inputs. 
GAPs imply higher profits if the price of cocoa per kilogramme is greater than US$ 
1.62. At a cocoa price of US$ 1.86, profits per hectare with GAPs were about 8 
percent higher than with FPs (labour and input costs being similar). 
4.3.2 Impact of participating in FPR experiment  
Having evaluated the effectiveness of GAPs, this section compares FPR farmers with 
CE farmers with respect to gains in farmer knowledge, yields and improvements in 
bean quality scores on their own farms. Before comparing knowledge and quality 
scores of the two groups of farmers, we tested whether there existed any significant 
differences between them in terms of demographic and group characteristics. 
4.3.3 Demographic and FBO characteristics of farmers 
Apart from household size, source of non-cocoa farm income, and some FBO 
characteristics, there were no significant differences in the demographic characteristics 
of FPR and CE farmers (see Table 4.5). The majority of FPR farmers obtained their 
main non-cocoa farm income from cultivation of other crops, while CE farmers earned 
additional income from trading (part-time farmers). FPR farmers reported an average 
number of five persons per household, CE farmers eight. The need for inputs 
dominated the reasons why farmers joined FBOs. The majority of FPR farmers wanted 
direct access to inputs, whereas CE farmers joined FBOs to gain access to credit for 
buying farm inputs. At baseline, FPR farmers more frequently reported strong 
cooperation and reciprocity among members of their FBOs than CE farmers. In 
subsequent analyses, we controlled for these differences by including these factors as 
variables in the regression models.  
4.3.4 Impact of FPR on knowledge scores 
Overall knowledge scores improved over time by about 17% for FPR and about 8% 
for CE farmers (Table 4. 6). The significant difference in scores of about 9% can thus 
be attributed to taking part in FPR. Specifically, knowledge scores were obtained on 
pre- and post–harvest activities. With regard to pre-harvest knowledge, FPR farmers 
recorded an additional knowledge score of 20% over the period of the experiment, 
while CE farmers recorded a gain of almost 10%. Taking part in FPR therefore led to a 
significant increase in knowledge score of almost 11%. FPR farmers recorded 
significant improvement in knowledge score for all pre-harvest quality-enhancing 
activities. CE farmers gained significant pre-harvest knowledge scores over time for 
pod health, pest damage, and chemical usage (Table 4.6).  
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Table 4.3 Profits per hectare under GAPs and FPs  
 
 GAPs FPs 
Revenue (US$/ha)    
     Output (kgha
-1
)  1104 743 
     Price of cocoa per kg (US$)  1.86 1.86 
    Total revenue  2053.4 1382.0 
Costs (US$/ha)  
       Pre-harvest labour cost   391.8 165.9 
     Post-harvest labour cost   314.2 201.2 
     Chemical input cost  247.1 0.0 
     Total labour cost   706.0 367.1 
     Total costs   953.1 367.1 
Profits (US$/ha)   1100.3 1014.9 
Note: All values in US$; 1 US$ = GH¢1.72) 
 
Table 4.4Mean farmer knowledge scores on pre-harvest and post-harvest activities before and 
after the FPR experiment 
(i)
 
  FPR farmers CE farmers Difference 
  (N=60) (N=60)  
Pre-harvest Before 54.3 (2.9) 57.1 (2.9) - 2.8 
 After 74.5 (1.5) 66.7 (2.6) 7.8 
 Difference 20.2 (2.4) 9.6 (1.7) 10.6
*
 
Post-harvest Before 65.7 (3.1) 71.0 (3.0) - 5.3 
 After 78.0 (2.6) 76.0 (2.8) 2.0 
 Difference 12.3 (2.3) 5.0 (1.6) 7.3
*
 
All questions Before 59.0 (2.3) 63.0 (2.2) - 4.0 
 After 76.0 (1.4) 70.6 (1.8) 5.4 
 Difference 17.0 (1.8) 7.6 (1.3) 9.4
*
 
Notes: (i) Knowledge score range from 0 to 100. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant differences (p < 0.05) between categories or rows. 
 
For post-harvest activities, the estimated changes in knowledge scores were 
12% and for FPR and 5% for CE farmers, a significant increase in post-harvest 
knowledge of 7% that could be attributed to taking part in FPR (Table 4.4). FPR 
farmers showed significant improvement in knowledge scores for pod breaking and 
management of fermentation heaps. CE farmers recorded a significant increase in 
knowledge scores for number of days of storing cocoa pods (before beans are 
extracted from them) (Table 4.6).  
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Table 4.5 Demographic and FBO characteristics of respondents 
 FPR farmers (n=60) CE farmers (n=60)  Statistics
(i)
 
Gender (%) 
   Male 78.3 70.0 χ2 =1.08 
   Female 21.7 30.0 
Marital status (%) 
   Married 76.7 78.3 χ2 = 0.06 
   Separated 16.7 15.0 
   Never married 6.6 6.7 
Migration status (%) 
   Indigene 46.7 45.0 χ2 = 0.034 
   Migrant 53.3 55.0 
Non-cocoa income (%)    
   Non-cocoa farm 41.1 20.8 χ2 = 9.73* 
   Processing 10.7 9.4 
   Trading 10.7 32.1 
   Formal employment 12.5 15.1 
   Artisan 25.0 22.6 
Reason for joining group (%)   χ2 = 10.26* 
   Input support 36.7 36.7 
   Social network 3.3 0.0 
   Reciprocal labour 6.7 1.7 
   Access to credit 21.7 43.3 
   Learning 31.7 18.3 
Cooperation in FBO (%)   χ2 = 7.40* 
   Weak 21.7 45.0 
   Strong 78.3 55.0 
Reciprocity in FBO (%)
 
  χ2 = 51.87* 
   Low 25.0 84.7 
   High 75.0 15.3 
Age (years) 50.2 47.8 t = 1.02 
Years of formal education 9.5 9.0 t = 0.84 
Household size 5.3 7.5 t = 4.50
* 
Number of cocoa farms 2.3 2.0 t = 1.67 
Cocoa farm size (acres) 4.6 3.8 t = 1.42 
Output (bags) 12.0 10 t = 0.69 
Proportion of cocoa in total income 71.0 72.1 t = 0.34 
Significant differences (p < 0.05) between categories or rows.   
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The results presented in Table 4.4 do not account for the observed differences 
in demographic and FBO characteristics mentioned above. This was remedied by 
running regressions with Difference-in-Difference methods while controlling for 
demographic and group characteristics for the following dependent variables: changes 
in pre-harvest knowledge, post-harvest knowledge, total knowledge, and quality 
(Table 4.7). Regarding changes in knowledge, the coefficient of participation in FPR is 
significant and positive in all three cases, indicating that farmers learn significantly 
more through FPR than through CE. Specifically, learning through FPR increases the 
scores on pre-harvest, post-harvest, and total knowledge scores with 3, 8, and 11 
percent, respectively. 
Knowledge scores also were significantly influenced by the benefits farmers 
expected from their FBOs. Farmers joined FBOs to have access to physical inputs, 
social support, reciprocal labour, or credit facilities. These factors are coded in the 
model as dummy variables with access to inputs as the reference variable. Farmers 
who had joined FBOs in order to have access to credit gained 13% more pre-harvest 
knowledge than farmers who had joined for the purposes of receiving physical inputs. 
Similarly, the farmers who joined their FBOs to have access to credit recorded 6% 
more total knowledge compared to farmer who joined for input support. 
 
Table 4.6 Percentage of respondents who scored correct answers for knowledge questions  
Activities that can  
influence cocoa  
bean quality 
FPR farmers (N=60)  CE farmers (N=60) 
Bef- 
ore 
Aft- 
er 
Chan- 
ge 
Chi sq.  
(χ2)  
 Bef- 
ore 
Aft- 
er 
Chan- 
ge 
Chi sq.  
(χ2)  
Pre-harvest  
 Fertile soils 72 88 17 5.2*  75 73 -2 0.0 
  Farm sanitation 68 83 15 3.7*  85 87 2 0.9 
  Healthy pods 68 98 30 10.2*  53 65 12 5.2* 
  Insect pod damage 40 13 -27 4.0*  50 55 5 6.9* 
  Chemical use 58 100 42 28.3*  52 60 8 2.2 
  Diseases 43 78 35 13.3*  52 70 18 0.1 
  Chemical spraying 30 60 30 64.6*  35 57 22 7.5* 
Post-harvest 
  Frequency of harvest 82 92 10 0.2  73 73 0 0.2 
  Days of pod storage 63 80 17 0.1  73 78 5 3.7* 
  Pod breaking 45 58 13 15.7*  70 73 3 1.1 
  Fermentation process 67 82 15 3.5*  63 72 8 1.0 
  Days of fermentation 72 78 7 0.7  75 83 8 1.1 
* p <0.05 
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4.3.5 Impact of FPR on farmers’ cocoa yields and bean quality scores 
FPR farmers reported a 25% yield increase of their own farms (from 189 kg ha
-1
 to 
238 kg ha
-1
) during the study period significantly more than the 8% reported by CE 
farmers, (229 kg ha
-1
 and 247 kgha
-1
, respectively (Table 4.2B) FPR farmers improved 
their bean quality scores from 70 to 75%, and CE farmers from 69 to 71%, so 3% 
significant improvement can be attributed to taking part in FPR (Table 4.2B). Changes 
in quality scores on their own plots attributed to participation in FPR however did not 
reach the 17% achieved on the experimental FPR plots (Table 4.2A & 4.2B). Finally, 
we regressed the improvement in bean quality scores achieved on one’s own farm on 
whether a farmer participated in FPR, controlling for demographic and group 
characteristic differences (Table 4.7). The results confirm the significant positive 
effect of taking part in FPR on farmer bean quality. 
 
Table 4.7 Parameter estimates of change in knowledge and change in quality regressions 
 Knowledge  
change models
(iii)
 
 Quality  
change model 
Variable  Pre-harvest Post-harvest Total   
Constant time effect 7.8 (1.179) 6.4 (0.948) 7.2 (1.391)  3.7 (2.355) 
FPR participation 3.4 (3.394)* 8.2 (2.042)* 11.2 (3.634)*  2.8 (3.024)* 
Household size  -0.4 (-.627) -0.4 (-0.701) -0.4 (-0.847)  0.1 (0.160)* 
Other economic activity 
(i) 
     
     Farming -1.0 (-0.214) 1.3 (0.275) -0.04 (-0.010)  -0.9 (-0.882) 
     Processing 8.0 (1.310) 3.5 (0.572) 6.1 (1.286)  -0.1 (-0.060) 
     Trading -4.0 (-0.825) 7.4 (1.518) 0.80 (0.206)  -2.0 (-1.783) 
     Artisan 0.8 (0.167) 5.5 (1.166) 2.8 (0.755)  -0.8 (-0.727) 
Reason for joining FBO 
(ii)
      
    Social support 13.1 (1.118) -5.2 (-0.441) 5.4 (0.595)  -2.1 (-0.758) 
    Labour support 1.0 (0.126) -6.4 (-0.823) -2.1 (-0.351)  1.6 (0.903) 
    Credit support 11.5 (3.097)* -1.8 (-0.481) 6.0 (2.049)*  -1.2 (-1.400) 
    Learning 4.5 (1.115) -7.6 (-1.839) -0.5 (-1.63)  -0.6 (-0.607) 
Cooperation in FBO 1.4 (0.433) 0.2 (0.045) 1.0 (0.347)  -0.3 (-0.356) 
Reciprocity in FBO -6.6 (-1.622) 1.2 (0.300) -3.3 (-1.047)  -0.2 (-0.256) 
Regression diagnostics R
2
 = 0.246 
F = 2.722* 
R
2
 = 0.122 
F = 1.163 
R
2
 = 0.224 
F = 2.405* 
 R
2
 = 0.198; 
F = 2.058* 
Notes: (i) Reference variable is “farming”, (ii) Reference variable is “ input support” , (iii) t-statistic in 
parenthesis 
*  p < 0.05 
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4.4 Discussion  
This study reveals that using GAPs can enhance the cocoa bean quality 17% more than 
current practices. Hence, as Quarmine et. al., (2012) and Adzaho et al, (2010) pointed 
out, there is room for farmers to improve the quality of their produce, in particular by 
reducing the proportion of beans with purple cotyledons. In recent years, international 
demands have led to strict requirements about the proportion of purple beans that can 
be tolerated (Kolavalli, et al. 2012). These standards can be met if farmers will protect 
their cocoa pods and beans from pests and diseases; harvest only ripe pods; break the 
pods with care; discard all diseased beans; ferment well; and polish and dry beans to 
appropriate moisture content (Masters, 2000). 
Earlier studies on cocoa bean quality were usually limited to a specific number 
of post-harvest practices (Anim-Kwapong et al., 2006; Anim-Kwapong et al., 2007; 
Dongo and Sogwa, 2009; Gilmour, 2009). This study has extended these studies by 
assessing the effect of an entire set of recommended quality-enhancing practices. We 
have further analysed the profitability of producing quality cocoa beans with GAPs, 
and compared this with the profitability of existing farmer practices. At a cocoa price 
of US$ 1.86 per kilogramme, profits per hectare were with GAPs about 8 percent 
higher than with FPs, just because GAPs yielded higher volumes of cocoa. If cocoa 
prices at the farm gate would be differentiated by quality, the relative profitability of 
using GAPs would even be higher.  
Having evaluated together with farmers the effectiveness of GAPs, we 
compared farmers who took part in the participatory research with farmers who 
learned GAPs through conventional linear extension methods, and found that 
knowledge of the former group was improved more. FPR participants increased their 
knowledge on all pre-harvest farm activities that could enhance cocoa bean quality. 
They also increased knowledge scores on post-harvest activities, such as pod handling 
and fermentation of beans. We can safely say that their advances in learning were 
induced by the active participation of farmers in the frequent collective activities 
regarding treatment, observation, analysis, and discussion of GAPs with other 
stakeholders. Our findings are in line with much of the theoretical and empirical 
literature that suggests that participatory methods of innovation development result in 
significant improvement of farmer knowledge (Biggs, 2007; De Jagger et al., 2004; 
Ton, 2005). However, farmers involved in conventional extension also improved their 
knowledge over the study period. Regarding pre-harvest activities, they learned more 
about pest and disease control, and regarding post- harvest activities, they improved 
their knowledge of pod storage. Besides extension officers, these farmers could have 
obtained cocoa production information from neighbour farmers, mobile-telephone 
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messages, newspaper publications, and television and radio services (Hainmueller, et 
al, 2011).  
Farmers’ objective for joining their FBOs is an essential determinant of 
improvement in knowledge scores. Farmers who joined FBOs to have access to credit 
recorded higher scores on pre-harvest knowledge and on total knowledge. This 
observation is similar to empirical findings by Asante et. al. (2011) among small-scale 
farmers in the Eastern Region of Ghana where this study was conducted. Farmers who 
joined FBOs with the aim of acquiring access to credit were particularly interested in 
raising their income, and therefore were motivated to pay more attention to group 
activities that could create opportunities in this area.  
A major expectation of this study was that, in line with the literature, farmers 
with improved knowledge will try out their new acquired information on their farms 
and hence improve the quality of their produce. Two results regarding this hypothesis 
were observed in this study. First, already, 68% of the cocoa beans from all farmers 
were of good quality. This level of quality meets the average minimum market 
requirements even though it falls short of current highest grade standards set by 
COCOBOD (Kolavalli, et al. 2012). There are historical and social factors which can 
explain this finding (Leiter and Harding, 2004). For instance, Ton et al (2008) explain 
that at the developmental stage of Ghana’s cocoa sector, farmer cooperatives were 
used in the past as a mechanism of cocoa bean quality control. Farmers supplied their 
cocoa through cooperatives which had internal rules for ensuring their members 
supplied good quality cocoa beans before onward sales to COCOBOD. With the 
collapse of cocoa cooperatives, COCOBOD instituted a policy of on-farm grading and 
paying for different grading of quality beans accompanied by a system of rewards and 
strict punishments (Amoah, 1998). Even though these institutional mechanisms have 
collapsed, the perception of what constitutes acceptable quality cocoa beans may have 
been passed on to latter generations of farmers and have thus become the norm.  
Second, although FPR farmers significantly increased their knowledge of 
GAPs, their try-outs of these technologies on their own fields only resulted in a 
moderate improvement in cocoa bean quality. This was lower than what we could 
expect from the literature (De Jagger, 2004; Röling, 2009), and from the strong 
increase in quality produced on the experimental FRP plots. This suggests that full 
adoption of GAPs did not take place over the study period. Farmers involved in the 
FPR may have selected only few GAPs activities to try out on their own farms. This 
behaviour pattern is explained by the theory of technology adoption which suggests 
that farmers try recommendations for themselves under their own conditions and pace 
as a basis of their adoption decision (Rogers, 1995; Leeuwis, 2004).  
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Furthermore, even though the interactive FPR may have exposed farmers to 
GAPs, they were not sure about the expected yields and potential profitability during 
the one year experimentation period. Through joint treatment of GAPs plots and 
analyses of outcomes it became clear to farmers that GAPs involves higher costs while 
the profitability could be uncertain and dependent on the behaviour of neighbouring 
farmers. In Ghana, cocoa is cropped by many smallholders whose farms are next to 
each other. Suppose a GAPs-adopting farmer is surrounded by farmers who do not 
invest in maintaining their farms. Then his effort may not yield desired results because 
of a transfer of pests and diseases from neighbouring farms. An example is the black 
pod disease, which spreads from infected pods left that left unattended to on the tree or 
on the ground in the farms. GAPs require that such pods should be discarded off the 
farm in order to manage the black pod disease. A GAPs-adopting farmer may have his 
farm damaged by black pods because his neighbour does not discard off diseased pods 
appropriately. Hence, it is likely that farmers were trying out specific GAPs practices 
which were only appropriate to their farm bio-physical conditions. Farmers were also 
selecting practices which minimized costs and had potential of improving their yields.  
Another reason why farmers were selective about GAPs is the nature of the 
market facing them. In Ghana’s internal cocoa market, the quality of beans are often 
untested or imperfectly tested prior to purchase. All cocoa sells for the same price. 
This characteristic of the internal cocoa market allows farmers to hold information 
about their bean quality from buyers at the point of sale. Hence, without changing 
much of their post-harvest practices, farmers can still sell their cocoa. A cost-
minimizing farmer will therefore adopt more pre-harvest GAPs as they increase  
output, and will not be motivated to enhance cocoa bean quality, even if newer 
standards are communicated to them (Fold, 2001). 
4.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
This study demonstrates that farmers’ knowledge about innovations is more 
improved if farmers are involved in the development and experimentation of these 
innovations than when they are just passive end-users. Hence, the present extension 
system in Ghana will have higher impact if policy and research and development 
practice build in more participatory approaches. Another conclusion of policy interest 
from the findings of this study is that farmers are likely to take keener interest and get 
more involved in extension activities than they are presently, if they are linked to 
reliable sources of credit.  
Improved knowledge however may not be sufficient to motivate famers to 
adopt practices which will enhance quality beyond minimum market requirements. A 
sufficient condition for adoption of innovation, in spite of improved knowledge, will 
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therefore be the existence of price or institutional mechanisms which motivate farmers 
to supply cocoa beans with higher quality standards. Current government policies that 
are targeted at motivating farmers to produce quality cocoa are often too broad to elicit 
the desired outcome. These policies tend to take advantage of social conditions such as 
reciprocity which oblige farmers to improve quality because of support services like 
scholarships, mass-farm spraying and production-based bonuses which government 
provides them. The problem with such an approach is that these support services are 
not linked to production of quality cocoa beans, although policy makers expect it as an 
outcome. Also, so long as all farmers cannot access these services, they do not provide 
much incentive for enhancing cocoa bean quality. 
Policy effort, therefore, needs to be directed at market institutions, which 
affects all farmers directly. In particular, institutions which ensure that buyers screen 
good from average quality beans at farmgate are recommended. An example of such 
an institution is organization of cocoa trading through certified FBOs which can apply 
their internal rules to regulate the adoption of quality-enhancing GAPs. Another 
example is a policy of on-farm grading with accompanied enforceable punishment and 
reward systems like price differentiation. While the policy of on-farm grading with 
price differentiation has been tried by Ghana in the 1960s, there is no systematic study 
that explains why the policy was stopped or that investigates its appropriateness for the 
current cocoa sector.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Incentives to produce quality cocoa under certification in 
Ghana 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates how certification programmes in the cocoa sector of Ghana 
attempt to solve the problems of asymmetric information that hamper the production 
of high-quality beans Ghana. In agricultural markets buyers, who purchase produce 
directly from farmers before onward sale, are often unable to determine the quality 
features of the produce before or even after purchase. This inability leads to a situation 
of asymmetric information where farmers know more about product quality than 
buyers. As a consequence, farmers have little or no incentive to spend extra costs and 
efforts to improve the quality of their produce. The cost of upgrading produce quality 
before it reaches the final consumer therefore falls to buyers, because they have no 
means of knowing which farmer produces what quality grade. Information economics 
theories suggest that buyers may design incentive mechanisms that motivate farmers to 
enhance the quality of their produce (Akerlof, 1970; Maskin, 2008; Mirrlees, 1997; 
Stiglitz, 1987)  
Examples of potential incentive mechanisms in agricultural markets include 
supervision of farmers during the production period, quality measurement before 
purchase, and the use of price premiums (Hueth at al., 1999; Wolf et al., 2001). 
However, these mechanisms are often too costly for first buyers to implement, given 
their small marketing margins (Jacoby and Mansuri, 2007; Feder, 1985). A number of 
authors therefore propose that third-party certification may provide a more efficient 
and more effective way to tackle the information problems in agricultural markets 
(Hertel et al., 2009; Wimmer and Chezum, 2003). Certification programmes are able 
to sell labelled produce in high-value markets, so they at least tend to have the 
financial capacity to absorb the operation costs of specific incentive mechanisms. 
Although a number of certification programmes exist in Ghana’s cocoa sector, very 
little research has been done on how they manage the problem of information 
asymmetry and which incentive mechanisms they employ to maintain or increase the 
quality of cocoa. 
The literature on certification in agriculture mainly deals with the impact of 
certification on the adoption of recommended farming practices that improve yields or 
safeguard the environment and its welfare implications for smallholders (Barham and 
Weber, 2012; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Bolwig et al., 2009; Buehler and Schuett, 
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2012; Dorr and Grote, 2009; Jena et al., 2012; Kleemann and Abdulai, 2012). For 
example, Dorr and Grote (2009) show that certification in the Brazilian fruit sector led 
to higher farm productivity and production. With respect to the Ghanaian cocoa sector, 
Afari-Sefa et al. (2010) and Gockowski et al. (2013) conclude that certification 
standards, through their positive effects on production, present a more profitable 
option for smallholders than existing production systems. Kleeman and Abdulai 
(2012) find that smallholders in certification were more likely to adopt environment-
friendly farming practices. How certification can generate such positive outcomes is 
debated. Some studies suggest that paying price premiums in certification schemes is 
the most effective incentive mechanism to influence farmer behaviour (Lohr and Park, 
1992; Valkila, 2009). Other studies point to non-price incentive mechanisms, such as 
farmer training, supervision of production, and social control through farmer 
organizations (Dorr and Grote, 2009). 
The literature on certification often focuses on yields and production methods, 
and largely ignores the quality dimension of the produce. Specifically, it fails to deal 
with one critical issue: which incentive mechanisms certification schemes employ to 
elicit the high level of effort required of farmers to produce crops of sufficient quality. 
In particular, considering that in the market higher quality is not compensated by 
higher price due to the information problems mentioned above. In this chapter, we 
address this issue by examining a particular certification programme in the Ghanaian 
cocoa sector. This study will identify the main incentive mechanisms used by this 
programme and assess their effectiveness with respect to the level of effort and 
commitment by farmers to invest in the practices and the resulting yield and quality of 
cocoa, by comparing the outcomes with those of the standard practices in the 
mainstream market. 
Which certification programmes exist in Ghana’s cocoa supply chain? The 
study focuses on the Oyoko cocoa district of the Eastern Region of Ghana, where a 
certain certification programme operates under the umbrella of a producer organization 
called Cocoa Organic Farmers Association (COFA). COFA works alongside the main 
stream market, but has different trading practices and incentive mechanisms. These 
incentive mechanisms comprise both price and non-price structures. Farmers have the 
liberty to sell their cocoa independently in the mainstream market to licensed buying 
companies (LBCs) or join COFA and abide by the rules of certification. 
The study proceeded by doing three exercises. First, since all farmers in the 
sample can choose the channel through which to sell their cocoa, we identified the 
determinants of the choice between being an independent farmer and being a certified 
farmer. The second exercise is to identify the most important price and non-price 
incentive mechanisms employed by COFA and those under the mainstream cocoa 
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market regime, and to rate the influence of each mechanism on the practices of the two 
types of farmers. It was expected that differences in trading practices and incentive 
mechanisms will influence the performance of COFA members and independent 
farmers in terms of input (effort) and output (quantity and quality of cocoa beans). 
Therefore, the final exercise is to compare COFA-farmers with independent farmers 
on the basis of the level of labour input into production practices, the yields they 
achieve, and the realized average bean qualities.  
Section 5.2 begins with a review of the different types of certification 
programmes existing in Ghana’s cocoa supply chain. Section 5.3 sketches the 
theoretical framework of the study, which among other things helps us to study why 
some farmers choose to be a member of a certification programme while other farmers 
want to stay independent. Section 5.4 discusses the empirical strategy and the collected 
data. Primary data were obtained from a survey of 161 COFA members and 161 
independent farmers using a pre-tested semi-structured questionnaire. Section 5.5 
presents the results. Section 5.6 rounds of with a discussion and conclusions, including 
some policy recommendations. 
5.2 Certification in Ghana’s cocoa market 
Ghana’s cocoa supply chain is relatively short. Cocoa beans move from farmers to 
licensed buying companies (LBCs) to the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC) - the 
government-owned exporter. Whereas all private-run certification programmes exist at 
farmgate, only one state-run certification system exists up the supply chain, through 
which eventually all beans must pass. 
5.2.1 Farmgate-level certification 
From the perspective of smallholder farmers, two types of private cocoa 
certification programmes exist in Ghana. The first type focuses on the process by 
which the crop is grown. Organic certification and other systems that impose standards 
of sustainable cocoa production can be placed in this category. The second type 
focuses on improving the trading position of farmers through different methods of 
distributing premium prices. An example is fair-trade certification, which pays a 
collective premium to farmer-based organizations (FBOs) or their communities. The 
fair- trade approach can be distinguished from other certification schemes that pay 
price premiums to individual farmers.  
In spite of these differences, the operation of private certification programmes 
at farmgate is similar. Production standards are determined by private labelling 
organizations. Standards are developed in response to the demands of cocoa-product 
manufacturers and final consumers of chocolate products. Some of the standards 
include rules regarding chemical use, good cultural practice, quality standards, and 
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whether or not children are allowed in the production process (Ponte and Gibbon, 
2005). When farmers are able to meet certification standards, they receive a premium 
price. For ease of coordination, most labelling organizations work with FBOs. It is the 
responsibility of the FBOs to develop incentive mechanisms to ensure that their 
members meet certification standards. Usually, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) partner with FBOs and build their capacity to develop and enforce incentive 
mechanisms. 
In this chapter, we study the incentive mechanisms employed by a certified 
FBO in the Oyoko Cocoa District, called COFA. This FBO subscribes to the standards 
of Control Union organic cocoa certification. Control Union is a multinational 
company which develops and executes certification programmes for various 
agricultural commodities. COFA is organized and trained by an NGO called Agro-Eco 
to implement a number of incentive mechanisms. First, COFA provides regular 
training for services on certification standards to their member farmers. Second, 
COFA employs farm inspectors who monitor production activities. After each farm 
inspection, detailed records on farmers and their production activities are kept. Third, 
COFA regulates input use by its members by procuring and distributing only approved 
organic chemicals to their members. Finally, all COFA members supply their cocoa 
through the organization. The quality of their supply is tested before the produce is 
accepted. Testing follows the standard cocoa industry cut test (Schwan, 1998).
1
 This 
cut test is not perfect, however, because only 300 beans out of an average of 55,000 
per bag are sampled for testing. So, the threat of moral hazard persists, and COFA 
members still have an incentive to free ride and supply lower quality cocoa. COFA 
thus implements a traceability mechanism that follows the cocoa beans of individual 
farmers until they are handed over to the final processor. In this traceability system, 
each member’s plot of land is coded and assigned a number of coded bags in which its 
beans are stored in the COFA warehouse. Hence, any cocoa beans that pass COFA’s 
test but are rejected up the supply chain can be traced back to the individual producer.  
COFA applies a number of punishment systems with these mechanisms. 
Punishment ranges from simple reproach through rejection of poor quality cocoa beans 
to loss of group membership. When beans are rejected or membership is revoked, 
COFA members have to sell their cocoa as independent farmers to LBCs, where they 
are paid the national annual price per unit of cocoa determined by the Cocoa Board 
(COCOBOD).
2
 When cocoa beans are accepted by COFA, farmers receive a price that 
consists of the COCOBOD price plus a 10% premium. Finally, as a collective, COFA 
                                                          
1
  The cut test involves cutting a sample of cocoa beans (normally 300) lengthwise through the middle in order to 
expose the maximum cut surface of the cotyledons. Both halves are examined in full daylight to make a 
judgment on whether the beans are well dried, fermented, and without any defect. 
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members apply social control on each other to ensure that the group does not lose its 
reputation as a producer of certified organic cocoa beans. 
5.2.2 Certification up the supply chain 
Independent farmers are not certified at farmgate. The national policy on quality 
control at farmgate is that LBCs should supply cocoa beans to CMC that meet a 
certain minimum quality standard (MQS). Unlike COFA, LBCs do not organize 
special training sessions for farmers, nor do they monitor farmer activities or keep 
record of farmer practices. To satisfy the quality requirements up the supply chain, 
they conduct an elementary observation of a farmers’ supply of beans. This test is less 
rigorous than the standard cut test, because it has no uniform sampling and testing 
procedure. Moreover, unlike COFA, LBCs have no further incentive mechanism that 
can indirectly perfect their quality test. After purchase from farmers, LBCs bulk all 
cocoa for further upgrading before onward supply to CMC. Thus the threat of moral 
hazard on the part of farmers is not reduced, since after bulking LBCs are unable to 
identify which farmer supplied what consignment of cocoa.  
Up the chain, Ghana’s cocoa regulations state that: 
“…no person shall market or export any cocoa unless: (1) it is 
cocoa which is the property of COCOBOD; or it is cocoa which 
has been graded and sealed, the export of which has been 
authorized in writing by the certifying authority of the 
COCOBOD…”3 
This implies LBCs, COFA, and all other farmer-level certification programmes are 
required to be part of the state-run certification system. In this certification system, the 
Quality Control Company Limited (QCCL), which is a subsidiary of COCOBOD, sets 
and reviews quality standards annually.
4
 When buyers (LBCs, COFA) are ready to 
forward cocoa to CMC for export, they must first store all bags of cocoa in their 
district warehouse and then write an application request to QCCL to certify their bags. 
QCCL officials inspect the premises of the district warehouse to ensure it meets 
sanitation standards for storing cocoa beans. The standard cut test is applied to assess 
the quality grade of each bag of cocoa. Bags are marked with the seal of COCOBOD, 
the quality grade, the district, and the LBC or FBO from which they are purchased. 
Neither the village where the cocoa was bought nor the farmer who produced it is 
coded on the bag. Any cost incurred up the chain associated with upgrading is borne 
by the LBC or FBO from which the cocoa was purchased.  
                                                          
3
 Ghana Cocoa Board Law, 1984, (PNDC. L.81) and the Export of Cocoa Regulations 
2004. http://www.cocobod.gh/images/export_of_Cocoa_Regulations.pdf 
4
 See Chapter 3 of this thesis for a full definition of quality standards 
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Finally, once cocoa is certified by QCCL it is ready for export. Both cocoa from 
independent farmers and cocoa from COFA farmers sell at a premium on the world 
market, although export prices may differ. Apart from financing the producer price, 
the export earnings realized through the mainstream market are used to cover a broad 
range of costs: government taxes; value-chain-upgrading costs (such as road 
construction and maintenance); quality control; LBC margins; the head office, 
subsidiaries and divisions of COCOBOD ; and costs related to certain social services 
in the village (Kolavalli et al., 2012). The allocation of the export earnings realized 
through the certification market is much more concentrated. Most earnings are used to 
finance labelling organizations, incentive mechanisms, and the 10% premium.  
5.3 Theoretical framework 
5.3.1 Effort and production of quality cocoa beans 
The amount of effort and commitment farmers apply to farm activities has been 
demonstrated to influence output significantly (Brada and Méndez, 2009). Producing 
cocoa beans of sufficient quality requires that farmers spend time and energy on a 
specific number of pre-harvest and post-harvest practices. Pre-harvest activities 
include soil fertility management, pest control, disease management, pruning and 
removal of parasitic plans, and general farm maintenance. These activities mainly 
determine the final volume of cocoa, but some pre-harvest activities like handling and 
control of pests and diseases also influence the final quality of cocoa beans. Post-
harvest activities include timely harvesting, pod storage, pod breaking, bean 
fermentation, and drying and polishing. These tasks are the main determinants of the 
final quality of cocoa beans.
5
  
It follows that, given farm sizes and capital inputs, the quantity and quality of 
cocoa beans increase with effort levels. In particular, post-harvest practices make high 
demands on producers’ labour the quality of cocoa beans is elastic with respect to 
effort levels (Anim-Kwapong et al., 2007). 
5.3.2 Mechanism design theory  
Mechanism design theory can provide insights on how to provide incentives to farmers 
to increase the effort they apply to their production (Maskin, 2008; Mirrlees, 1997; 
Myerson, 2008; Hurwicz, 1994). Neoclassical economics assumes that all parties in a 
market have full information about the characteristics of the traded products or factors, 
and that the motivations of buyers and sellers are perfectly aligned. In practice, this 
assumption does not always hold. Cocoa buyers in Ghana have difficulties in 
                                                          
5
 During pod breaking, farmers must first avoid damaging the cocoa beans with the instrument of pod breaking. 
Second, they must sort and discard all disease/insect damaged beans.  
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observing the quality of cocoa beans, and are not sure of the motivation of farmers to 
provide the level of effort needed for sufficient quality. When this market failure 
favours farmers, they are likely to reduce the level of effort they apply to their 
production activities, negatively affecting the quality of their produce. 
Mechanism design theory proposes that the party that is most affected by the 
market imperfection (in this case buyers) can offer a menu of options to the other 
party. The purpose of the menu is to attract farmers with different bean qualities to sell 
their produce under different arrangements. Following the discussion in Section 5.2, 
we observe that a menu of options to trade their cocoa beans have evolved in Ghana; 
the mainstream and certification markets. Following Paterson and Boisvert (2004), 
farmers are expected to select among the appropriate market arrangement on the menu 
which best suit their production practices and produce quality. In this chapter we the 
specific mechanisms employed under certification and the mainstream market are 
compared. Then, the impact of these mechanisms on farmers’ motivation to supply 
quality cocoa beans are estimated.  
5.3.3 Determinants of market choice 
To analyse the choice of farmers to which market arrangement to supply their produce 
– the mainstream market or the certified market – we use the standard utility 
maximization framework. Suppose the reduced-form utility of farmer i (capturing both 
preferences and constraints) depends positively on the income he receives from selling 
cocoa (r) and negatively on the effort (e) he has to exert to produce cocoa according to 
the function: 
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Let a farmer who exerts effort level e produce a quality of cocoa beans that is 
rewarded by r(e). Suppose this function r is strictly increasing, so that higher effort 
results in higher income. The choice problem of farmer i is to choose an effort level 
that maximizes   ( ( )  ). The first-order condition of maximization implies 
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Hence, the optimal level of effort is such that the ratio of the marginal utility of 
reducing effort and the marginal utility of income equals the marginal income of 
effort. This ratio is the marginal rate of substitution between effort reduction (or 
leisure) and income, and measures how much income farmer i is willing to forego for 
one unit less effort. 
Now suppose the certification market pays a higher price for cocoa than the 
mainstream market but implicitly also requires more production effort from the farmer. 
This simple model suggests that farmers then compare   ( (  )   ) with 
  ( (  )   ), where    and    are low and high effort levels. Farmers with a high 
need for income, and so a high marginal utility for income, will choose to supply to the 
certification market. Farmers with a strong desire to save effort, on the other hand, will 
go for the mainstream market.  
5.4 Data and empirical strategy 
5.4.1 Data 
Data for this study were taken from both secondary and primary sources. Secondary 
data were obtained from files and publications of LBCs, COFA, and COCOBOD. 
Primary data were obtained from a survey of 161 COFA members and 161 
independent farmers using a pre-tested semi-structured questionnaire. To arrive at this 
sample, information about the farmer population in the Oyoko District was first 
obtained from COFA executives, key informants, LBC staff, and COCOBOD staff 
using focus group discussions. Based on this information, a sampling frame was 
established. Eight communities -- Brong Densuso, Brong No. 1, Dome, Mangoase, 
Nankese, Nkurankan, Oyoko, Nyamekrom – were sampled for the study (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 Sampling Frame 
Community Estimated Farmer  
Population 
Sample size 
COFA Independent 
Brong Densuso 361 58 58 
Brong No 1 83 13 13 
Dome 56 10 10 
Mangoase 241 13 13 
Nankese 363 20 20 
Nkurankan 317 17 17 
Oyoko 279 15 15 
Nyamekrom 300 15 15 
Total  2000 161 161 
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From each of these communities we targeted at least 10% of the estimated farmer 
population for sampling. The questionnaire collected information on farmers’ 
demographic characteristics, effort on farm practices, yield, cocoa bean quality and 
perceptions about incentive mechanisms of COFA and LBCs. 
5.4.2 Empirical strategy 
Determinants of choice of certification 
The empirical strategy proceeded in three steps. The first involved the use of logistic 
regression to identify the determinants of the choice between supplying to the 
certification market or to the mainstream market. The binary logit model has been 
employed by previous studies to model farmer decision making in Ghana (Akudugu et 
al., 2012; Aneani et al., 2012). As suggested in Section 5.3, the decision to sell through 
certification or to sell independently will be determined by the reduced preferences of 
the farmer for income (more effort) and leisure (less effort). Although the parameters 
of these preferences are unobservable, we can define a latent variable, y*, that 
implicitly captures these preferences such that y*= 1 if a farmer prefers the 
combination of high income and high effort, and y*= 0 if a farmer prefers the 
combination of low income and low effort. Applying the results of our first empirical 
step (Section 5.2.1), y* can then be written as 
 
   {
                
                       
      (2) 
 
This latent variable, y*, can be related to a set of explanatory variables X as follows: 
 
         (    ) ⁄   (   )      (3) 
 
where    is the probability that farmer i chooses to join the certification programme, 
and (    ) otherwise.      is a vector of j exogenous variables containing socio-
economic and farm characteristics. Marginal effects (at the sample mean) were 
estimated to determine the effect of changes in an explanatory variable on the 
probability a farmer joins the certification programme. 
The explanatory variables of equation (3) consist of socioeconomic and farm 
characteristics that are expected to influence this trade-off (Boahene et al., 1999; 
Donnellan and Hennessy, 2007; Langyintuo and Mungoma, 2008). (see Appendix for 
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definition of variables). Specifically, we expected older farmers, land owners, males, 
large-scale farmers, and those with off-farm income to be independent farmers, 
because their willingness to sacrifice income for effort reduction seems relatively high 
(a high marginal rate of substitution between effort reduction and income). Moreover, 
younger farmers, more-educated farmers, indigenes or non-migrants are probably 
more flexible and open to new opportunities, which also suggest that they are member 
of COFA.  
Comparison of incentive mechanisms of CoFA, LBCs and COCOBOD 
Our second step was to assess the influence of a number of incentive mechanisms 
employed by COFA, LBCs, and the COCOBOD on the motivation of farmers to 
enhance the production of quality cocoa beans. We asked farmers to rate the influence 
of each specific incentive mechanisms on their effort and commitment to apply 
quality-enhancing farm practices.6
 
 Descriptive statistics were then used to assess the 
degree of influence of incentive mechanisms.  
Estimation of impact of certification 
Having assessed farmers opinions about mechanisms of certification and the 
mainstream market, the third empirical step was to compare the performance of COFA 
members with that of independent farmers with respect to effort levels, yields and 
cocoa beans. A counterfactual approach was followed to estimate the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) or the impact of certification on COFA members 
(Heckman et al, 1997). This approach was followed because of potential selection 
biases in our cross-sectional data. Farmers self-selected themselves into treatment 
(COFA) and control (Independent) groups. Hence a simple comparison of their 
performance does not give an indication of causality since it is not clear whether 
treatment groups have similar comparisons. Selection bias also arises due to 
unobserved confounders between treatment and comparison groups. One way to 
overcome the selection bias is the use of propensity score matching techniques (PSM) 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). PSM is a non-experimental technique which consists 
of matching treated observations with untreated observations on the basis of observed 
characteristics unaffected by the treatment (in this case propensity scores). The 
average treatment effect is then calculated as the mean difference in outcomes across 
these two groups, i.e. treated and untreated.  
The “average treatment effect on treated” (hereafter ATT) can be written as: 
    
       ( )      ( )     ( )      ( )      (4) 
                                                          
6The question was asked: “Rate how the following policies/mechanisms of your regular LBC motivate you to 
apply recommended farming practices. [1] Low [2] Average [3] High” 
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where  ( ) and  ( ) are values of the outcome variables of interest between treated 
and control farmers. C = 1 and C = 0 refer to treated and control farmers respectively. 
 ( ) corresponds to the propensity score, i.e. the probability that conditional to a set of 
observable covariates  , a farmer joins CoFA or sells independently.  
The PSM technique requires two conditions to be fulfilled. The first is the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA), which assumes that the researcher 
observes all variables that can influence both the treatment and the potential outcomes. 
The second assumption is the common support condition which implies that the 
propensity score distribution is not very different in the treatment and the control 
group (Brodaty et al., 2007). Having met these conditions, the PSM technique 
proceeds in three steps as follows: 
(a) Estimation propensity scores: The binary logit model in equation (3) was used 
to calculate propensity scores. In order to satisfy the common support 
condition, only variables which are unaffected by participation in COFA 
activities or are fixed over time entered the logit model.  
(b) Choice of matching algorithm: Two matching algorithms were assessed in 
terms of the extent to which they reduce the biasness of our estimations (Table 
5.6). The first was the nearest neighbour matching (NN). The NN matching 
estimator consists of matching each treated observation with an untreated 
observation that is the closest in terms of propensity score. We considered the 
one-to-one matching (n = 1), the three nearest-neighbour matching (n = 3), and 
the five nearest-neighbour matching (n = 5). The second matching method was 
the radius matching (RM). The RM matching estimator imposes a threshold on 
the maximum propensity score range or radius within which to match treated 
and control farmers (callipers). Three callipers were considered here; a wide 
radius (r = 0.03), a medium radius (r = 0.03), and tight radius (r = 0.01). Each of 
these matching options was without replacement. 
(c) Quality checks: In order to ensure the quality of matching estimator we 
inspected the standardized bias reduction by the various methods. Also, 
bootstrapped standard errors were estimated. 
Definition of outcome variables 
Two broad categories of effort scores are identified in this chapter: pre-harvest and 
post-harvest effort scores. For pre-harvest activities we assigned an effort score for 
each task of weeding, pruning, chupon removal, mistletoe removal, pest and disease 
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management.
7
 The average of these scores represents the pre-harvest effort score. 
Similarly, the post-harvest effort score equals the average of the individual scores for 
appropriate harvesting, pod breaking, fermentation, and drying methods. The effort 
score of each task was calculated as follows. Each score, ranging between 0 and 100, 
was based on indices of at least three factors: (1) time spent on a specific farm 
practice; (2) the proportion of farm the specific activity was applied to; and (3) the 
degree to which the application of the specific farm practice conformed with 
recommendations of the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG). For example, 
CRIG recommends weeding of the whole farm at least 4 times a year. A farmer who 
did not weed at all scored a zero as weeding effort. A farmer who weeded 30% of his 
farm just once over the entire season was assigned a weeding effort score of (0.25x 
0.3) x 100 = 7.5). Yields and cocoa bean qualities were measured in a straightforward 
way. Yields are indicated in kg per hectare. Cocoa bean quality is also captured by a 
score between 0 and 100. Following Schwan (2008), 100 cocoa beans are randomly 
sampled, cut into two halves and inspected for physical damage. The number of cocoa 
beans out of the 100 that had no physical defects is recorded as the quality score.  
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Determinants of participation in certification programmes 
All farmers in the sample can choose to which market they wish to supply their cocoa 
beans. In this section, we try to identify the determinants of the choice between 
supplying to the certification market or to the mainstream market using a binary 
logistic model. Results of the logistic model on the factors affecting the probability of 
participation in certification programmes (joining COFA) are presented in Table 5.2. 
Model-diagnostic tests show that the logistic equation is appropriate for the analyses. 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic (6.695; p > 0.05) indicates that the model fits the 
data well. Sensitivity and specificity test scores also show that the model has a 70% 
and 76% chance of correctly predicting the probability of participation and non-
participation.  
Farmers are more likely to participate in certification programmes if they are 
indigenes (born in the village), have more years of experience, have more formal 
education, are involved in share cropping contracts, and also trade non-farm goods 
(Table 5.2). Marginal effects estimations indicate that, holding other factors constant, 
being an indigene rather than a migrant increases the probability of participation by 18 
percentage points. One more year of experience in cocoa farming increases the 
probability of participation by 2 percent. Compared with no education, primary 
                                                          
7
 A chupon is a newly growing stem that emerges at the base of the cocoa tree 
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education (6 years of formal schooling), increase the chance of joining certification by 
25% and junior high school education (nine years of formal schooling) raises the 
probability of participation by 23 percent. Also, schooling beyond junior high school 
has a positive effect: senior high school education (12 years of formal education) or 
more increases this probability by 30 percent. Land use contracts are another important 
factor. 
Share cropping is an important determinant of participation in certification 
programmes. Two share cropping contracts are identified in the study area. These are 
the abunu contract where a sharecropper receives half of the output and the abusa 
contract where a sharecropper receives a third of the output. As compared with 
complete ownership of the farm, having abusa farms increases the probability of 
participation by 40 percent. Owning a farm in addition to an abunu plot increases this 
probability by 50 percent. Similarly, farmers with both own and abusa farms have a 52 
percent likelihood of participation, and for farmers with both abunu and abusa farms 
this is 36 percent.  
Factors that reduce the likelihood of participating in certification programmes 
include age and dependence on cocoa. Marginal effects reported in Table 5.2 reveal 
that when a farmer is one year older, he or she has a lower probability of participation 
of 1 percent. Farmers with a one percent higher proportion of cocoa income in their 
total farm have a 1 percent lower probability of joining certification programmes. 
Additionally, indigenous farmers have an 18 percent more probability of joining 
certification compared to migrants. 
To some extent these results can be explained by referring to the theoretical 
framework discussed in Section 5.3.3. Above we have shown that the certification 
market pays a higher price for cocoa than the mainstream market, but implicitly also 
demands more production effort from the farmer because certification imposes 
particular production and processing standards. The theoretical framework then 
suggests that farmers with a high need for income, and so a high marginal utility for 
income, will choose to join the certification programme. On the other hand, farmers 
with strong preferences or heavy constraints that put weight on saving effort will go 
for the mainstream market and sell their cocoa to local LBCs. This theoretical 
perspective is largely in line with our observation that farmers with socio-economic 
characteristics that indicate higher income status and potentially more critical health 
problems, such as farmers with sufficiently big farms to allow cocoa to be the major 
income source and who are of older age, are less likely to participate in certification 
programmes.  
An important indicator of the need for more income (high marginal utility of 
income) is whether or not farmers are involved in sharecropping. Share cropping 
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means that a farmer must give up part of the output/income he produces (Quarmine et 
al., 2012).  
 
Table 5.2 Results of regression of determinants of participation in certification programmes 
DV = COFA Membership Marginal effects Robust standard errors 
Age -0.011 0.025* 
Sex  -0.155 0.126 
Marital status  0.171 0.104 
Household size  -0.034 0.011* 
Migration status 0.181 0.089* 
Size cocoa farm -0.033 0.033 
Size other farm -0.023 0.020 
Dependence on cocoa -0006 0.002* 
Experience 0.198 0.004* 
Education Level   
   Primary 0.250 0.103* 
   Junior high 0.285 0.106* 
   Secondary and above 0.300 0.110* 
Land use contract   
   Abunu  0.251 0.085* 
   Abusa 0.408 0.076* 
   Own_abunu 0.492 0.042* 
   Own_abusa 0.520 0.042* 
   Abunu_Abusa 0.362 0.090* 
   Own_Abunu_Abusa 0.466 0.055* 
Other economic activity   
   Processing -0.011 0.0913 
   Trading 0.160 0.125 
   Office work -0.128 0.114 
   Processing-trade-office -0.092 0.165 
Regression diagnostics  
Pseudo R-squared  0.239 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test  6.695 p=0.515) 
Sensitivity (%)  70.2 
Specificity (%)  76.4 
False Positive Rate (%)  25.2 
False Negative Rate (%)  28.1 
See appendix for definition of variables *= p<0.05   
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The more output/income he has to give up, the more likely it is that he will join 
certification programmes. This is evident in our results. Abusa farmers, who forego 
two-thirds of their crop, had the highest likelihood of joining certification 
programmes. Farmers that for some reason are constrained in their capacity to apply 
extra effort to their pre-harvest and post-harvest activities, by lack of time or health 
conditions, are not likely to join the certification programme. This is another reason 
why younger farmers had a higher likelihood of joining certification programmes.  
5.5.2 Incentive mechanisms 
The obvious question which follows is what price and non-price incentive structures 
motivate farmers to exert the levels of effort we observed and so produce higher 
volumes of quality cocoa? We address this question by discussing the rankings farmers 
made of the influence of the various incentive mechanisms implemented within the 
mainstream cocoa market (by COCOBOD and LBCs) and the certification market (by 
COFA).  
COCOBOD incentive mechanisms 
The major incentive policies of COCOBOD relate to producer price, (free) mass-
spraying of farms, credit services, extension services, and scholarship programmes for 
children of farmers. These policies extend to all cocoa farms in Ghana, thus including 
farmers who work under certification programmes. The overall expectation was that 
the extent to which these policies influence farmers depends on whether they are 
independent or members of COFA, because being organized under an FBO usually 
empowers farmers to better take advantage of existing policies and services. How 
COFA members and independent farmers rate these polices is presented in Table 5.3. 
In general, the producer price of cocoa, which is determined by COCOBOD, 
has an average influence on both COFA and independent farmers. This suggests that if 
farmers have to increase their effort to enhance quality, merely increasing the producer 
price will not much encourage this. Significantly more COFA farmers than 
independent farmers reported low influence of producer prices on their effort levels. 
This is because COFA farmers receive a premium price in addition to the producer 
price. Some level of price competition can be observed among LBCs in the district. 
Some LBCs pay a token in addition to producer price (which is less than COFA 
premium) to attract higher volumes of cocoa beans. Table 5.3 shows that while 94% 
and 54% of COFA independent farmers respectively reported receiving extra prices 
for their cocoa beans. Most independent farmers were however not satisfied about this 
extra (token) price they received.  
Another incentive policy of COCOBOD is the cocoa bonus. This is an extra 
amount of money paid to the farmer at the end of the season based on his or her yield. 
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Two categories of cocoa beans can be distinguished in Ghana during the two cropping 
seasons – main crop and light crop seasons. In the main crop season, cocoa beans are 
bigger in size while the light crop season yields smaller beans (Kolavalli et al., 2012).  
 
Table 5.3 Farmers’ rating of the influence of incentive policies of COCOBOD on the effort 
they apply to their farm activities 
 Influence COFA 
farmers 
(n=161) 
Independent 
farmers 
(n=161) 
Standard 
residuals 
(z-score) 
Price policy Low 27 (16.8) 7 (4.3) 2.4
*
 
 Average 89 (55.3) 123 (76.4) 1.7 
 High 45 (28.0) 31 (19.3) 1.1 
     
Cocoa bonus Low 37 (23.0) 18 (11.2) 1.8 
 Average 22 (13.7) 9 (5.6) 1.7 
 High 102 (63.4) 134 (83.2) 1.5 
     
Credit facilities Low 111 (68.9) 113 (82.6) 1.0 
 Average 45 (28.0) 21 (13.0) 2.1* 
 High 5 (3.1) 7 (4.3) 0.4 
     
Mass-spraying Low 41 (25.5) 7 (4.3) 3.5
 *
 
 Average 65 (40.4) 13 (8.1) 4.2
 *
 
 High 55 (34.2) 141 (87.6) 4.3
 *
 
     
Extension services Low 112 (69.9) 118 (73.3) 0.3 
 Average 22 (13.7) 12 (7.5) 1.2 
 High 27 (16.8) 31 (19.3) 0.4 
     
Scholarship Low 7 (4.3) 19 (11.8) 1.7 
 Average 138 (85.7) 135 (83.9) 0.1 
 High 16 (9.9) 7 (4.3) 1.3 
Figures represent frequency counts. Percentages are in parentheses. * = p<0.05 (-1.96 o +1.96) 
 
COCOBOD uses the bonus mechanism to pass on additional revenues to 
producers for the supply of main crop cocoa, based on the consideration that the bigger 
beans are of better quality than the smaller ones. For every unit of main crop cocoa 
supplied to LBCs or COFA offices, farmers receive up to 6% of the producer price as 
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bonus every year. Table 5.3 shows that there is a high influence of the bonus on the 
effort levels both COFA and independent farmers. Hence, indirectly, the bonus 
appears to contribute to the production of higher volumes of big sized cocoa beans. 
COCOBOD has two incentive policies regarding input use: a fertilizer input credit 
facility, called High-tech, and a free mass-spraying policy. Even though some studies 
attribute the national increase in cocoa yields in Ghana since 2000 to this credit facility 
(Omane-Adjepong, 2012), our results show that in the Oyoko Cocoa District the Hi-
Tech programme does not motivate farmers to exert more effort (Table 5.3). However, 
among those that reported a positive, though low level of influence, there are 
significantly more COFA farmers than independent farmers. Maybe this is because 
COFA is well organized and more capable of providing easy access to this facility. 
Regarding the mass spraying policy of COCOBOD, the responses of COFA 
farmers and independent farmers are significantly different. Whereas a large majority 
(87%) of independent farmers thought mass-spraying policy highly influenced their 
effort, most COFA farmers reported a low or no influence at all. A key explanation is 
that because COFA farmers subscribe to organic cocoa certification, they have a 
different chemical use regime than independent farmers. Why does mass spraying 
influence the effort of independent farmers so much? A central condition for a 
farmer’s field to be sprayed is that he has to undertake all the necessary farm practices 
(weeding, chupon removal, pruning, etc.). Hence, the production achieved under this 
regime is a combined effect of mass spraying and a number of agronomic practices.  
With the reorganization of Ghana’s extension services, we expected that 
extension workers would be a source of information and motivation for farmers to 
apply higher levels of effort in their production activities. Yet both independent and 
COFA farmers reported that COCOBOD’s extension policy did not influence their 
effort. Maybe this is because extension services have just been revived, and impacts 
are still at the early stage. In Chapter 4, where current extension methods are 
evaluated, it is argue that more participatory methods have better impacts on farmers’ 
effort than standard extension practices. 
Regarding the scholarships provided by COCOBOD, the ratings of appreciation 
by the two groups of farmers are more or less similar. Both groups reported a low 
influence of the scholarship policy on their effort. One observation on these incentive 
mechanisms is that, COCOBOD policies may have contributed in attracting more 
farmers into cocoa production or for existing farmers to expand the area under 
production. However, they are not enough to address the problem of information 
asymmetry between buyers and farmers. CoFA incentive mechanisms on the other 
hand, tackle problems of quality directly. This is why CoFA incentive mechanisms are 
rated by farmers as being more influential than COCOBOD/LBC policies. 
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LBC incentive mechanisms 
It is likely that both COFA and LBCs are aware of the limited incentives that are 
created by the policies of COCOBOD to stimulate the production of quality cocoa. 
Both have to cope with the upgrading costs that have to be incurred in order to meet 
the minimum quality standard (MQS). Below we turn to the incentive mechanisms 
employed by LBCs, which include the imposition of a simple quality test and the 
provision that farmers have the opportunity to recondition any rejected beans and 
supply them again for testing. Table 5.4 presents the ratings of the incentive 
mechanisms by, in this case, independent farmers 
The influence of quality testing by LBCs on effort is low according to the 
majority of independent farmers (52%), though almost one third of the farmers 
reported a high influence. A reason might be the low predictive power of the test, 
resulting in high accepting rates, as discussed above. In fact, the quality tests differ a 
lot among LBCs as they fail to display clear standards to farmers. As a consequence, 
beans that are rejected by one LBC might be accepted by another. This probably also 
explains why independent farmers reported a low influence of the opportunity to 
resupply any rejected beans after reconditioning.  
 
Table 5.4 Independent farmers’ rating of the influence of incentive mechanisms of LBCs on 
the effort they apply to their farm activities 
 Response Frequency (percentage) 
Quality test before purchase Low 84 (52.2) 
 Average 28 (17.4) 
 High 49 (30.4) 
   
Provision to resupply rejected beans  Low 139 (86.3) 
 Average 13 (8.1) 
 High 9 (5.6) 
Sample size = 161. *= p<0.05 (-1.96 o +1.96) 
COFA incentive mechanisms 
The incentive mechanisms employed by COFA differ from those of LBCs in a 
number of ways. Recall that COFA pays a price at least 10% higher than the producer 
price and that a large majority of COFA farmers shows satisfaction with this price 
premium. Merely paying higher prices and using a stricter test do not completely solve 
the information problem, because the quality test used by COFA still has its 
imperfections. To reduce the scope for moral hazard, COFA therefore enforces a 
number of policies. Farmers who join COFA must make themselves available for 
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training and must allow their farms to be monitored on the standards of their 
certification programme. Further, recall that COFA implements a traceability 
mechanism that can trace back any cocoa beans that have passed the test but are 
rejected up the supply chain to the individual farmer.  
Table 5.5 shows that COFA farmers did not regard monitoring as an important 
determinant of their effort level. As stated by some portion of the literature, 
monitoring of every farmer’s activity over the entire production period is impractical 
(e.g., Jacoby and Mansuri, 2007). Hence, this imperfect monitoring may explain why it 
does not motivate farmers to supply more effort. 
 
Table 5.5 COFA farmers’ rating of the influence of incentive mechanisms on the effort they 
apply to their farm activities 
 Response Frequency  
(percentage) 
Farm monitoring Low 114 (70.8) 
Average 18 (11.2) 
High 29 (18.0) 
   
Quality test before purchase Low 9 (5.6) 
Average 2(1.2) 
High 150 (93.2) 
   
Traceability Low 39 (24.2) 
Average 51 (31.7) 
High 71 (44.1) 
   
Training  Low 36 (22.3) 
Average 69 (42.9) 
High 56 (37.8) 
Sample size = 161 
 
The quality test employed by COFA turns out to be the most important driver of 
the effort of COFA farmers. About 93% of them rated the test to be of high influence 
on the effort levels they apply to their production activities (Table 5.5). This high 
impact underscores the effectiveness of the test used by COFA. As compared with the 
cursory inspection by LBCs, which only moderately motivated farmers, the cut test by 
COFA is a strong device that promotes almost all farmers in supplying high quality 
cocoa. 
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About 75% of the farmers reported an average or high influence of the 
traceability mechanism on their effort. This high response is understandable, as the 
traceability system implicitly perfects the whole testing process. By tracing back the 
poor cocoa to the farm where it was produced, the cost of upgrading is borne by the 
farmer. Finally, about 80% of the farmers reported an average or high influence of the 
training activities they were subjected to. One reason for this high score is that, as 
discussed by Marenya and Barrett (2007), training and the new information going with 
it may open the eyes of farmers to try new ways of production.  
5.5.3 Impact of certification on effort, yield, and quality  
To produce higher volumes of quality cocoa beans, farmers must exert higher levels of 
effort in their production and post-harvest activities. Table 5.6 compares the 
performance of COFA farmers and independent farmers with respect to effort, cocoa 
yields, and cocoa quality and reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). 
Before discussing the effect of certification, the quality of the estimation techniques 
employed are discussed. First, the common support assumption is checked by 
inspecting the distribution of predicted propensity scores for both CoFA and 
independent farmers (Figure 5.1). The propensity scores for the whole sample ranged 
between 0.006 and 0.989 with a mean of 0.50 (SD = 0.26). The predicted propensity 
scores for COFA members fell between 0.048 and 0.989 with a mean of 0.636 (SD = 
0.234). Independent farmers had an estimated propensity score ranging from 0.007 to 
0.904 with a mean of 0.363 (SD = 0.215). This distribution of propensity scores 
implies enough area of common support. Observations with propensity scores higher 
than the maximum or smaller than the minimum in the control group are dropped in 
subsequent analyses (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999).  
Next, the NN and RM matching methods were tried and the option which best 
reduced biases in the model was selected for the analyses. Table 5.6 presents results on 
the matching quality indicators of the different methods before and after matching. 
When the p-values of the likelihood ratio test (LR
2
) are compared for NN matching, it 
is observed that, except for nearest neighbor 3, the hypothesis of joint significance 
among covariates could not be rejected. Hence neighbor 3 was the best option if the 
NN matching method was to be use. The p-values of the LR2 test for all the different 
calipers of the RM method showed that the hypothesis of joint significance among 
covariates was rejected. Therefore the choice of matching technique was made from 
NN (neighbor n = 3), RM (calliper r = 0.01), RM (calliper r= 0.03) and RM (calliper r 
=0.05) by comparing the percentage bias reduction. As can be observed from Table 
5.6, RM (r = 0.03) and RM (r = 0.05) had a similar percentage bias reduction of about 
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143%. Hence, the RM (with calliper r = 0.03) estimator was selected as increasing the 
calliper did not reduce the percentage bias any further.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of propensity scores 
 
Table 5.6 Matching quality indicators before and after matching 
 
Matching 
estimator 
Pseudo R2  LR2 of 
logit model 
 Mean 
Standardized 
 bias 
Total % 
bias 
reduction 
Before After  Before After  Before After  
Nearest Neighbour (NN)  
   Neighbour1 0.223 0.134  99.7(0.00) 56.52 (0.000)  17.31 15.20 156.97 
   Neighbour 2 0.223 1.101  99.7(0.00) 42.46 (0.030)  17.31 15.01 162.46 
   Neighbour 3 0.223 0.075  99.7(0.00) 31.69 (0.246)  17.31 10.06 90.27 
Radius matching (RM)         
   Caliper 0.01 0.223 0.045  99.7(0.00) 15.29 (0.965)  17.31 7.41 90.52 
   Caliper 0.03 0.223 0.060  99.7(0.00) 23.96 (0.684)  17.31 11.17 143.37 
   Caliper 0.05 0.223 0.082  99.7(0.00) 34.67 (0.180)  17.31 13.23 143.28 
Notes:  Estimators for the propensity scores were performed by using the PSMATCH2 programme 
developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2012) for the Stata 12.0 software. 
 
Table 5.7 outlines the ATT effects of participation in certification programmes. 
With respect to pre-harvest activities, average mean effort scores of COFA farmers 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
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were 17 percentage points significantly higher than those of independent farmers. 
Specifically, COFA members applied significantly more effort in weeding, pruning, 
and pest and disease management than independent farmers. Note that among COFA 
farmers relatively little effort was invested in insect and disease management 
compared with other pre-harvest activities. This can be explained by the generally low 
level of cocoa disease incidence in the Oyoko cocoa district. It is this observation of 
low pest incidence which prompted the COCOBOD to demarcate the district as an 
organic cocoa production zone. 
 
Table 5.7 Effect of participation in certification on farmer’s effort scores, yield and produce 
quality  
 COFA 
farmers 
(n=161) 
independent 
 farmers 
(n=161) 
ATT
a
 Robust 
Standard 
errors
b
 
t-statistic 
Pre-harvest effort      
   Weeding 59.7 31.8 27.9 3.537 9.35* 
   Pruning 65.8 34.8 31.0 3.838 8.11* 
   Mistletoe removal 94.0 90.0 4.0 4.222 1.03 
   Chupon removal 94.8 89.7 5.1 5.153 1.26 
   Pest management 56.4 28.2 28.2 3.658 8.62* 
   Disease management 13.4 5.1 8.3 2.064 2.37* 
   Pre-harvest effort score 64.0 46.6 17.4* 4.175 8.79* 
Post-harvest effort      
   Pod breaking 63.1 51.3 11.8* 1.932 2.6 
   Harvesting  82.2 69.2 13.0* 2.788 4.2 
   Fermentation 83.1 65.8 17.3* 4.410 3.33 
   Drying and polishing 93.0 55.1 37.9* 5.466 6.26 
   Post-harvest effort score 80.4 60.4 20.0* 1.474 7.28 
      
Yield (KgHa
-1
) 214.9 114.7 100.2 17.307 6 
Quality scores 84.4 72.2 12.2 1.315 9.02 
a
 ATT represents the average treatment effect on the treated farmers. Means were estimated based on 
propensity scores based on radius matching (caliper = 0.03).  
*= p<0.05 
 
Regarding post-harvest activities, the ATT estimates in Table 5.7 shows that 
COFA farmers exerted a significantly higher mean effort level than independent 
farmers in all practices (20 percentage points more). Pod breaking, fermentation, and 
drying and polishing activities are the main determinants of cocoa bean physical 
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quality. Pod breaking is critical because at this stage, farmers must take care to remove 
all diseased and defective beans from the harvest before fermentation, otherwise they 
compromise average quality. The chemical processes of fermentation do not just 
produce the unique chocolate flavour but also facilitate faster drying of cocoa beans 
(Anim-Kwapong et al., 2006). Drying and polishing results in a consistent product 
which is free of defective beans and foreign materials. 
Holding other exogenous factors constant, pre-harvest efforts of farmers largely 
determine yields while post-harvest efforts determine the physical quality of cocoa 
beans (Anim-Kwapong et al., 2007). The study found that in the Oyoko cocoa district, 
CoFA members and independent farmers had a similar pattern of input use. The 
application of higher pre-harvest efforts by COFA members therefore explains why 
they recorded significantly more yield per hectare (52%) than did independent farmers. 
The high levels of effort applied to post-harvest practices by COFA members are 
reflected in the significantly better (12%) quality cocoa they produced as compared 
with independent farmers. 
5.6 Discussion and concluding remarks 
The results of this study indicate that certified producers apply a higher level of effort 
to enhance their cocoa bean quality than independent farmers. Holding other 
exogenous variables and input use constant, this higher level of effort explains why 
certified producers supply more volumes of quality cocoa than independent farmers. 
This finding is consistent with theoretical and empirical literature which suggests that 
institutions shape the actions of economic agents (North, 1990). As an institutional 
arrangement, the results indicate that certification provides high prospects for 
addressing the asymmetric information problem which threatens Ghana’s consistent 
supply of premium quality cocoa beans to the international chocolate and 
confectionary market.  
Certification programmes are able to elicit higher volumes of quality cocoa 
from farmers compared to the mainstream market because their incentive mechanisms 
more directly address information asymmetry. In particular, mechanisms of quality 
testing before purchase in combination with traceability have the most impact. 
Furthermore, these mechanisms work effectively because of the strict enforcement of 
punishment and rewards by the producer organization under which certification 
operates. In contrast, the mainstream market arrangement provides a number of 
general policies through COCOBOD. Our data confirms the position of Quarmine et 
al. (2012) that most of the policies from COCOBOD do not motivate farmers to 
increase their current effort levels because they are not designed to deal with problems 
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facing production of quality cocoa.
8
 The closest mechanism of the mainstream market 
which influences farmers to produce quality cocoa is the cocoa bonus. However since 
the bonus does not reward different quality grades, it is unlikely that changing it will 
elicit additional effort from farmers. These results imply that extending the 
mechanisms of certification programmes to farmgate, especially traceability and the 
development of producer organizations, may address the threat posed by asymmetric 
information.  
In line with the literature, the results of the study reveal that the need for higher 
income is a key determinant of farmers’ choices, especially the decision to choose for 
certification or mainstream markets (Boahene et al, 1999). The need for income, 
together with the high influence of the cocoa bonus policy, leads us to conclude that 
when designing incentive mechanisms in the cocoa sector, buyers and policy makers 
need to focus attention on increasing producer incomes. This is where price-related 
incentive mechanisms become important. Future research is required to test the impact 
of alternative cocoa pricing mechanisms on farmers’ incentive to supply higher 
volumes of quality cocoa beans. One limitation of this study is that our analysis is 
limited to a specific certification programme which pays a price premium directly to 
farmers. Further studies are required to analyse the impact mechanisms of other 
certification programmes like fair-trade, which pay a social premium to farmers’ 
community. This study estimated farmers’ efforts using their reported farm practices 
as proxies. Future studies may explore alternative measures of farmers’ effort. Again, 
our approach to understand the specific mechanisms of certification programmes was 
to ask farmers to rate the importance of these mechanisms. A limitation of this 
approach is that it may not be incentive-compatible. This is because farmers may be 
reporting ratings of these mechanisms which do not reflect their real opinions. Future 
studies could estimate the influence of these mechanisms through alternative methods. 
 
  
                                                          
8
 See Chapter 3 of this thesis 
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Appendix 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable 
Measurement 
Mean 
(n=322) 
a-prior 
 sign 
Age Years  53.21 - 
Sex  1= Male, 0= Female 0.76 + 
Marital status  1= Married 0 = Unmarried 0.74 +/- 
Household size  Number of people in one household 6.43 + 
Migration status 1 = Indigene, 0 = Migrant 0.22 + 
Size cocoa farm Size of cocoa farm in acres 5.32 - 
Size other farm Size of non-cocoa farm in acres 2.31 - 
Dependence on cocoa Percentage of cocoa in total household 
income 
64.25 
+ 
Experience Number of years farming cocoa 22.24 + 
Education Level    
   Primary 1 = 6 years of formal education, 0 otherwise  0.23 + 
   Junior high 1 = 9 years of formal education, 0 otherwise 0.48 + 
   Secondary and above 1 = More than 9 years of formal education, 0  0.13 - 
Land use contract    
   Abunu  1 = Abunu land use contract only, 0 otherwise  0.12 + 
   Abusa 1 = Abusa land use contract only, 0 otherwise  0.24 - 
   Own_abunu 1 = Own farms and Abunu farms, 0 otherwise 0.06 +/- 
   Own_abusa 1 = Own farms and Abusa farms, 0 otherwise 0.05 +/- 
   Abunu_Abusa 1 = Abunu farms and Abusa farms, 0 
otherwise 
0.31 
+/- 
   Own_Abunu_Abusa 1 = Own, Abunu and Abusa farms, 0 
otherwise 
0.01 
+/- 
Other economic 
activity 
 
 
 
   Processing 1 = Farming and processing, 0 otherwise 0.14 - 
   Trading 1 = Farming and trading, 0 otherwise 0.24 - 
   Office work 1 = Farming and office work, 0 otherwise 0.16 - 
   Proc-trade-office 1 = Farm, processing and trade, 0 otherwise 0.12 - 
Reference variable for education is “no formal education” (1 or 0 otherwise) 
Reference variable for Land Use Contract is “Own farm only” (1 or 0 otherwise) 
Reference variable for Other Economic activity is “Farming Only”(1 or 0 otherwise) 
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Does price differentiation with self-selection motivate the 
production of quality cocoa by smallholders?  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine alternative price mechanisms that can stimulate 
cocoa farmers to enhance the quality of their produce. A number of microeconomic 
studies have demonstrated a positive supply response to prices in Ghana’s cocoa sector 
(Armah, 2009; Bateman, 1965; Quarmine et al., 2012). These studies focus on how 
changes in producer price may increase the volume of cocoa beans and neglect how 
price movements affect cocoa bean quality. Drawing on these studies, producer price 
policy in Ghana has consequently involved paying a uniform producer price for all 
quality grades of cocoa beans so long as they meet a certain minimum standard (Fold, 
2001; Leiter and Harding, 2004). Yet evidence presented in previous chapters of this 
thesis and in other studies suggests that the payment of a uniform price at farmgate 
does not solve emerging issues with cocoa bean quality which arise from problems of 
asymmetric information (Quarmine et al., 2012). Under asymmetric information, 
buyers have no adequate information about the quality of cocoa beans individual 
farmers supply, and so cannot pay a price according to quality. As a result, farmers 
may not have enough incentive to further enhance the quality of their produce beyond 
minimum standards. 
To address this information problem, economists have proposed a number of 
alternative mechanisms that can govern the interaction between farmers and buyers 
(Stiglitz, 1975; Guasch and Weiss, 1981; Salop and Salop, 1976; Padilla, 2003). One 
such mechanism is that buyers try to sort farmers’ produce into different quality grades 
by using a screening device before purchase (Stiglitz, 1975). Related to agricultural 
markets, a much discussed screening device is certification or labelling (Stiglitz, 1975; 
Jahn et al., 2005). There is evidence that certification is an effective screening 
mechanism in Ghana’s cocoa market (see Chapter 5). Certification solves the 
information problem in Ghana’s cocoa market by providing price and non-price 
incentives for farmers to increase the production of cocoa of the highest quality (see 
Chapter 5). For example, through the mechanism of traceability, certification 
organizations are able to categorize producers of agricultural commodities according 
to the quality grades of their produce. Screening devices like certification however 
have their own problems. For instance, some studies show that certification sets 
demands in terms of time, capital, and training investments on participants, which not 
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only makes it an expensive solution but also leads to exclusion of less endowed 
smallholder farmers (Vuylsteke et al., 2005).  
Another way to tackle asymmetric information problems is the implementation 
of a self-selection device. Following Salop and Salop (1976), a self-selection device is 
a pricing scheme that causes the farmer to reveal truthful information to the buyer 
about the quality of his or her produce. One of the most popular self-selection devices, 
which has received much research attention and implicitly underlies many economic 
interactions, is the test-cum-fee pricing rule (Greenwood and McAfee, 1991; Guasch 
and Weiss, 1981; Haagsma, 1995; Ng, 2006; Padilla, 2003; Serti and Tomasi, 2008). 
The test-cum-fee device follows the “carrot and stick” format (Brousseau and Farès, 
2000; Mirrlees, 1997) where a buyer offers a price higher than the market price so long 
as the supplied produce meets a certain high quality standard, but the seller must pay a 
fee to have his or her produce tested. If the produce meets the buyer’s quality standard, 
the seller receives the high price (which more than compensates for the fee), otherwise 
he or she just gets the market price. As is already demonstrated by Guasch and Weiss 
(1981), test-cum-fee devices are a powerful instrument to discourage participation in 
transactions by unqualified parties. An appropriate combination of prices and fee 
lowers the test costs incurred by buyers and raises the average quality of the produce 
that passes the test, because through self-selection fewer sellers of low quality will 
apply (Guasch and Weiss, 1981; Salop and Salop, 1976). 
Price differentiation with self-selection can benefit both farmers (at least in an 
ex ante sense) and LBCs (Licensed Buying Companies). The latter because the supply 
of potentially higher cocoa bean quality will lower the upgrading costs LBCs have to 
make after purchase. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, these hypotheses have not 
been empirically tested. We therefore conducted a quasi-experiment to examine the 
behavioural response of farmers to a specific test-cum-fee pricing rule. The experiment 
was held during two cocoa seasons, allowing farmers also to respond with their 
farming practices and so to change the quantity and quality of their produce. Sixty 
cocoa farmers in the Suhum cocoa district of Ghana were given the option to choose 
between selling their cocoa in the conventional way or through a test-cum-fee process 
conducted by their regular LBC. The behavioural response of these sixty farmers was 
then compared to forty farmers who did not have a menu of prices. The test-cum-fee 
experiment allowed us to examine three issues: (1) to what extent does price 
differentiation increase the overall quality and quantity of supply per hectare?; (2) to 
what extent does price differentiation induce self-selection?; and (3) what socio-
economic characteristics determine farmers’ self-selection behaviour? 
As a starting point, a historical overview is given of the institutional 
mechanisms that have been employed in previous years to motivate farmers to supply 
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quality cocoa beans and the circumstances which led to the failure of these policies. In 
Section 6.3 a theoretical model of a test-cum-fee pricing rule is presented that can 
illustrate self-selection behaviour among cocoa farmers. Section 6.4 discusses the 
empirical strategy and the collected data. Hypotheses derived from the theoretical 
model were tested using data obtained from a field experiment conducted in the 
Suhum cocoa district in the 2011/12 and 2012/13 cropping seasons. The results are 
presented and discussed in Section 6.5. The final section concludes the study and 
distils policy recommendations.  
6.2 Historical overview of cocoa bean quality assurance in Ghana  
In this section, a historical background of the institutional mechanisms that have been 
employed in Ghana at the farmgate level to ensure that farmers supply cocoa beans of 
the best quality is presented. These mechanisms include cooperative institutions, 
price differentiation, minimum quality standards, and certification. The discussion 
also points to factors that led to the success or failure of these mechanisms and 
provides a context for our test-cum-fee experiments. 
 
6.2.1 Producer cooperatives  
Since World War I, consistent export of quality cocoa beans has been central to 
government agricultural policy in Ghana. One instrument used by the British colonial 
government to achieve this goal was the formalization of already existing farmer 
groups into producer cooperatives (Ton et al., 2008).
1
 According to Cazzufi and 
Moradi (2010), the major aim for creation of these cooperatives was to coordinate 
farmers to supply cocoa beans with consistent quality characteristics. Farmers in 
producer cooperatives sold their produce through their organization. It was the duty of 
the cooperative then to bulk and upgrade the produce of their members to meet the 
quality standards of cocoa merchants. After the cocoa beans had been sufficiently 
upgraded, an Agricultural Officer from the government’s Department of Agriculture 
was invited to test and grade the beans. Graded and sealed cocoa bags were then sold 
to private international merchants at either the minimum producer price or at a 6% 
quality premium (Cazzuffi and Moradi, 2010). 
The grading activities of producer cooperatives thus served as a screening 
device for cocoa export merchants, who paid different prices depending on the quality 
grade or on other factors like transportation costs. Running parallel to the producer 
cooperative were independent farmers who sold their produce through specialized 
brokers. These brokers however purchased cocoa without regard to quality 
                                                 
1
 A new law, Cooperative Society Ordinance No. 4 of 1931, amended in 1937, was passed in 1931 to 
set the limits within which producer cooperative could operate.  
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characteristics.
2 
A number of studies reveal that the screening process of the 
cooperatives resulted in a cocoa bean quality higher than that supplied by independent 
farmers (Nowell, 1938; Ton et al., 2008).  
 
6.2.2 Price Differentiation 
The British colonial government expected that the screening process of cooperatives 
would gradually replace the system of selling cocoa through private brokers. However, 
between 1937 and 1957, a number of important events occurred in the cocoa sector of 
Ghana that re-shaped cocoa trading activities. For instance, in 1937 the international 
cocoa merchants formed an oligopolistic cartel to collude on minimum prices for 
farmers. Cocoa producers, who had been well organized through the growing numbers 
of cooperative societies, countervailed these cartel prices with boycotts and agitations. 
The colonial government responded by creating a new market system where cocoa 
trading activities were to be coordinated by a marketing board which was to buy all 
cocoa beans at differentiated prices based on quality grades, i.e. the Gold Coast Cocoa 
Marketing Board (now Ghana COCOBOD).
3
 A new law, “The Cocoa Industry 
Regulation of 1950’’, spelled out cocoa quality grading standards and a modality for 
differentiating prices based on grades. Furthermore, the law transferred produce 
inspection and grading responsibilities from the Department of Agriculture to the 
Quality Control Division of the Marketing Board. In 1953 the government finally 
introduced cocoa price differentiation which targeted both cooperatives and 
independent farmers.  
The price differentiation policy collapsed the same year it was introduced, 
largely because of lack of trust, high operating costs, and a general lack of interest by 
international cocoa merchants (Amoah, 1998; Leiter and Harding, 2004). Trust 
problems arose on two levels. First, at the international level, chocolate manufacturers, 
cocoa grinding companies and merchants could not agree on what constituted bean 
quality. As explained by Leiter and Harding (2004), while manufacturers and grinders 
were interested in difficult to determine flavour characteristics, merchants could only 
guarantee a consistent produce with minimized physical defects. So, manufacturers 
and grinders did not pay a premium for quality. Second, at the production level 
farmers and cocoa graders could not agree on physical standards and test results. 
Consequently, cocoa sector actors (especially manufacturers) pushed against the policy 
of price differentiation (Gordon, 1976).  
                                                 
2
 The cocoa market in the 1930s was not under the supervision of a marketing board. About 10 
international commodity merchants directly purchased cocoa beans from farmers for export. 
3
 The Gold Coast Cocoa marketing Board (GCMB) presently known as the Ghana Cocoa Board 
(COCOBOD) was brought into being by the colonial law Ordinance No. 16 of 1947. 
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The cost of operating a price-differentiation scheme, related to grading, 
transportation, and covering remote areas, was too high as compared to the extra 
revenues obtained at the export market. The costs were also high because farmers 
supplied both good and poor quality grades for testing. Beforehand, it was erroneously 
expected that the new pricing policy would lead to self-selection among farmers. That 
is, farmers would be motivated to supply only cocoa of high quality for testing in 
return to the payment of higher prices.  
 
6.2.3 Minimum quality standards with a bonus 
When the price differentiation policy failed, the Cocoa Industry Regulations of 1954 
was passed. The new law discarded the price differentiation component of the market 
but required the establishment of grading facilities in cocoa-growing communities 
across the country. The Cocoa Regulations of 1954 set a clear minimum quality 
standard, below which supply was not acceptable. The regulations also laid out 
punitive measures, including even jail terms for deliberate supply of cocoa below the 
minimum quality standard. Quality grading was implemented not only as an incentive 
mechanism for farmers but also to signal to the international cocoa market that Ghana 
is committed to guarantee the export of premium quality cocoa beans. A number of 
companies were licensed to purchase cocoa beans from farmers. Among these 
companies was the United Ghana Farmers’ Cooperative Council (UGFCC), the 
umbrella union of the cooperative societies. By 1961, adopting the UGFCC as its 
farmers’ wing, the Ghanaian socialist government directed that the council should be 
the sole licenced cocoa buyer. The operation of the UGFCC was not different from the 
earlier activities of cooperatives. The council purchased cocoa beans from both 
members and independent farmers at one price, upgraded the beans, and sold them to 
COCOBOD. Farmers were then paid a bonus by COCOBOD for supplying cocoa 
above the minimum quality standard (Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011).
4
 
After 1966, when the socialist government lost power, UGFCC and its 
cooperatives were confronted with organizational and managerial problems. 
Subsequent governments banned the UGFCC and stopped their purchasing activities. 
Farmers lost their capacity to organize themselves freely and their political clout was 
reduced. Furthermore, widespread corruption and mismanagement of cooperative 
funds were reported across the country. This led to organizational problems and of 
lack of trust. Eventually the cooperative structure collapsed. In response, COCOBOD 
tried to license more private buying companies to purchase cocoa on minimum quality 
standards at a uniform price. However, these private companies were unable to 
                                                 
4
 This bonus system evolved over time. Currently, farmers receive a bonus for supplying more of bigger-sized 
“main crop” cocoa beans 
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generate profit in the market. In 1978, a single state-owned buyer, the Produce Buying 
Company (CPC), was introduced. The CPC operated on the minimum quality 
standards and paid uniform prices for quality till the cocoa sector reforms in 1992.  
Under the minimum quality standards Ghana was able to maintain consistent 
supply of quality cocoa beans to the export market (Acquaah, 1999). Grading activities 
at farmgate together with the punitive measures for supplying poor quality cocoa and 
the prospect of a quality bonus may have induced self-selection among farmers and 
ensured the supply of quality cocoa beans. In addition to farmers selecting themselves 
to supply good quality cocoa, the screening activities of cooperatives and/or CPC may 
also explain the consistency in the quality of cocoa beans COCOBOD received and 
exported up to 1992. Grading activities at farmgate also brought farmers and cocoa 
officers together to interact regularly on quality standards. This interaction led to 
learning among farmers about the best ways to achieve the required quality (Amoah, 
1998). 
 
6.2.4 Multiple mechanisms under liberalization 
In 1992, as part of a gradual reform of the cocoa sector that started in 1984, the market 
was once again liberalized. COCOBOD set out regulations which governed the re-
introduction of private companies into the internal market. Another step taken by 
COCOBOD was to abolish grading activities at farm-gate. Grading activities were to 
be carried out at district depots of licenced buying companies (LBCs). Quality grading 
was no longer an incentive mechanism for providing incentives to farmers. Licenced 
buying companies were to act as the new screening device. They were to buy cocoa 
which met minimum quality standards, upgrade the purchased beans, and forward 
quality grades to COCOBOD qualifying for onward export for an agreed upon margin. 
Cocoa beans which failed to meet minimum quality standards are either discarded or 
in some case sold at a lower price to companies licenced by COCOBPOD to purchase 
“waste cocoa”. Waste cocoa purchases occur only in isolated parts of the cocoa belt o 
Ghana. COCOBOD continued to fix an annual guaranteed minimum producer price. 
Further price and non-price strategies were left to LBCs, including the decision to pay 
for higher quality grades (Fold, 2001). 
Consequently, in the liberalized market, LBCs and international actors of the 
chocolate chain were able to employ different mechanisms to provide incentives for 
farmers to supply quality cocoa. In effect, cooperative structures and certification 
schemes emerged together with the minimum quality standards system. In previous 
chapters of this thesis, aspects of certification mechanisms for eliciting quality cocoa 
beans from farmers have been analysed (see Chapter 5). It was observed that 
traceability systems, where all cocoa beans can be traced to the farm where it was 
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produced, as well as payment of a premium over and above the market producer price 
were the main mechanisms of certification programs. These mechanisms ensured that 
the problem of asymmetric information that is inherent to the current minimum quality 
standards approach by COCOBOD was significantly reduced.  
With LBCs free to choose their incentive structures, test-cum-fee mechanisms 
present a plausible alternative. The advantage of test-cum mechanisms is that they 
address the costs encountered by the government under the price differentiation market 
system (Section 6.2.2) while at the same time it reduces the cost of upgrading. In the 
following section, a theoretical model of a test-cum-fee pricing rule is outlined to 
demonstrate how it leads to the supply of higher volumes of quality cocoa at lower 
upgrading costs. 
6.3 Model with a test-cum-fee pricing rule 
To guide our quasi-experiment and empirical strategy, we present a simple model that 
illustrates how self-selection behaviour among cocoa farmers can be induced through a 
test-cum-fee pricing rule. 
The model starts with assuming a population of cocoa farmers that supply 
cocoa beans of heterogeneous quality. Suppose each farmer knows the quality of the 
beans he or she supplies, e.g. through their employed production methods and exerted 
effort, but LBCs are unable to obtain this information before buying. Suppose there is 
a specific LBC that seeks to resolve this information problem by offering a menu of 
prices to farmers with two options. First, farmers can supply their cocoa beans in the 
traditional way, where their produce is subjected to a simple quality test and where 
they receive a producer price    for every bag that passes the test. This price is the 
same as what other LBCs pay. For simplicity, all cocoa beans produced by farmers are 
assumed to meet the standards of this simple test, so that their quality is at least of 
Grade II (lower than Grade I). Second, farmers may subject their produce to a more 
elaborate test that, to some extent, can determine whether the quality of a bag of cocoa 
beans is of Grade I. Cocoa beans that pass this test are rewarded with a higher price    
per bag (     ) and beans that fail receive the usual price   . To have their beans 
tested, however, farmers must pay a fee   per bag. The second option on the menu 
thus has a “carrot and stick” format (Mirrlees, 1997).  
A number of crucial assumptions are made here about the power of the second 
option on the menu to predict the private information farmers have about their bean 
quality. Let   denote the quality of a bag of cocoa and      the true probability that 
this bag passes the elaborate test. To fix ideas,   is a strictly increasing function with 
       and   approaches 1 if   goes to infinity. Suppose that farmers do not know 
this true probability of passing the test, but can make an estimate   ̃    of their own 
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probability of passing. For simplicity, this estimate is a weighted average of one half, 
representing a fifty-fifty guess, and the true probability: 
  ̃     
 
 
                (1) 
Parameter           is a constant that indicates the degree of inaccuracy of 
individual perceptions. The higher  , the less information a farmer has about the 
probability that his or her bag will pass the test. It is assumed that all farmers have the 
same perception parameter    
Given these assumptions, we now probe the question: which option does the 
farmer choose? A risk-neutral farmer will opt for the special test if the cocoa quality is 
such that the expected returns exceed the general producer price  
  ̃         (    ̃   )              (2) 
which comes to 
  ̃                      (3) 
Hence, a farmer will subject his or her beans to this test if the expected price 
premium   ̃             is larger than the test fee. 
 Figure 6.1 illustrates the decision of a farmer with a bag of cocoa quality   by 
confronting the subjective probability of passing   ̃   , indicated by the “S-curve”, 
with the ratio of fee and price premium           . It is seen that if this ratio is 
such that  
 
 
 
 
       
   
 
 
       (4) 
there exists a positive cut-off level  ̂ such that farmers with cocoa beans of quality 
less than  ̂ will supply their beans in the traditional way and receive      while 
farmers with beans of quality more than  ̂ will pay the fee and subject their beans to 
the special test. Hence, farmers at the lower tail of the quality distribution will turn 
down the second option because it is likely that their cocoa will be rejected by the 
special test, so that they will end up with both the cost of paying the fee and the low 
price    . An appropriate combination of prices and fee thus can induce such self-
selection on the part of farmers that applications with low-quality bags are 
discouraged.  
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Figure 6.1 The self-selection mechanism 
 
Inspecting equations (3) and (4), we see a number of conditions that are 
crucial for creating this self-selection. First, the LBC must demand a positive fee, i.e. 
   . If there was no fee, all farmers would apply for the special test. Second, 
farmers must have some knowledge about the true test scheme (θ < 1). If    , so if 
farmers guess that the passing probability is fifty-fifty, the LBC cannot create any 
self-selection with their pricing rule. Third, the price premium        the LBC 
offers on top of the producer price must not be too high, nor must the fee be too low. 
Otherwise, a risk-neutral farmer will not apply. Similarly, a too low price premium or 
a too high fee would deter all farmers from applying, making the special-test option 
redundant. Finally, note that if farmers would be risk averse, a given combination of 
price premium and fee would result in fewer applications for the special test as 
compared with the case of risk neutrality, since farmers then also demand 
compensation for taking the risky option.  
What are the welfare implications for farmers and LBC? Farmers who face 
these two options could improve their payoffs. Those who choose the standard option 
are equally well off as before, when the LBC did not provide the alternative. Those 
who apply for the special test option are clearly better off in an ex ante sense 
(otherwise they would not have applied). Ex post things are different. Farmers whose 
q
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beans are rejected receive      per bag and when accepted they receive      
   . 
Creating self-selection on the part of the farmers favours the LBC for two 
basic reasons. First, fewer bags of cocoa are now supplied for testing. So the costs of 
carrying out the special test are lower (granting that the fee is less than the individual 
test cost). Second, the sorting of beans into a low-quality and high-quality class 
enables the LBC to cut upgrading costs. In practice, after buying the cocoa beans, 
any LBC has to upgrade the cocoa beans in order to be able to sell it at a uniform 
price to COCOBOD.
5
 We can safely assume that the upgrading cost of a bag of 
cocoa falls, when grading has been carried out already. For example, suppose beans 
beyond quality q* do not need to be upgraded. Then offering a price premium and fee 
such that   ̃                implies that only the class of low-quality beans 
requires upgrading. 
These are gains that apply to a given production. More importantly is the 
observation that over time farmers and LBC can increase their gains, because farmers 
will have an incentive to improve their production practices and efforts to increase 
the quality of their supply and so submit more beans for testing.  
6.4 Empirical strategy 
6.4.1 Quasi-experiment and data 
The central aim of this study was to test if farmers will select themselves to supply 
higher volumes of quality cocoa beans when they are able to sell in differentiated 
markets. We therefore exposed a number of farmers to a menu of price options. 
These farmers could sell any proportion of their produce to a selected LBC either in 
the traditional way or through a test-cum-fee application as described in the 
theoretical model. The response of these “treated” farmers, in terms of the quantity 
and quality of cocoa beans supplied, was then compared with farmers who received a 
uniform price for all quality grades. This quasi-experiment was conducted in the 
Suhum Cocoa District from November to April in the 2011/12 cropping season and 
repeated over the same period in the 2012/13 cropping season.  
As discussed in Section 6.3, self-selection behaviour depends partly on the 
price of higher quality grades      and test fees    . To ensure that these parameters 
were realistic before the menu of prices were offered, a group discussion was 
organized with farmers, extension officers, and cocoa buyers. The discussion used 
information on the premium payments by other organizations, some of the findings in 
our previous studies (see Chapter 3), outcomes of previous stakeholder workshops, 
                                                 
5
 Upgrading activities of LBCs include bulking all cocoa beans purchased, sorting out poor quality cocoa beans 
and other foreign material, and re-drying when the produce is not sufficiently dried. 
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and experiences of LBCs and farmers. Based on these consultations the following 
parameters were set: 
Quality standards: For the purposes of this study, two quality grades were 
defined. A bag of cocoa was classified as Grade I if it contained less than 25% 
physical defects. Otherwise, it was marked as Grade II. The standard “Cut test” was 
employed to determine the level of physical defects. This test involves sampling a 
quantity of beans from each side of the cocoa bag. 100 beans are randomly selected 
from this sample. Each bean is cut lengthwise through the middle in order to expose 
the surface of the cotyledons. Both halves are examined in full daylight to assess 
whether it contains any physical defect (Schwan, 1998). A count was then made of 
the non-defective beans to determine the quality score.  
Test fee: A one kg fee was charged for every standard 62.5 kg bag submitted 
for the Cut test. The literature suggests that 1 kg per bag is the generally accepted 
limit to which farmers are willing to pay for levies and fees (Baah, 2008). 
Prices: For   , we took the current market producer price.    was set at 105% 
of this price (i.e.,                ), implying a price premium of about 3 kg for 
every standard bag of cocoa.  
A couple of months before the start of the experiment, farmers were informed 
about the test-cum-fee option. Test-cum-fee activities were carried out once a month 
during the experimentation period. Practically, during the cocoa season, farmers had 
cocoa beans ready for the market almost every week. We therefore took measures to 
avoid denying them of their incomes. When the situation arose such that their cocoa 
beans were ready for sale before the test-cum-fee process opened, the 1 kg fee was 
charged, and the produce was assessed for dryness and other criteria carried out in 
the traditional market. Farmers were then paid the regular producer price   . A 
sample of their beans was taken and stored. On a typical day of test-cum-fee, every 
produce submitted so far to test-cum-fee was subjected to the standard cut-test and 
eventually the price premium was paid. In control communities, we allowed the 
traditional process to go on uninterrupted. Farmers were paid    for every bag of 
cocoa beans sold. Samples were taken from farmers’ beans for testing. 
A two-step approach was followed to assign farmers into treated or control 
groups. First, four farmer based organizations (FBOs) were selected from different 
communities that are at least 5 km apart. The FBOs were selected on a number of 
criteria. First, they were to have enough members from which we could sample up to 
20 members. Second, two of the four FBOs had to be involved in our earlier 
participatory farmer research on quality-enhancing good agricultural practices 
(Chapter 4). Finally, the FBOs were to have one buyer to whom the majority of their 
members already sold their beans to. We chose to work with FBOs because it was 
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easier to organize farmers.
6
 Based on these criteria, we selected the FBOs in the 
villages of Duodukrom and Anum Asuogya with whom we had already worked 
during the farmer participatory research. One FBO in each of the villages of Otwe 
and Besease, which were not part of our participatory research activities, were also 
selected. The FBOs in Duodukrom and Besease were treated with the menu of prices 
while those in Otwe and Anum Asuogya were left as control. In each of the FBOs we 
sampled a random subset of farmers to obtain data for our analysis.  
Before proceeding to the data gathered from this quasi-experiment, a few 
design issues and limitations which came up deserve discussion. First, we did not 
have data on an alternative menu of prices. Hence, the analyses presented in this 
paper strictly apply to one specific combination of test fee (1kg) and price premium 
(3kg). This implies that other combinations of fee and price premiums may have 
resulted in different self-selection outcomes. Second, the timing of announcement of 
the menu of prices to farmers in the first season was rather late, as most of the 
production investment decisions had been made by farmers in earlier months, 
although they could still work on the quality of their produce through their post-
harvest practices. Hence, it was expected that the first year would be a learning 
phase, where farmers could also become familiar with the test-cum-fee option and 
the accuracy of the test, while the second year could generate much clearer results. 
Finally, we were unable to estimate correctly the volume of beans a farmer sold to 
other LBCs than those we worked with. Hence the variable “cocoa beans supplied” in 
this chapter does not necessarily refer to total production.  
Data were obtained from 60 treated and 40 control farmers, so 30 from each 
treated village and 20 from each control village. Self-selection behaviour was 
indicated by the proportion of the total yearly supply of cocoa beans by a farmer that 
is submitted to test-cum-fee. Hence, the main data of interest were the total volume 
of cocoa beans supplied, proportion of this amount submitted to test-cum-fee, and 
their quality scores. It was also expected that exogenous socio-economic 
characteristics to influence farmer behaviour. Therefore, a semi-structured 
questionnaire was employed to elicit information about farmers household and farm 
characteristics at the beginning of the program.  
6.4.2 Methodology 
The first exercise of this paper was to assess the extent to which exposure to a menu 
of prices improves the overall quality and quantity of cocoa beans supplied. To 
achieve this we employed difference-in-difference estimation which allowed us to 
                                                 
6
 Opening the test-cum-fee treatment to the entire community implied paying quality premiums which were 
beyond the budget of this PhD research. 
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estimate an “average treatment effect” by comparing the average change in quantity 
and quality of cocoa beans supplied by farmers. This approach allowed us to estimate 
the changes in supply and quality attributed to the introduction of a menu of prices. 
The theoretical model presented earlier suggests that a necessary condition for self-
selection is exposure to the test-cum fee option. How much self-selection takes place 
depends on farmers’ risk preference, perception about the test, and production. Hence 
we estimated a regression model which controlled for these factors in order to obtain 
the true treatment effect. 
Next, the study focused on farmers who were exposed to a menu of prices. We 
assessed their self-selection behaviour by first plotting a kernel density distribution 
function (Figure 6.2). From the density function, we could a binomial pattern of self-
selection behaviour among farmers facing a menu of prices could be observed One 
set of farmers supplied about half of their produce to test-cum-fee while another set 
supplied most of their beans.  
Figure 6.2 Distribution of proportion of supply submitted to test 
Following this distribution, we run a logistic regression to predict the effect of 
socio-economic characteristics on self-selection behaviour in the presence of a menu 
of prices. Our theoretical model suggests that self-selection behaviour is influenced 
by individual risk preference, perception and understanding of the test properties, and 
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production capacities. The socio-economic characteristics would presumably give us 
an indication of the effect of these parameters. The logistic regression analysis with 
self-selection behaviour as dependent variable and the socio-economic characteristics 
as independent variables was performed using the logit commands of Stata 12.0 
software as follows: 
Given a farmer with characteristics           
         |           
 
                              
 , (11) 
which transforms into 
             ⁄                          ,  (12) 
where α is a constant,    represents the coefficient of     independent (continuous or 
dichotomous ) variable     of farmer i (j = 1, 2….m). The dependent variable    is an 
ordered dichotomous variable representing 0 and 1 if the farmer submitted up to 75% 
and more than 75% of total supply to test-cum-fee, respectively.  
A number of independent variables entered the regression. These variables 
were grouped into three sets: a first one consisting of variables that presumably 
indicated risk preferences, a second set with variables that were likely related to 
farmer’s perception of the test and understanding of the new price mechanism, and a 
third set consisting of variables that possibly indicated the degree to which farmers 
were constrained in producing quality cocoa. 
Underlying the first set with risk-preference indicators was the intuition that 
the test-cum-fee option implies risking the test fee. Hence, among farmers with the 
same volume of quality cocoa, those with less risk aversion are likely to supply a 
higher proportion to this option. The risk preference variables included age, gender, 
experience, farm size, dependence on cocoa, share crop status, and size of farm 
holding. Age was captured in years. Our hypothesis was that younger farmers were 
less risk averse (or more risk-loving). Hence, we expected that self-selection 
behaviour decreases with age. The gender variable was dichotomous, 1 for male and 
0 for female. Women were expected to take fewer risks than men, hence, self-
selection behaviour was expected to be higher among male farmers. Dependence on 
cocoa may also influence risk preference. This dependence factor was captured by a 
number between 0 and 100 representing the proportion of cocoa in family income. As 
we did not have a way of estimating a farmer’s real income, we simply asked them to 
make an estimate of this percentage. It was hypothesised that farmers who depend 
more on cocoa will be more cautious about losing income through the fee, and so will 
show less self-selection behaviour. Sharecropping was defined as a dichotomous 
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variable which stated whether a farmer owned all his farms (value is 0) or 
sharecropped some of them (value is 1). The behaviour of sharecroppers should be 
analysed with caution since it may depend on their interaction with land owners. 
Holding this omitted variable constant, however, land owners were expected to have 
the freedom to take more risks than share croppers. Similarly, farmers with larger 
holdings were expected to be able to take more risks associated with losing cocoa 
beans (which is implied by the test-cum-fee price menu) and hence supply a higher 
proportion of their beans to test-cum-fee. 
The second set of variables consists of indicators that could have influenced 
farmers’ perception about the new price mechanism (formalized by   in Section 6.3). 
Perception-related variables included education and migration. Education represented 
the number of years of formal education. It was expected that more educated farmers 
would find it easier to understand the mechanism of test-cum-fee and hence supply 
more of their beans to the special test. Migration is a discrete variable which defined 
farmers as originating from the villages they live in (value is 1) or migrants from 
other communities (value is 0). Coming from different backgrounds may affect the 
social groups and networks farmers join and the extent to which they discuss the test-
cum-fee option on the menu (Zetlin, 2009). We did not have an a priori expectation 
of this variable as it is difficult to predict how farmers in different circles perceived 
the test-cum-fee option. 
The third set of variables relates to factors which constrain farmers’ capacity 
to supply higher quality cocoa beans. Holding risk preference and perceptions about 
the test-cum-fee process constant, our theoretical model suggests that farmers will 
not apply for testing if they do not have cocoa beans which meet the higher 
standards. Variables which we expected to constrain farmers’ supply of quality 
produce were household size, participation in participatory research, and experience. 
Supply of quality cocoa beans involves many steps, particularly post-harvest 
activities of pod breaking, fermentation, drying and polishing (Dongo and Sogwa, 
2009). These activities normally involve the use of household labour (Abenyega and 
Gockowski, 2003). Hence, other factors held constant, we expected that farmers in 
bigger households will have extra hands to take care of their cocoa which will allow 
them to supply cocoa of higher quality. Taking part in our previous participatory 
research program built the capacity of farmers to enhance the production of quality 
cocoa beans (see Chapter 4). Hence, in line with our findings in Chapter 4, we 
expected that participants would supply a higher proportion of their produce to test-
cum fee compared to those who were trained under the conventional extension 
system. Similarly, we expected experienced farmers to be able to take better care of 
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their cocoa, produce more quality beans, and supply a higher proportion to test-cum-
fee. 
Finally, although we allocated the variables to three different sets, we also 
expected certain variables to play a role in more than one category. For instance, 
while educated farmers may form better perceptions about the test-cum-fee option on 
the menu than less educated farmers, they are probably also able to better manage the 
quality of their produce and take calculated risks. Farmers with big household may 
have better capacity to manage quality than those with a small household, but also 
have more need for income and hence be cautious about losing revenue through the 
test-cum-fee option. 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Response of supply and quality to a menu of prices 
The influence of introducing a menu of prices on the supply of cocoa beans and on 
their quality is explored in Table 6.1, using non-parametric difference-in-difference 
estimates. Per hectare, both treated and control farmers in the experiment 
significantly increased the average supply of cocoa beans to the LBC in the second 
season compared to the first. 
Table 6.1 Change in quantity and quality of cocoa bean supply per hectare among 
farmers in the entire sample
1
 
1
 Figures represent means. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Estimated mean attributed to the 
treatment is given by [(A-B) - (D-C)]. *p<0.05 
 
Yet, the difference between these two increases cannot be attributed to the 
menu of prices; the treatment effect was not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Recall that the limitations of our data do not allow us to draw conclusions on the 
 Kilograms per hectare Quality scores 
 
 
 
Treated  
farmers  
[A] 
Control  
farmers 
[B] 
Diff. 
 
[A-B] 
Treated 
 farmers  
[A] 
Control  
farmers 
[B] 
Diff. 
 
[A-B] 
Season 1 [C] 275.3 
(136.02) 
235.2  
(210.04) 
40.1 69.3  
(4.15) 
67.0  
(3.51) 
2.3* 
Season 2 [D] 322.9  
(180.94) 
342.3  
(496.3) 
-19.4 74.2  
(3.30) 
69.2  
(5.304) 
5.0* 
Difference [D-C] 47.6* 107.1* -59.5 4.9* 2.2 2.7* 
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effect of the menu of price treatment on production. However, the price menu 
opportunity resulted in a significant increase in quality scores of cocoa beans 
supplied by treated farmers compared to control farmers. Treated farmers increased 
the quality of their beans significantly (from 69% to 74%) in the second season 
compared to the first, while for control farmers it remained similar. Therefore, the 
introduction of the price menu significantly raised the quality of cocoa supplied by 
2.7 percent.  
In Table 6.2, we explore the extent to which the observed change in quality 
scores between control and treated farmers is confounded by socioeconomic 
variables. In column (1) we report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results 
for the first season in which the experiment was held and in column (2) OLS 
regression results for the second season. The data sets were separated because we 
suspected farmers’ response to be more realistic in the second season due to the 
design issues (see Section 6.4.1). 
For both OLS specifications we observe a significant positive relationship 
between exposure to a menu of prices and average quality of cocoa beans per hectare. 
Socioeconomic variables of interest here are previous involvement in our farmer 
participatory research (see Chapter 4), migration status, and the extent to which 
farmers depended on cocoa as a source of livelihood. In both seasons, farmers who had 
previously learnt about quality-enhancing practices supplied a significantly better 
quality of  4 percent points more compared with farmers who did not join the learning 
program. Whereas in the first season indigenes responded differently from migrants by 
supplying a lower quality of their produce, in the second year there was no significant 
difference in supplied quality. In the second year, we observed a positive significant 
relationship between dependence on cocoa and the quality of cocoa beans supplied. 
This could be explained by the strong commitment of people who depend on cocoa for 
their livelihood. 
In column (3), we estimate the change in cocoa quality between the first and 
second season attributable to our treatment while controlling for other characteristics 
(by ignoring design issues and pooling the data in order to regress the quality score of 
the farmer on their socioeconomic characteristics and a time variable). The results 
confirm our findings in Table 6.1 that due to the menu of prices, cocoa farmers in the 
study area increased their cocoa bean quality significantly by 3 percent points. The 
results are similar to those in the first season, but only migrants and indigenous 
farmers did not differ in the extent to which they improved their cocoa bean quality 
over time. Similar to the results of the second season, dependence on cocoa had a 
significant and positive effect on quality over the experimental period.  
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Table 6.2 Results of regression of quality of cocoa beans supplied by farmers  
 
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) 
Constant 
65.111  
(2.686)* 
63.892 
(2.910)* 
62.443 
(1.991)* 
Treatment with price menu 
2.939 
(1.297)* 
3.153 
(1.401)* 
3.036 
(0.955)* 
Season  
  
4.221 
(0.514)* 
Involved in participatory research  
3.955 
(1.208)* 
3.911 
(1.286)* 
3.939 
(0.881)* 
Age 
-0.014 
(0.039) 
-0.005 
(0.041) 
-0.005 
(0.028) 
Sex 
-0.124 
(0.972) 
-1.498 
(1.044) 
0.703 
(0.713) 
Household size 
0.104 
(0.139) 
-0.131 
(0.149) 
0.117 
(0.102) 
Migration status 
-1.879 
(0.880)* 
-0.381 
(0.947) 
-1.123 
(0.646) 
Education 
-0.067 
(0.132) 
-0.002 
(0.142) 
-0.033 
(0.097) 
Size of other farms 
0.004 
(0.120) 
0.015 
(0.129) 
0.011 
(0.088)* 
Dependence 
0.008 
(0.017) 
0.047 
(0.018)* 
0.027 
(0.012)* 
Experience 
0.032 
(0.033) 
-0.002 
(0.035) 
0.014 
(0.024) 
Off-farm income 
-1.084 
(0.802) 
-0.095 
(0.861) 
-0.590 
(0.589) 
Share crop 
-0.941 
(0.830) 
-0.438 
(0.902) 
-0.682 
(0.612) 
Size of cocoa farm 
0.093 
(0.059) 
0.094 
(0.078) 
0.091 
(0.047) 
Sample size 97 97 194 
Adjusted R
2
 0.222 0.297 0.408 
F 3.11* 4.12* 10.50* 
OLS refers to Ordinary Least Squares regression method. Dependent variable = quality score (ranges 
between 0-100). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p<0.05. 
6.5.2 Self-selection behaviour 
The evidence compiled in the previous tables confirms an overall improvement in 
quality in the presence of price differentiation with test-cum-fee. However it does not 
reveal whether farmers will opt to sort out the best quality cocoa beans for sale. To 
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address this issue, we turn our attention to only farmers who received the menu of 
prices (the treated farmers). The proportion of cocoa beans these farmers submitted to 
the test-cum-fee option rather than to the single-price option was compared (Table 
6.3). It was already found that over the two seasons, the total supply per hectare of 
cocoa beans did not change significantly (Table 6.1). However, the average amount 
submitted to the test-cum-fee option per hectare went from 95 kg in the first season to 
202 kg in the second. Proportion wise, farmers submitted about 35% of their produce 
to the test-cum-fee option in the first season, and this significantly increased to 63% in 
the following season.  
Table 6.3 The amount of cocoa beans as part of the total (kg/ha) submitted to test-
cum-fee option (n=60)
1
 
 
 
 
Yield per 
hectare [A] 
Amount 
submitted  
to test-cum-fee 
[B] 
Difference 
 
[A-B] 
Proportion 
Season 1 [C] 275.3 
(136.02) 
95.5 
(264.42) 
179.8 34.85 
Season 2 [D] 322.9  
(180.94) 
202.2 
(635.11) 
120.7 62.63 
Difference [D-C]  47.6* 111.7* -59.1 27.78* 
1
 Standard deviations are in parentheses. *p<0.05  
Table 6.4 indicates the impact of the self-selection behaviour of treated farmers 
on the quality of their produce, by comparing the quality score of beans submitted to 
the test-cum-fee option and that submitted to the single-price option. Over the two 
seasons, the average quality score of beans supplied to the test-cum-fee option 
increased significantly by 7 percent points. This significant increase was 3 points more 
than the change (although also significant) in average quality score of the beans 
submitted to the simple test that goes with the single-price option.  
The result in Table 6.3 further shows that in the first year, there was no 
significant difference in the qualities of cocoa beans submitted to both options on the 
menu. As we discussed in Section 6.4.1, this observation showed that farmers were 
probably trying out the new market arrangement. A serious application of the test-
cum-fee process was in the second season. Table 6.5 therefore reports the results of a 
logistic regression using data from the second season to explain the determinants of 
the self-selection behaviour observed in Table 6.3 and 6.4. 
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Table 6.4 Comparison of quality of cocoa beans submitted by the treated farmers to 
test-cum-fee option and single price option (n=60)
1
 
 
 
 
Quality scores 
of beans submitted 
to test-cum-fee option 
[A] 
Quality scores of 
beans submitted to 
single-price option 
[B] 
Difference 
 
 
[A-B] 
Season 1 [C] 69.7  
(5.24) 
69.1  
(4.47) 
0.6 
Season 2 [D] 76.7  
(5.60) 
73.1  
(4.20) 
3.6* 
Difference [D-C]  7.0* 4.0* 3.0* 
1
 Figures represent means. Standard deviations are in parenthesis.*p<0.05  
 
The dependent variable is an ordered dichotomous variable that captures the 
two patterns of self-selection behaviour pictured in Figure 6.2. It equals 0 if the farmer 
submitted up to 75% and equals 1 if the farmer submitted more than 75% of his or her 
total supply to test-cum-fee (see Section 6.4.2). Holding other factors constant, farmers 
who took part in the participatory research were 71% more likely to supply more than 
75% of their total supply to the test-cum-fee option, as compared with farmers who did 
not have this training. Similarly, farmers with one more household member were 4% 
more likely to supply such a high proportion to the test-cum-fee option. Farmers with 
an extra year of formal education were 7.5% more likely to submit such a high 
proportion for testing. Another variable with a significant positive sign was the size of 
the cocoa farm. Cropping an extra hectare of cocoa farm increased the probability of 
supplying more than 75% for testing by almost 2%. Also migration status influenced 
the extent of self-selection behaviour. Farmers who migrated to the treated 
communities in the past were 29% more likely to supply a high proportion for testing, 
as compared with indigenes.  
An outcome in Table 6.5 was that farmers who depend on cocoa were likely to 
exhibit more self-selection behaviour rather than less. As discussed in Section 6.4.2, 
we expected such farmers would be more cautious about losing income through the 
fee, and so would opt more for the single-price option. Yet the results (Table 6.5) 
suggest that farmers whose proportion of cocoa income in total income is 1% higher 
than that of other farmers were 0.6% more likely to supply more than 75% of their 
beans for testing.  
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Table 6.5 Logit estimation of the determinants of self-selection behaviour among 
“exposed farmers”  
 Marginal effects 
Involved in participatory research  
0.714 
(0.145)* 
Age 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Sex 
0.084 
(0.122) 
Household size 
0.042 
(0.022)* 
Migration status 
-0.293 
(0.127)* 
Education 
0.075 
(0.035)* 
Size of other farms 
0.038 
(0.028) 
Dependence 
0.006 
(0.004)* 
Experience 
-0.182 
(0.190) 
Share crop 
0.135 
(0.129) 
Size of cocoa farm 
0.019 
(0.111)* 
Observations 60 
Pseudo r square 0.400 
LR chi-square 30.51* 
Dependent variable equals 0 if the farmer supplied to 75% and 1 if the farmer supplied more than 75% 
of total supply to test-cum-fee (see Section6.4.2). *p<0.05. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
6.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Overall, our results reinforce the argument made by several authors that, whereas 
Ghana is a net producer of premium quality cocoa beans, Ghanaian cocoa farmers can 
still do more (Hainmueller et al., 2011; Williams, 2009; Osei, 2007; Laven et al., 
2007). Extensive evidence exists to support the idea that farmers respond significantly 
in terms of output to price changes (Armah, 2009; Bateman, 1965). We contributed to 
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this evidence by filling a hitherto unexplored gap. We showed that in the presence of a 
governance structure (specifically a menu of prices) that directly addresses the 
problem of asymmetric information, farmers significantly improve cocoa bean quality. 
This result provides empirical support for a number of studies which have previously 
argued for price differentiation by quality in the cocoa market (Leiter and Harding, 
2004). This literature however ignores one basic pitfall: rewarding producers of better 
quality cocoa financially without imposing some direct form of punishment or cost on 
bad performers may not yield the desired results. We therefore assessed the impact of 
a governance structure that blends both punishments and rewards in a “carrot and 
stick” fashion on farmers’ response in terms of supply of quality produce. We 
observed that the test-cum-fee aspects we built in our price differentiation mechanism 
signalled the prospects of a fair reward to farmers and, hence, elicited increased effort 
from the majority of farmers towards enhancing bean quality. This explains why cocoa 
beans supplied to both options on the price menu exhibited improvement over time.  
Following our theoretical model, the finding of significant positive self-
selection behaviour (i.e., a high proportion of total supply submitted to the test-cum-
fee option of the price menu) can be explained in three ways. First, given similar 
yields, farmers with different ability to learn or form different perceptions about the 
new price mechanism will make different choices. Specifically, a better informed 
farmer will show more self-selection behaviour. One factor which expands a farmer’s 
scope of inference as well as his ability to access and process agricultural information 
is education (Meenambigai, 2003). We indeed observed that farmers with more years 
of formal education exhibited more self-selection behaviour. In their study on 
Ghanaian cocoa farmers, Baffoe-Asare et al. (2013) have argued that extra training in 
farm practices re-enforces farmers’ experience and up-grades their ability to learn 
about innovations. This may explain why farmers who were involved in our previous 
participatory research activities engaged more in self-selection, as they presumably 
were more able to understand the implications of the test-cum-fee option than non-
participants. Farmers’ ability to learn and their perceptions may also improve with 
their social interactions. According to Zetlin (2009), who studied technology adoption 
behaviour of Ghanaian cocoa farmers, migration status influences the social networks 
of producers. It is likely that discussions among farmers belonging to different social 
groups or ethnic groups may result in different views on the new pricing rule. This 
may, to some extent, explain the observed difference in the self-selection patterns 
between indigenous and migrant farmers.  
For a better understanding of their different responses, we turn to the second 
explanation of the observed self-selection behaviour: the role of risk preferences. The 
test-cum-fee pricing rule necessitates risky decisions by farmers. As we observed in 
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Chapter 4, a quantity of cocoa beans from farmers will always contain some defective 
beans. Opting to sell cocoa through the test-cum-fee option therefore implies a risk of 
failing the test and thus losing the test fee. Hence, in addition to differences in 
information, and divergent risk preferences among farmers may explain the observed 
pattern of self-selection. Hill (1997) has chronicled how cocoa farming in Southern 
Ghana (including our study area) was developed through capitalist migrants. One 
would therefore expect that migrant farmers will be more adventurous in exploiting 
price differentiation. This was confirmed by our data. Some literature also suggests 
that in general Ghanaian cocoa farmers, most of them being smallholders, are risk-
averse (Aneani et al., 2012; Laven and Boomsma, 2012). With such a risk-averse 
disposition, it is not surprising that smallholders were less responsive to our menu of 
prices compared with farmers with large holdings. Farmers who depended more on 
cocoa for their livelihood exhibited more self-selection, this is in contrast to our a 
priori expectations that assumed that such farmers would be more risk averse. Perhaps 
these farmers take more care of their beans than farmers since they do not have much 
diversified sources of income.  
The third strand of explanations relates to the presence of constraints hampering 
the supply of quality cocoa beans. Farmers who face fewer constraints are more able to 
exploit the opportunities of the new price menu and so to engage in self-selection 
behaviour (other things equal). Hence, granting that educated and trained farmers have 
a relatively better capacity to produce quality cocoa, this explains why these categories 
of farmers exhibited more self-selection behaviour. Our results also show that farmers 
in bigger households, who potentially have easier access to extra hands to sort out 
cocoa beans, engaged more in self-selection. A similar reason explains our finding that 
large-scale farmers exhibit much self-selection behaviour. Apart from being less 
affected by the risk of losing test fees, large-scale farmers have relatively high 
financial resources to hire extra hands to carry out some of the quality-enhancing 
functions.  
What are the implications of a governance structure that employs price 
differentiation with a test-cum-fee option for cocoa buyers in Ghana? According to 
Tollens and Gibert (2003), the increasing liberalization of cocoa markets in West 
Africa from state control to private participation has led to transfer of some quality-
enhancing functions to cocoa buyers. This shift in functions means that LBCs must 
spend resources to upgrading cocoa beans purchased from farmers in order to meet the 
high quality standard specification of COCOBOD (Quarmine et al., 2012; Williams, 
2009; Tollens and Gilbert, 2003). The general increase in average quality per hectare 
found in this study suggests that price differentiation with test-cum-fee could 
significantly reduce upgrading cost of LBCs.  
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Quarmine et. al, (2012) observed that the changing organization of the cocoa 
market increases the burden on LBCs to procure quality cocoa beans. Yet it appears 
they are reluctant to examine the potential of governance structures that employs price 
differentiation by quality. One explanation for this reluctance may be the narrow 
selling margin within which they must operate (Laven, 2010). LBCs also may not have 
the financial capacity to operate such governance structures (Fold, 2001). Moreover, 
cocoa laws and regulations anyway limit the space within which LBCs can implement 
alternative governance structures. For instance, COCOBOD neither provides LBCs a 
premium for every unit of superior quality cocoa beans purchased nor allow LBCs to 
fully exploit the international market where they may sell their cocoa at a higher price. 
Successful implementation of alternative governance structures by LBCs to address 
asymmetric information problems may also depend on the level of trust they can build 
with farmers. In sum, given all these limitations, the question of how far can LBCs 
goes to address asymmetric information problems arises. The bottom line of this study 
is that there are win-win opportunities left unexploited; benefitting both farmers and 
LBCs, once the hurdle of price differentiation by quality is taken. 
A number of final remarks are in order. Given this opportunity for a win-win 
situation through price differentiation, policy makers need to focus on continuously 
analysing the market and experimenting with more alternative governance 
mechanisms if Ghana is to sustain its position on the world market as a net exporter of 
quality cocoa beans. This study is a pioneer in the field of asymmetric information in 
Ghanaian cocoa and agricultural markets for that matter. However, there are two 
limitations of this study which could be improved in future studies. First, the sample 
size on which the analysis was conducted is relatively small. Even though we believe 
the results are scalable, a much bigger sample over a longer time period may generate 
more robust and externally valid results. Second, this study was strictly limited to a 
specific test-fee combination. More investigation is required to test the optimal 
combination of test fee (stick) and price premium (carrot) which elicits the best results.  
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7.1 Introduction 
Two broad observations from previous research on the behavioural patterns of 
smallholder cocoa farmers in Ghana motivated the studies presented in this thesis. 
First, Ghana seeks to remain the supplier of the bulk of the world’s premium quality 
cocoa beans. To achieve this objective, farmers need to commit themselves to specific 
recommended technologies and production activities (Anim-Kwapong et al, 2007). 
Yet, there is evidence that smallholder farmers (SHFs) in Ghana have not adopted 
more than 4% of recommended quality-enhancing technologies (Aneani et al., 2012). 
Second, institutional factors (formal regulations, laws, policies, informal norms, 
standards, forms of organization) have often been hypothesized to determine the 
decision of farmers to take up these technological recommendations. However, until 
now research has paid only little attention to institutional factors that influence 
farmers’ willingness and capacity to further enhance the quality of their produce. 
Hence, at the moment not much is known about how institutions undermine or 
promote the supply of quality cocoa beans in Ghana.  
This thesis employed perspectives of institutional economics, mechanism 
design theory, and other social science tools to empirically investigate how institutions 
structure incentives for SHFs to enhance the production of quality cocoa beans. Five 
specific research questions were addressed in separate empirical chapters: (1) how did 
macro-level institutional reforms influence the incentive structures embedded in 
producer prices? (2) which institutional factors constrain SHFs from enhancing the 
production of quality cocoa beans? (3) given current market structure, to what extent 
will farmers who have taken part in participatory research activities enhance their 
cocoa bean quality? (4) how do the incentive mechanisms of certification programs 
influence farmers’ effort to enhance the quality of cocoa beans they produce? (5) to 
what extent do farmers respond to price differentiation with a test-cum-fee option in 
terms of supply of higher volumes of quality cocoa beans? 
The empirical evidence provided in this thesis led to a number of conclusions 
about how to motivate farmers to enhance the quality of their produce through 
institutional mechanisms.  
1. Formal macro-level institutions influence the level of risk and uncertainty 
farmers face and hence their incentive to apply more effort to their production 
activities. 
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2. At the micro level, a mix of formal and informal institutional factors undermine 
SHFs’ incentive to enhance the production of quality cocoa beans. A major 
institutional factor is the presence of asymmetric information in the cocoa 
market.  
3. Changing farmer knowledge institutions alone, without re-organizing the 
market, results in adoption of yield-enhancing rather than quality-enhancing 
technologies. 
4. To improve the quality of their produce beyond current levels, buyers and 
policy makers need to design market governance arrangements that directly 
address existing problems of asymmetric information. 
5. One market governance structure that significantly motivates the supply of 
enhanced quality cocoa beans is certification of Farmer Based Organizations 
(FBOs). When certification programs implement traceability systems, the 
problem of asymmetric information is largely solved.  
6. The asymmetric information problem can also be significantly reduced through 
price differentiation with test-cum-fee mechanisms.  
Below, these contributions to the literature are discussed in detail. 
7.2 Summary and discussion of main conclusions 
7.2.1 Diagnosing the problem 
A couple of diagnostic studies were conducted to identify and assess the impact of 
institutional factors, and how they have evolved over time, on the behaviour of cocoa 
farmers in Ghana. Of particular interest were the incentives for farmers to enhance the 
production of quality cocoa beans.  
Price-setting institutions influence SHFs’ incentive to produce cocoa  
In this thesis, diagnostic studies started with a macro-level analysis of how the 
evolution of some formal institutions influenced the incentive structures of SHFs 
(Chapter 2). Specifically, the influence of changes in (1) the organization that sets 
cocoa producer prices in the internal market, and (2) the price-setting rules applied to 
producer price, and their stability. Ghanaian cocoa farmers respond positively to 
producer prices in terms of supply (Abdulai and Reider, 1995; Gyimah-Brempong, 
1987). However, we also found that the variation or instability of producer prices has a 
negative impact on their production activities, because it creates uncertainty and 
distorts expectations (Chapter 2).  
Shifting the price formation responsibility from COCOBOD to a multi-
stakeholder platform (the producer price review committee or PPRC) brought greater 
transparency in the price-setting process (Chapter 2). The PPRC made the rules of 
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price determination more flexible. Producer pricing was no longer based on a rigid 
cost-plus-margin estimate, but on a negotiated percentage of the export price, after a 
number of industry (or chain-upgrading) costs were deducted. With more transparency 
and a flexible pricing rule, producers could negotiate for higher prices. This 
institutional change led to a significant increase in the share of the world price 
transmitted to producers. Nevertheless, with these changes came negative 
consequences. One was that, by following the fluctuations of the world price, the 
producer price stabilization objective of COCOBOD had been compromised. 
Combined with the earlier finding that farmers tend to reduce their supply when 
prices become more variable (unstable), these results paint a picture of how 
institutions can put farmers at risk and constrain their opportunities to improve their 
production activities (Hounkonnou et al., 2012; Röling et al., 2012). It also shows that 
if carefully managed, price-setting institutions have the ability to enhance producer 
incentives.  
Formal and informal institutions shape SHFs’ incentive to enhance cocoa 
bean quality  
A crucial question in a number of publications is: what will motivate SHFs to increase 
the production of quality cocoa beans? (Osei, 2007; Laven, 2010; Williams, 2010; 
Hainmuller, 2011). While different stakeholders define quality cocoa beans differently, 
much emphasis is placed on physical characteristics, such as moisture content, colour 
(an indication of fermentation), pest infestation, and uniformity of size. Consequently, 
two quality grades exist in Ghana, based on the percentage of physical defects: a high 
standard Grade I and a lower quality Grade II. Yet, SHFs are not always able to 
produce cocoa that meets Grade I standards.  
Often farmers are unable or unwilling to invest resources into recommended 
quality-enhancing recommendations because there are little or no incentives to do so. 
Consistent with the literature, this study has provided evidence to show that a number 
of institutional factors, which are often beyond farmers’ control, explain this behaviour 
pattern. Farmers’ inability to invest in quality-enhancing technology arises due to 
inadequate knowledge. Contacts of farmers with extension workers have been very 
limited due to the fact that for over two decades since 1984 extension policies stopped 
focusing on cocoa commodity development. Hence the specialized cocoa extension 
services unit of COCOBOD was merged with the Ministry of Agriculture. With lack 
of special emphasis on cocoa, farmer-extension worker contact hours gradually 
declined considerably. The consequence of this inconsistent extension policy is that 
farmers’ knowledge of appropriate quality-enhancing technologies is generally 
inadequate (Dormon, 2006). Therefore, they often do not produce beyond Grade II. 
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Farmers’ unwillingness to enhance the quality of their cocoa beans any further also 
arises from informal institutional factors like land tenure contracts, corruption and 
rent-seeking behaviour of cocoa buyers, affecting farmers’ income position negatively. 
Farmers do not have enough countervailing power to deal with these problems because 
they are often very weakly organized (Chapter 3).  
The willingness of farmers to enhance the quality of their produce is also 
influenced by an asymmetric information problem (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz, 1975). This 
problem arises because buyers do not determine the quality features of the produce 
before or even after sale transaction. This asymmetric information is attributed to the 
lack of market governance arrangements that ensure that cocoa beans are graded 
before purchase from farmers. The absence of grading before purchase and the 
subsequent payment of uniform prices lowers producer incentives to enhance quality, 
because raising quality through additional effort is not rewarded (Quarmine et al., 
2012). In the absence of a pay-for-quality policy, and given their low incomes, farmers 
will rather not invest extra labour in further enhancing produce quality.  
7.2.2 Experimentation with alternative solutions 
These identified problems work to weaken Ghana’s position on the world market as a 
supplier of premium quality cocoa beans. How can policy makers and other actors in 
the cocoa sector of Ghana ensure that farmers enhance the quality of their produce? 
There are opportunities to change institutions to structure farmer incentives: 1) change 
farmer knowledge institutions by re-organizing extension services; 2) reconsider 
market governance structures. Below, three empirical experiments (Chapters 4, 5 and 
6) which sought to test how alternative market governance arrangements can structure 
SHFs incentives to enhance the quality of their produce are discussed.  
Farmer knowledge institutions do not provide sufficient incentives for 
SHFs to enhance produce quality 
Inconsistent extension policy negatively affected farmers’ knowledge about quality-
enhancing technology and hence their capacity to enhance the quality of their produce 
(Chapter 3). The literature demonstrates a positive relationship between participatory 
methods of innovation development and farmer knowledge (Biggs, 2007; De Jager et 
al., 2004; Ton, 2005).  Although the impact of participatory methods on yield-
enhancing technologies has been studied (Ayenor et al 2007, Soniia and Asamoh, 
2011), the question is whether SHFs will continue to use the technologies they learned 
after having been involved in the participatory studies. For example, a significant 
rationale of the COS-SIS research program, within which framework this thesis is 
written, is that while participatory methods could make considerable impact locally, 
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the continuous adoption of the technology often depends on institutional conditions 
over which farmers have no control (Van Huis et al, 2007).  
This hypothesis was tested by comparing the early adoption behaviour of 
farmers who had been involved in participatory learning about quality enhancing-
technologies with that of farmers who learnt about the same recommendations through 
much more linear conventional methods. It was found that participatory research 
methods improved farmer knowledge about cocoa production practices more than 
conventional extension. Their gain in knowledge did not motivate farmers to enhance 
cocoa bean quality as we would have expected. Instead, farmers in participatory 
learning selected more pre-harvest activities, which increased their yields at a 
relatively low cost (Chapter 3). Farmers’ selective try-outs of post-harvest 
technologies on their own plots therefore only resulted in a moderate improvement in 
cocoa bean quality. 
These results suggest that economic (income) considerations (“what is in it for 
me”) are the dominant criterion for farmers when deciding on the quality of their 
produce. They challenge the argument of some social scientists that historical 
antecedents and other social forces such as reputation, knowledge and reciprocity 
norms among farmers are more important drivers of adoption of technology by farmers 
than market forces. Yet, the cocoa market is organized such that farmers who increase 
their yields benefit more, in terms of income, than those who spend resources on 
quality enhancement.  
Does certification address the asymmetric information problem? 
As long as the interaction between farmers and buyers is characterized by asymmetric 
information problems, producers will be reluctant to invest extra labour and capital 
into recommended quality-enhancing technologies (Chapter 3 and 4). Unfortunately, 
policy has failed to give this asymmetric information problem the relevant attention. 
Rather, broad policy instruments such as scholarships, bonuses and mass-spraying of 
all farms are implemented, which do little to address the main problem of asymmetric 
information. 
Economists suggest two categories of market governance arrangements that can 
address the information problem. The first category of arrangements, which can be 
referred to as screening devices, assists cocoa buyers to sort farmers or their produce 
into different quality categories before and after trade transactions. One such 
mechanism is certification or labelling. In Ghana’s cocoa sector, two market 
arrangements exist: the mainstream market and the certification market. While there is 
enough evidence of the impact of certification programs on cocoa in terms of yields, 
there is a lack of evidence about how certification programs address the problem of 
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asymmetric information (Afari-Sefa et al., 2010; Gockowski et al., 2013; Kleeman and 
Abdulai, 2012).  
The study revealed  that farmers in certification programs apply higher levels of 
effort to enhance the quality of their cocoa beans than independent farmers (Chapter 
5). Holding other exogenous variables and input use constant, increased effort resulted 
in higher volumes of quality cocoa beans. Certification programs are able to elicit 
these high volumes of quality cocoa from farmers because their incentive mechanisms 
address the information asymmetry more directly. Specifically, mechanisms of quality 
testing before purchase in combination with traceability afterwards have the most 
impact among the factors that reduce the information problem. These mechanisms 
work effectively because of the strict enforcement of punishment and rewards by the 
producer organization under which umbrella certification operates. 
These findings are consistent with the suggestion of Laven and Boomsma 
(2012) that certification can be used as a tool for meeting the growing demand for 
sustainable cocoa beans across the world. Already, policy makers are discussing 
possibilities of achieving the 2015 cocoa production certification standards stipulated 
by the World Cocoa Foundation.
1
 Direct market governance structures are sufficient 
conditions for motivating SHFs to supply higher quality produce.  
The “carrot and stick” approach to pricing addresses the asymmetric 
information problem  
The second category of governance arrangements, proposed by economists to address 
asymmetric information problems, encourages farmers to select themselves into 
different markets based on the quality of their beans. A typical self-selection device 
that has been discussed in the literature is price differentiation. 
Even before Ghana’s independence in 1957, the cocoa sector actors were 
discussing how to design price differentiation mechanisms to induce self-selection 
among farmers (Amoah, 1998). In 1953 the colonial administration introduced price 
differentiation in the cocoa market. The policy failed the following year after it was 
introduced because it did not have built-in mechanisms to address a number of 
problems. These problems included the costs associated with quality testing, lack of 
infrastructure, and conflict among the actors regarding what constituted cocoa bean 
quality. Overtime, the cocoa market has been reformed and several infrastructural 
bottlenecks have been removed. For instance, a uniform physical cocoa quality 
standard has been developed and accepted by farmers, buyer and policy makers over 
the years. Secondly, the road networks to cocoa-growing communities have been 
                                                 
1
 http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=259970 
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extensively developed. Finally, the market reforms allowed competitive cocoa buying 
activities at farmgate.  
Given these changes, then, will a price differentiation policy reduce the 
problem of asymmetric information? This issue was tested by building a “carrot and 
stick” mechanism into a price differentiation experiment. A “carrot and stick” 
mechanism combines rewards and punishments to shape people’s choices. The “carrot 
and stick” mechanism we used, also referred to as test-cum-fee, worked as follows: A 
buyer offered his/her regular trade partners a price menu with two options. The first 
option was the regular market price for cocoa beans of any quality above the normal, 
minimum quality standard. In the other option, cocoa of better quality could be sold 
for a higher price (the “carrot”) so long as it met a certain higher standard. Some other 
conditions were however required before the supplier of higher quality produce was 
paid. A farmer willing to sell cocoa for a higher price was to pay a fee (the “stick”) to 
have his or her produce tested. If the produce met the high standard set by the buyer, 
the seller received the high price (which more than compensated for the fee), otherwise 
he or she just received the regular market price and the test fee would become his or 
her cost. Faced with this menu of prices, it was hypothesized that farmers would select 
themselves to enhance the quality of their produce. 
This experiment, where farmers were exposed to price differentiation with such 
a test-cum-fee option, yielded two major outcomes. First, the overall quality of cocoa 
supplied per hectare in communities where price differentiation was introduced 
increased significantly compared to control communities (Chapter 6). Second, based 
on their risk preferences, their perceptions and understanding of the price 
differentiation mechanism, and their actual capacity to supply quality cocoa beans, 
SHFs exposed to test-cum-fee sorted out their better produce and sold it for a 
premium, while their average quality beans were traded for the regular price. Thus 
test-cum-fee mechanism resulted in significant self-selection behaviour among 
farmers. 
Put together, these results meant that not only were SHFs better off in terms of 
income, but also the LBC they traded with would have to incur less costs to upgrade 
the purchased cocoa beans. In the long run, one can argue therefore that Ghana stands 
to benefit from such a policy when majority of farmers adapt their production 
decisions to take advantage of a market which offers them higher revenues for taking 
up some of the costs of upgrading.  
7.3 Policy implications 
A number of policy implications can be derived from the empirical evidence provided 
by this thesis. First, this study highlights the importance of formal and informal 
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institutions as determinants of farmers’ capacity and willingness to enhance the 
production of quality cocoa beans. Different types of institutional factors have been 
identified in this study, particularly formal institutional factors such as rules, 
regulations, policies and enforcement organizations which shape farmer education and 
trading practices. Ghana’s cocoa sector is strongly supported by such institutional 
factors. Specifically, the presence of a governing board, which seems to have a posture 
of introducing gradual reforms into the sector (Essegbey and Ofori-Gyamfi, 2012; 
Laven, 2010). When compared to other countries without such institutional support, it 
is seen that Ghana is better able to manage problems associated with producing and 
exporting quality cocoa beans (Amoah, 1998).  
The cocoa literature devotes significant space to comparison of the impact of 
institutional settings in producing countries on the quality of produce. Ivory Coast, 
Ghana, and Nigeria are among the largest producers of the crop but have different 
institutional settings. Prior to economic liberalization policies across Africa in the 
1980s, the governments of these countries controlled cocoa production and exports 
through marketing boards. Ghana and the rest of the African countries are a classic 
case of comparison because they took different approaches to liberalization of their 
cocoa sectors. While Ghana chose to maintain its central institutional structures and to 
introduce gradual reforms, Nigeria and Ivory Coast fully liberalized their cocoa sectors 
(Williams, 2009). As a result, whereas Ghana’s cocoa production, pricing, quality 
assurance and export are centrally controlled by COCOBOD, Nigeria and Ivory Coast 
allowed private companies to drive the market. Laven et al. (2007) conclude that 
quality deteriorated completely in the case of the fully liberalized countries. This 
study’s findings therefore reinforce policy debate for the need to maintain the core 
structure of the cocoa sector. Notwithstanding the strong institutional context of cocoa 
in Ghana, a number of issues related to supply of good quality cocoa beans by SHFs 
could be better addressed. For example, existing farmer knowledge systems can be 
improved (Chapter 4). On-going reforms in cocoa extension provide opportunities for 
policy makers to introduce more participatory methods of farmer education.  
Even though smallholder farmers can further enhance the quality of their 
produce, the set of rules that govern the internal cocoa market of Ghana creates an 
asymmetric information problem which constrains them from doing so. Attention 
needs to be placed on designing governance structures that coordinate farmers to 
enhance the quality of their produce by directly rewarding or costing them for their 
performance. Following the positive impact of certification on SHFs incentive to 
enhance the quality of their produce (Chapter 5), it is recommended that COCOBOD 
policy should create the space for the growth of certification programs in Ghana. This 
recommendation is in line with COCOBOD’s target to fully certify its cocoa by 2015. 
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The opportunity to expand certification already exists. For instance, an internal 
certification program is already operational where all cocoa beans shopped from 
Ghana are inspected and certified as being of premium quality by the Quality Control 
Company Limited. What is lacking in this system however is that cocoa beans cannot 
be traced back to the farm where it was produced.  
Policy makers need to continue deliberations on the best possible means to 
ensure the market is fully certified with traceability systems. One way to achieve this 
is to create an environment for FBOs to thrive. Certification thrives with well-
developed producer organizations (Jena et al., 2012). With a worldwide increased 
demand for certified cocoa beans, there is the temptation for policy makers to hasten 
this process of certifying all cocoa producers. This thesis however provides evidence 
that not all farmers are willing or able to participate in certification programs (Chapter 
5). Hence the process of certifying Ghanaian cocoa should be approached with care 
(Laven and Boomsma, 2012). Policy makers can learn from history. Between 1930 
and 1970 the government created laws to put all farmers into one cooperative 
organization and controlled their activities (Acquaah, 1999; Cazzuffi and Moradi, 
2010; Young et al., 1981). This approach did not help to develop farmers’ managerial 
ability and capacity to organize. In the long run, poor organization, lack of trust and 
mismanagement among cocoa cooperatives led to the complete breakdown of producer 
associations and put the entire sector at risk.  
There is a need for policy makers to be open to ideas which seek the best 
pricing mechanism which will aid in maintaining Ghana’s premium cocoa position on 
the world market. The implication is that minimum price floors for all quality grades 
cannot provide enough push for farmers to enhance the quality of their produce. 
Hence, in line with suggestions from some sections of the cocoa literature, it is 
recommended that policy makers consider quality price differentials at farmgate 
(Barrientos et al., 2007; Leiter and Harding, 2004). This study shows that an 
alternative pricing strategy with a test-cum-fee mechanism will adequately reward 
farmers who supply higher quality produce and so significantly address asymmetric 
information problems in Ghana’s cocoa sector. 
A critical look at Ghana’s cocoa market regulations is required in order to 
identify specific legal and policy instruments that can be formulated to create the room 
for price differentiation. When Ghana partially liberalized its internal cocoa market in 
1992, and allowed for private firms to participate as first buyers of the produce, it was 
hoped that that these firms would compete on prices and as such design new pricing 
mechanisms to address asymmetric information. Why did LBCs not compete on 
prices? One school of thought is that the margins within which they operated were too 
limited. Cocoa regulations make it difficult for LBCs to sell cocoa externally; hence 
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they have to operate within the narrow margins set for them by COCOBOD. After 
over two decades of liberalization of the internal cocoa market, the time may just be 
right to critically review the marketing practices of LBCs and the legal regulations 
within which they operate in order to identify important reforms needed to provide 
direct incentives to farmers to enhance the production of quality cocoa beans.  
7.4 Limitations and recommendations for future research 
The outcome of the investigations presented in this thesis revealed a number of 
limitations that may be addressed in future research activities which seek to find 
mechanisms to motivate farmers to enhance the quality of their produce. These 
limitations relate to the approach adopted for the entire study, design issues and some 
institutional factors not addressed in this thesis.  
7.4.1 Reflection on the CoS-SIS approach to research 
Focus on institutions 
The five empirical studies which comprise this thesis were conducted within the 
framework of the CoS-SIS research program. This explains why we employed 
institutional perspectives to investigate how farmers can be motivated to increase the 
quality of their produce. Institutions have been widely accepted in development 
economics as important determinants of agricultural development. However 
institutions encompass a complicated set of factors which have not been fully 
unbundled in the literature or in this thesis. There is on-going debate regarding 
whether institutions can change in the short-run. If they can, there is no clear 
understanding how (Voors, 2012). 
It was found that some institutional factors can be deliberately altered in the 
short-run which can create incentives for agricultural producers. Such institutions 
include mechanisms that govern trade relationships between farmers and LBCs. 
However, the windows of opportunities created by institutions which can be altered in 
the short-run are often narrowed by other institutional factors which are difficult to 
change even in the long run (such as land tenure). Furthermore, institutional change 
often requires activities such as advocacy, negotiation, and facilitation of interactions 
that are beyond the time and budget scope of a PhD researcher. Therefore, his or her 
best contribution is to provide empirical evidence to feed the negotiation process of 
institutional change. 
Diagnostic studies 
A flagship component of the COS-SIS approach to research is that the research 
process begins with a diagnostic study. The diagnostic studies unearthed often 
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neglected but relevant institutional issues that plague the cocoa sector. The diagnostic 
studies enriched other empirical studies because their findings encompassed the 
opinions and expectations of all stakeholders. However, a number of bottlenecks arose 
during this phase of the research. Chiefly, it was difficult to obtain information on 
sensitive issues like cocoa bean quality at the various stages of the value chain. Faced 
with this challenge and the general knowledge that Ghana exports only premium 
quality cocoa, it became almost impossible to make claims about quality at farmgate. 
However, with continuous critical reflection and interaction with stakeholders, the 
issues became clear. The implication is that future PhD researchers can identify 
relevant research issues that benefit smallholder farmers through diagnostic studies 
and regular interaction of stakeholders.  
Experimental design and CIGs 
In line with the CoS-SIS research process, the specific empirical research work 
presented in this thesis was agreed upon after several discussions with stakeholders. 
One observation during these discussions was that the cocoa sector is made up of a 
number of stakeholders with entrenched interests. For instance, while farmers were 
open and expectant to experimentation with alternative governance structures, policy 
makers were critical of such an approach. They argued that any alternative structure 
may be counterproductive to the cocoa sector. They cited previous experimentation 
with such policies and how these collapsed because they did not suit well the Ghanaian 
conditions. Furthermore, policymakers mentioned that Ghana receives a premium for 
all quality grades in the world market; hence it cannot differentiate prices in the 
domestic scene. Finally, some policy makers were of the opinion that compared to 
other countries, Ghana had the best governance structure for exporting quality cocoa 
beans, hence there was no need for reforms. Such conflicting expectations put a 
researcher in a position where he or she must take several roles, including the 
facilitation of interactions and negotiations.  
These observations may have prompted the design of the COS-SIS program to 
initiate an innovation platform called Concertation and Innovation Group (CIG), 
where motivated actors team up to facilitate institutional change. The cocoa CIG 
worked on transparency of cocoa pricing. Hence some of the empirical observations in 
the thesis formed an input of the work of the CIG (Adu-Acheampong, 2012). For 
instance, having observed that the market institutions were important to structure 
producer incentives (Chapter 2 and 3), the CIG developed the objective of influencing 
the cocoa price-setting process. Another objective of the CIG, partly informed by the 
studies on farmer participatory research and learning (Chapter 4), was to improve the 
cocoa mass spraying policy. The interest of the CIG over the study period did not 
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always align with the empirical studies agreed upon with stakeholders involved in the 
diagnostic study. The CIG did not prioritize differentiated prices for farmers, but 
instead chose to promote higher prices for cocoa farmers than their colleagues in 
neighbouring countries.  
7.4.2 Recommendation for future research 
Even though diagnostic studies (Chapter 2 and 3) revealed both formal and informal 
institutions as the main impediments to farmers in their effort to enhance the quality of 
their produce, the empirical studies reported in this thesis do not address them all. The 
extent to which (in) formal institutional factors like trust, land tenure contracts, 
informal networks and alleged corrupt practices of LBCs can be changed, and how 
these changes will provide incentives for producers to supply better quality cocoa 
remains to be studied. While studies such as Nakane (2000) and Baah (2011) attempt 
to investigate incentives embedded in informal institutions, they fail to explain how 
informal institutions shape farmers’ decision to enhance the quality of their produce.  
The time frame of the study on farmer participatory research (Chapter 4) in 
which adoption was measured, may have been too short for farmers to fully decide to 
adopt quality-enhancing practices. The analyses presented, while still relevant, would 
have been richer if participatory training activities occurred over a longer period and 
farmers had adequate time to decide on whether to adopt these practices or not. An 
essential area of future research will thus be to assess whether there are long-term 
differences in the adoption behaviour of farmers exposed to participatory research and 
other extension delivery methods. 
A number of methodological issues also emerged from this thesis. A 
certification program that pays a price premium directly to farmers was investigated. 
However, more insights are needed to understand alternative certification programs 
like fair-trade, which pay a social premium to the collective of farmers. In this study 
on certification, effort scores generated by estimating an index of farm activities and 
the frequency or time spent on these activities. Future research may explore additional 
means of determining how much effort farmers put in their farm activities. The 
certification program we studied, like many others, thrive on well-organized FBOs. 
Previously, we proposed that COCOBOD’s agenda of certifying cocoa produced from 
Ghana will more likely succeed if it is linked with well-developed producer 
organizations. In recent years, some studies have been conducted on cocoa FBOs in 
Ghana (Baah, 2008). However, more theoretical and empirical work on how FBOs 
emerge and how their organization is influenced by the institutional context is 
required. There is a need for further research also on how the organization of FBOs 
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provides incentives for their members to enhance the production of quality cocoa 
beans.  
This thesis also presented outcomes of an experiment where farmers (exposed 
farmers) were offered a menu of prices, and their behavioural response was compared 
to those of control farmers (who faced just one price for all grades) (Chapter 6). This 
experiment was limited in a number of ways. First, there is the question of external 
validity. The experiment was carried out in the Suhum cocoa district in the Eastern 
region of Ghana, where agro-ecological conditions are quite different from other 
regions in the cocoa belt of Ghana. Factors like rainfall and sunshine days may have 
influenced the quality of cocoa beans produced. Second, the limited number of treated 
(60) and control (40) farmers restrict the inferences we could have drawn from the 
experimentation. Future research which compares different price differentiation 
mechanisms across different districts and years is recommended. Third, even though 
our experimental price premium and test fees were informed by research and practical 
considerations, alternative combinations of price premium and fee need to be tested in 
future studies in order to find the optimal combination which might inform policy and 
LBC purchasing practice. Finally, we showed evidence that LBC upgrading costs may 
decline with the introduction of price differentiation with a test-cum-fee mechanism. 
Yet, the cost structures of LBCs were not thoroughly discussed. More empirical 
evidence on how institutions shape the costs and governance structures of LBCs and 
what prevents them from competing over prices remains to be done. 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
Empirical evidence has been presented to show, among other things, that if 
smallholder farmers in Ghana adopt more recommended technologies, the volume of 
quality cocoa beans produced will increase. Drawing from institutional perspectives, 
this thesis has demonstrated that the set of rules that govern the cocoa market in Ghana 
limits the incentives for smallholder farmers to further enhance the quality of their 
produce. Two alternative governance structures which may provide beneficial win-win 
solutions to the existing asymmetric information problem were proposed. These were 
certification through FBOs with a built-in mechanism of traceability and price 
differentiation with test-cum-fee options. The posture of policy makers towards 
gradual reforms in the cocoa sector may create an opportunity to further examine 
alternative governance structures related to quantity and quality of cocoa produced in 
Ghana, in order to make the country even more competitive on the world market.  
  
 
 Summary 
 
Cocoa beans from Ghana have a reputation of being of consistent quality. As such they 
sell at a premium on the international market. As a result of this quality reputation, 
Ghana is able to sell over 70% of its annual produce in forward markets. This trading 
practice ensures that farmers are protected from price fluctuation in the international 
market. Consequently, farmers, buyers, scientists and policy makers agree that 
sustaining Ghana’s premium quality position on the international market should be a 
central component of cocoa sector policies in Ghana.  
Over the years, therefore, policy and programme attention has been placed on 
ensuring that the produce supplied by farmers is of superior quality. Some of these 
efforts have included development of clearer quality parameters, establishment of 
cooperative societies, market liberalization, introduction of competition in the cocoa 
market, and farmer extension reforms among others. In spite of the attention paid to 
quality, evidence is emerging that farmers can do more to enhance the quality of their 
produce. For example, nationwide, disease infestation alone results in loss of up to 
35% of the potential crop. Also, the surge in poorly fermented and not thoroughly 
dried produce has been amply described in the literature. These quality issues would 
not arise if farmers were to improve their rate of adoption of the several recommended 
quality-enhancing technologies developed by scientists.  
The question is therefore frequently asked: why does the rate of adoption of 
recommended technologies by farmers fall below the expectation of policy makers and 
scientists? Drawing mainly from new institutional economics, this thesis argues that 
the adoption by farmers of quality-enhancing technologies is hampered by the rules (or 
institutions) that govern interactions in the internal cocoa market of Ghana. The central 
object of this thesis is to gain an insight into what institutional factors are and how 
they can be altered to provide effective incentives for Ghanaian cocoa farmers to 
enhance the production of quality cocoa beans. Five specific objectives were 
addressed. First, impact of specific price-related institutional reforms on producer 
incentives was analysed. Second, the study identified relevant institutional factors 
constraining smallholders from enhancing the production of quality cocoa beans. 
These two studies set the stage for experimentation with alternative institutional 
mechanisms which might motivate cocoa farmers to enhance the quality of their 
produce. Hence, the third objective explored agricultural knowledge institutions by 
comparing the effectiveness of participatory and conventional extension methods on 
accumulation of knowledge and adoption of quality-enhancing technologies. The 
fourth and fifth objective of this study then focused on what alternative institutions 
may be designed to govern cocoa beans trade to ensure that Ghana sustains its good 
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premium quality reputation. The fourth objective of this study assessed the influence 
of incentive mechanisms designed by certification programs on farmers’ effort to 
enhance the quality of cocoa beans they produce. The fifth objective then attempted to 
determine the extent to which farmers respond to a price differentiation structure 
which builds in mechanisms of rewards and punishments. 
Having introduced the thesis in the first chapter, Chapter 2 addressed three 
questions: (1) did prices and the variation of these prices influence cocoa supply?; (2) 
to what extent did institutional reforms affect the stability of producer prices? and (3) 
how did cocoa price-related institutional reforms affect the transmission of world price 
to producers? A time series econometrics approach was employed in this study. To 
assess the impact of prices on farmer behaviour, a double-logarithmic ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression was estimated. Cocoa production was regressed on current 
and lagged producer prices and on a number of control variables, including the price of 
maize. To answer the question of how cocoa price-related institutional reforms 
affected the transmission of world price to producers, specific reform eras were first 
identified. These were: (1) before and after the introduction of the Producer Price 
Review Committee (PPRC); and (2) before the use of cost-plus-margin price rule; 
during the cost-plus-margin price rule; and during the percentage F.O.B. pricing rule. 
Next, a co-integration and error correction approach was employed to analyse the 
impact of these reform periods on the transmission of world prices to producers. The 
results confirmed economic theory in that increases in the producer price provided 
sufficient incentives for farmers to increase their output while the variation or 
instability of this price was a disincentive. The institutional reforms led to increases in 
prices but did little to stabilize producer prices over the years. These results pointed to 
the important role institutions can play in shaping farmer incentives.  
The time series data employed in the analyses of institutions failed to account 
for the perspectives of stakeholders. Chapter 3 therefore employed a cross-sectional 
approach to investigating how institutions shape the incentive for smallholders to 
enhance the quality of their produce. A number of formal and informal institutions 
work together to constrain farmers’ capacity and willingness to enhance the production 
of quality cocoa beans. Farmer knowledge institutions, especially the organization of 
cocoa extension, have resulted in low contact hours between farmers and extension 
agents. This affected the knowledge and hence capacity of farmers to utilize relevant 
technological innovations which could enhance the quality of their produce. Farmers’ 
unwillingness to enhance the quality of their cocoa beans any further also arises from 
institutional factors like land tenure contracts, corruption, and rent-seeking behaviour 
of cocoa buyers, which affect their income position. Farmers do not have enough 
countervailing power to deal with these problems because they are often very weakly 
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organized. The willingness of farmers to enhance the quality of their produce is also 
influenced by an asymmetric information problem. This problem arises because buyers 
do not determine the quality features of the produce before or even after sale 
transaction. This asymmetric information is attributed to the lack of market 
governance structures that ensure that cocoa beans are graded before purchase from 
farmers. The absence of grading before purchase results in payment of uniform prices 
for all quality grades. In the absence of a pay-for-quality policy farmers will rather not 
invest extra labour in further enhancing produce quality. 
In Chapter 4, the effectiveness of participatory and conventional extension 
methods of extension on accumulation of knowledge and adoption of quality-
enhancing technologies was compared. Farmers involved in participatory research 
were compared with those involved in conventional extension in terms of knowledge 
accumulation, yields and bean quality. It was found that using recommended 
technologies can enhance the cocoa bean quality 17% more than current practices. At a 
cocoa price of US$ 1.86 per kilogramme, profits per hectare were with recommended 
technologies about 8% higher than with farmers’ practices, just because recommended 
technologies yielded higher volumes of cocoa. If cocoa prices at the farm gate would 
be differentiated by quality, the relative profitability of using good agricultural 
practices would even be higher. Being trained through participatory methods resulted 
in significant improvement in farmers’ knowledge. Their gain in knowledge did not 
motivate farmers to enhance cocoa bean quality, but rather farmers selected specific 
yield-enhancing technologies for adoption. This chapter confirmed that as long as 
there is a lack of market incentives farmers are unwilling to adopt quality-enhancing 
recommended technologies.  
In Chapter 5, the question of how certification programs influence farmers to 
enhance the production of quality cocoa beans was addressed. The study identified the 
determinants of the choice between being an independent farmer and being a certified 
farmer. The study showed that farmers with a high marginal utility of income 
participated in certification. Furthermore, farmers that for some reason were 
constrained in their capacity to apply extra effort to their pre-harvest and post-harvest 
activities, by lack of time or health conditions, were not likely to join the certification 
program. Having joined certification programs a number of incentive mechanisms 
were used to coordinate farmers’ production activities to ensure they supply quality 
cocoa beans. First, certification programs organize farmers into producer organizations 
which use their internal rules of rewards and punishments to strictly enforce quality 
requirements. Also, certification programs employ traceability mechanisms where 
every cocoa bean can be traced to the farm where it was produced. Hence the 
information asymmetric problem is completely resolved. Additionally certification 
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programs pay a higher price for the quality of produce they purchase. These 
mechanisms were not available to independent farmers. As a result of these differences 
in trading practices and incentive mechanisms, certified farmers put up 17% more pre-
harvest and 20% more post-harvest effort in their production practices than 
independent members. This explains why certified farmers recorded 52% higher yields 
and 12% better quality than independent farmers.  
In Chapter 6 an alternative market governance mechanism to certification was 
experimented with. The impact of price differentiation with self-selection was tested 
by offering farmers in the Suhum district a menu of price; the regular producer price 
for lower quality Grade II cocoa beans and the higher price for Grade I cocoa. To 
receive the higher price however farmers were to pay a fee (of 1kg of cocoa beans) and 
had to have their beans tested. If the produce met the high standard set by the buyer, 
the seller received the high price (which is equivalent to 3kg of cocoa), otherwise he or 
she just received the regular market price and the test fee would become his or her 
cost. The results showed that faced with this menu, farmers exposed to this test-cum-
fee price option significantly improved the quality of their cocoa beans by 2.7% more 
than control farmers. Other factors which significantly impacted on the quality of 
farmers’ produce were previous involvement in farmer participatory research (Chapter 
4) and dependence on cocoa as a main source of livelihood. A central aim of test-cum-
fee price mechanism is to stimulate farmers to supply only their best quality produce. 
Over the two seasons of the experiment farmers who were exposed to the test-cum-fee 
price mechanism increased the proportion of their produce which was sold for a 
premium by 28%. The quality of these beans sold for a premium also improved over 
the experimental period by 3%. This self-selection behaviour is explained by farmers’ 
risk preferences, perception about the new price mechanisms, and their capacity to 
enhance their quality of their cocoa beans. 
In Chapter 7, the main findings of the study were summarised and their policy 
implications were discussed. The study’s limitations were highlighted and some ideas 
for future research were proposed. Problems with cocoa bean quality at farmgate have 
been attributed to asymmetric information between farmers and buyers. As a result of 
this information problem, buyers are unwilling to pay for quality. This thesis puts 
forward two governance structures which can address the asymmetric information 
problem. First, it is demonstrated that certification of producer organizations with 
mechanisms of traceability, group control and price premiums can completely resolve 
the information problem. This thesis shows that another governance structure with a 
win-win potential to address the information problems in Ghana’s cocoa industry is 
price differentiation with self-selection mechanisms. Policy makers therefore need to 
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pay closer attention to these mechanisms if Ghana is to sustain her position as a net 
supplier of premium quality cocoa beans. 
 
 
 

  
 Samenvatting 
 
Cacaobonen uit Ghana hebben de reputatie van constante kwaliteit te zijn. Op de 
internationale markt verkopen ze derhalve tegen een meerprijs. Dankzij deze reputatie 
is Ghana in staat meer dan 70% van de jaarlijkse productie op termijnmarkten te 
verkopen. Dit zorgt ervoor dat boeren beschermd zijn tegen internationale 
prijsfluctuaties. Boeren, kopers, wetenschappers en beleidsmakers zijn het er daarom 
over eens dat het behoud van Ghana’s positie als internationale aanbieder van cacao 
van hoge kwaliteit een centraal onderdeel van het beleid met betrekking tot de 
cacaosector in Ghana zou moeten zijn.  
 Om deze reden is binnen beleid en programma’s jarenlang de aandacht 
uitgegaan naar het veiligstellen van de hoge kwaliteit van de opbrengst die door 
boeren werd aangeleverd. Hieronder vielen onder andere de ontwikkeling van 
duidelijkere kwaliteitsparameters, het oprichten van coöperaties, liberalisering van de 
markt, het stimuleren van concurrentie op de cacaomarkt en hervormingen van de 
voorlichting aan boeren. Ondanks die aandacht zijn er aanwijzingen dat boeren meer 
kunnen doen om de kwaliteit van hun product te verbeteren. Op landelijk niveau zorgt 
bijvoorbeeld alleen al infestatie voor een verlies van tot wel 35% van de potentiële 
oogst. Ook de toename van slecht gefermenteerde en niet volledig gedroogde 
producten is uitvoerig beschreven in de literatuur. Deze problemen zouden zich in 
mindere mate voordoen als boeren meer gebruik zouden maken van de 
kwaliteitsverhogende technologieën die door wetenschappers zijn ontwikkeld.  
De vraag waarom boeren deze aanbevolen technologieën in mindere mate 
overnemen dan beleidsmakers en wetenschappers verwachten, is reeds vaak gesteld. 
Gebruikmakend van met name de nieuwe institutionele economie (NIE), wordt in dit 
proefschrift betoogd dat de adoptie van kwaliteitsverhogende technologieën door 
boeren wordt belemmerd door de regels (instituties) die de interacties op de 
binnenlandse Ghanese cacaomarkt reguleren. Het belangrijkste doel van dit 
proefschrift is inzicht te verkrijgen in welke deze instituties zijn en hoe deze veranderd 
kunnen worden zodat ze effectieve prikkels genereren die Ghanese cacaoboeren 
stimuleren de productie van kwalitatief hoogstaande cacaobonen te verhogen. Vijf 
specifieke kwesties kwamen aan de orde. In de eerste plaats werd de impact van 
specifieke, prijs gerelateerde institutionele hervormingen in Ghana op 
producentenprikkels geanalyseerd. Vervolgens werden enkele institutionele factoren 
geïdentificeerd die kleine boeren belemmeren bij het verbeteren van de kwaliteit van 
hun cacaobonen. Deze twee studies bereidden de weg voor het experimenteren met 
alternatieve institutionele mechanismen die cacaoboeren mogelijkerwijs motiveren om 
de kwaliteit van hun productie te verhogen. De derde studie verkende bestaande 
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instituties op het gebied van landbouwkennis door de effectiviteit van participatieve en 
conventionele voorlichtingsmethodes te vergelijken met betrekking tot de 
vermeerdering van kennis en het gebruik van kwaliteitsverhogende technologieën. De 
laatste twee studies richtten zich vervolgens op de vraag welke alternatieve instituties 
voor het beheer van de handel in cacaobonen kunnen worden ontworpen om het 
behoud van de reputatie van Ghana als producent van kwalitatief hoogstaande cacao 
veilig te stellen. De vierde studie trachtte vast te stellen wat de invloed is van de 
economische prikkels verbonden aan certificeringsprogramma’s op de inspanning van 
boeren om de kwaliteit van hun cacaobonen te verhogen. De vijfde studie probeerde te 
bepalen in hoeverre boeren reageren op een structuur met prijsdifferentiatie en 
zelfselectie.  
 Na de introductie van de thesis in het eerste hoofdstuk, werden in hoofdstuk 2 
drie vragen aan de orde gesteld: (1) Hebben de producentenprijzen en de variatie 
hiervan het aanbod van cacao beïnvloed? (2) In hoeverre hebben de institutionele 
hervormingen de stabiliteit van producentenprijzen beïnvloed? En (3) hoe hebben de  
aan de  cacaoprijs gerelateerde institutionele hervormingen de doorberekening van 
wereldprijzen aan producenten beïnvloed? In deze studie werd een econometrische 
benaderingswijze gebruikt. Om de invloed van prijzen op het aanbodgedrag van 
boeren te bepalen, werd een kleinste-kwadraten schatting (OLS) gemaakt. Cacao 
productie werd geregresseerd op lopende en vertraagde producentenprijzen en op een 
aantal controlevariabelen, waaronder de prijs van maïs. Om een antwoord te vinden op 
de vraag hoe de aan de cacaoprijs gerelateerde institutionele hervormingen de 
overdracht van wereldprijzen op producenten hebben beïnvloed, werden eerst een 
aantal specifieke hervormingsperioden geïdentificeerd. Dit waren: (1) vóór en ná de 
invoering van de Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC); en (2) vóór het gebruik 
van de kosten-plus-marge waarderingsregel, tijdens het gebruik van de kosten-plus-
marge waarderingsregel, en tijdens de z.g. percentage-F.O.B. waarderingsregel. 
Vervolgens werd een co-integration en foutencorrectie procedure gebruikt om de 
impact van deze hervormingsperiodes te bepalen op de transmissie van wereldprijzen 
naar producentenprijzen. De resultaten bevestigden de economische theorie: een 
stijging van de producentenprijs was voldoende stimulans voor boeren om hun 
productie te vergroten, terwijl meer variatie of instabiliteit van deze prijs 
ontmoedigend werkte. De institutionele hervormingen leidden tot prijsstijgingen maar 
hielpen nauwelijks bij het stabiliseren van producentenprijzen met de jaren. Deze 
resultaten wijzen op de belangrijke rol die instituties kunnen spelen bij het creëren van 
prikkels voor boeren.  
De data tijdreeksen die gebruikt werden bij de analyses van de institutionele 
hervormingen konden geen licht werpen  op de perspectieven van stakeholders. In 
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hoofdstuk 3 werd daarom een cross-sectie aanpak gebruikt om te onderzoeken hoe 
instituties kleine boeren stimuleren om de kwaliteit van hun productie te verbeteren. 
Een aantal formele en informele instituties beïnvloeden gezamenlijk het vermogen en 
de bereidwilligheid van boeren om de productie van goede kwaliteit cacaobonen te 
verhogen. Instituties op het gebied van landbouwkennis, met name de manier waarop 
voorlichting aan cacaoboeren is georganiseerd, hebben het aantal contacturen tussen 
boeren en voorlichters verkleind. Dit had effect op de kennis en daardoor het 
vermogen van boeren om relevante technologische innovaties te gebruiken die de 
kwaliteit van hun opbrengst zouden kunnen verbeteren. De onwilligheid van boeren 
om de kwaliteit van hun cacaobonen verder te verbeteren, komt verder voort uit 
institutionele factoren die hun inkomenspositie nadelig beïnvloeden, zoals contracten 
met betrekking tot de pacht van land, corruptie, en winst zoekend gedrag van 
cacaokopers. Boeren zijn niet opgewassen tegen deze problemen omdat zij vaak 
nauwelijks georganiseerd zijn. De bereidheid van boeren om de kwaliteit van hun 
productie te vergroten wordt ook beïnvloed door een asymmetrische 
informatievoorziening. Dit probleem doet zich voor omdat kopers de kwaliteit van de 
cacao niet testen,  zelfs niet na de verkooptransactie. Deze asymmetrische informatie is 
toe te schrijven aan het gebrek aan beheersstructuren die garanderen dat cacaobonen 
worden geclassificeerd vóórdat ze gekocht worden van boeren. De afwezigheid van 
sortering voor koop resulteert in de betaling van een uniforme prijs voor alle 
kwaliteiten. Zonder een beleid gericht op betaling naar kwaliteit zullen boeren geen 
extra arbeid willen investeren in het verder verbeteren van de kwaliteit van hun 
product.  
In hoofdstuk 4 werd de effectiviteit van participatieve en conventionele 
voorlichtingsmethodes op de vermeerdering van kennis en de adoptie  van 
kwaliteitsverhogende technologieën vergeleken. Boeren die betrokken waren bij de 
participatieve methode werden vergeleken met boeren die deelnamen aan 
conventionele voorlichting met betrekking tot kennisvermeerdering en opbrengst en 
kwaliteit van cacaobonen. Hierbij bleek dat het gebruik van aangeraden technologieën 
de kwaliteit van de cacaoboon 17 % meer kan verhogen dan gangbare praktijken. Bij 
een cacaoprijs van 1.86 US$ per kilo waren de winsten per hectare met aangeraden 
technologieën ca. 8 % hoger dan gebruikelijk, alleen al omdat de aangeraden 
technologieën grotere volumes cacao opleverden. Als producentenprijzen van cacao 
naar kwaliteit gedifferentieerd zouden worden, zou de relatieve winstgevendheid van 
het gebruik van z.g. goede landbouwmethodes (Good Agricultural Practices) nog 
hoger zijn. Training middels participatieve methodes resulteerde in een significante 
verbetering van de kennis van de boeren. Deze kennistoename motiveerde boeren 
echter niet om de kwaliteit van de cacaobonen te verbeteren. In plaats daarvan 
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selecteerden de boeren specifieke opbrengstverhogende technologieën. Dit hoofdstuk 
bevestigde dat zo lang marktprikkels zoals prijsdifferentiatie ontbreken, boeren niet 
bereid zijn om technologieën te gebruiken die de kwaliteit verhogen. 
In hoofdstuk 5 werd de vraag hoe certificeringsprogramma’s boeren aanzetten 
om de productie van cacaobonen van goede kwaliteit te vergroten, aan de orde gesteld. 
Het onderzoek identificeerde de determinanten die bepalend zijn voor de keuze van 
boeren om onafhankelijk te zijn of zich aan te sluiten bij een certificeringsprogramma. 
Uit het onderzoek bleek dat boeren met een hoog marginaal nut van inkomen 
deelnamen aan certificering. Verder bleek dat boeren die moeilijk hun pre- en post-
oogst activiteiten konden uitbreiden, door gebrek aan tijd of vanwege hun gezondheid, 
waarschijnlijk niet zouden deelnemen aan certificering. Boeren die bij een 
certificeringsprogramma zijn aangesloten, worden onderworpen aan een aantal 
economische prikkels teneinde hun productieactiviteiten te coördineren en om ervoor 
te zorgen dat zij cacaobonen van goede kwaliteit leveren. In de eerste plaats groeperen 
certificeringsprogramma’s boeren in producentenorganisaties, die door middel van 
interne mechanismen van beloning en boete het naleven van kwaliteitseisen 
afdwingen. Verder gebruiken deze programma’s opspoorbaarheidsmechanismen, die 
het mogelijk maken elke cacaoboon terug te voeren naar de boerderij waar hij 
geproduceerd is. Hierdoor wordt het asymmetrische informatie-probleem geheel 
opgelost. Certificeringsprogramma’s betalen bovendien een hogere prijs voor de 
kwaliteit die zij aankopen. Al deze mechanismen waren niet beschikbaar voor 
onafhankelijke boeren. Door deze verschillen in handelspraktijk en prikkels staken 
gecertificeerde boeren 17 % meer energie in hun pre-oogst  en en 20 % meer energie 
in hun post-oogst activiteiten dan onafhankelijke leden. Dit verklaart waarom 
gecertificeerde boeren een 52% hogere opbrengst en 12 % betere kwaliteit dan 
onafhankelijke boeren bereikten.  
In hoofdstuk 6 werd geëxperimenteerd met een marktbeheersstructuur die een 
alternatief bood voor certificering. De impact van prijsdifferentiatie met zelfselectie  
werd getest door boeren in het Suhum district een menu van prijzen aan te bieden: de 
reguliere producentenprijs voor tweede klas cacaobonen van lagere kwaliteit en een 
hogere prijs voor eerste klas cacao. Om de hogere prijs te ontvangen moesten de 
boeren echter een vergoeding (van 1 kilo cacaobonen) betalen en hun bonen laten 
testen. Als het product aan de hogere eisen van de koper voldeed, kreeg de verkoper de 
hogere prijs (die gelijk staat aan 3 kilo cacaobonen meer). Zo niet, dan ontving hij of 
zij de reguliere marktprijs en was de testvergoeding voor eigen rekening van de boer. 
De resultaten van dit onderzoek lieten zien dat boeren die geconfronteerd werden met 
dit menu de kwaliteit van hun cacaobonen significant (met 3 %) verbeterden ten 
opzichte van de controlegroep. Andere factoren die een significante invloed hadden op 
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de kwaliteit van de productie waren eerdere deelname aan participatief onderzoek 
(hoofdstuk 4) en de afhankelijkheid van cacao als  belangrijke inkomstenbron. Een 
centrale doelstelling van dit test-cum-fee waarderingsmechanisme is boeren te 
stimuleren alleen cacao van de beste kwaliteit aan te leveren. Over twee seizoenen 
bezien, vergrootten boeren die onderworpen werden aan het test-cum-fee mechanisme 
de proportie van hun productie die voor een meerprijs verkocht werd met 28%. De 
kwaliteit van de bonen die een toeslag opleverden verbeterde bovendien tijdens de 
duur van het experiment met 3%. Dit zelfselectiegedrag kan worden verklaard door de 
risicovoorkeuren van boeren, de perceptie van boeren van de nieuwe 
prijsmechanismen en het vermogen van hen om de kwaliteit van hun cacaobonen 
daawerkelijk te verbeteren. 
In hoofdstuk 7 werden de belangrijkste resultaten van deze studie samengevat 
en werden de implicaties hiervan voor beleid besproken. De beperkingen van deze 
studie werden aangestipt en enkele ideeën voor toekomstig onderzoek werden 
geopperd. Problemen met de kwaliteit van cacaobonen op producentenniveau zijn 
toegeschreven aan de asymmetrie in informatie die er bestaat tussen boeren en kopers. 
Door dit probleem in informatievoorziening zijn kopers niet bereid te betalen voor 
goede kwaliteit. Dit proefschrift stelt twee beheersstructuren voor die dit probleem 
kunnen aanpakken. In de eerste plaats is gedemonstreerd dat de certificering van 
producentenorganisaties met mechanismen van traceerbaarheid, groepscontrole en 
meerprijzen het informatieprobleem geheel kan oplossen. Dit onderzoek heeft tevens 
een tweede beheersstructuur met een win-win potentieel gevonden die het 
informatieprobleem in de cacaosector in Ghana kan oplossen: prijsdifferentiatie met 
zelfselectie. Beleidsmakers zouden derhalve meer aandacht moeten schenken aan deze 
mechanismen, wil Ghana haar positie als een belangrijke aanbieder van kwalitatief 
hoogwaardige cacaobonen behouden.  
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C) Career-related competences/personal development 
Introductory course WASS 2009 1.5 
Competences for integrated Agricultural Research WGS 2009 1.0 
Globelics PhD School on Economics and Innovation University of 
Tampere, Finland 
2011 3.0 
Scientific Writing WGS 2013 1.7 
Career Assessment WGS 2013 0.3 
Presentations at six (6) CoS-SIS International 
conferences  
CoS-SIS 2010-
2013 
6.0 
   Factors which constrain farmers' incentives to enhance the quality of cocoa beans, 2010 
   Enhancing cocoa bean quality through knowledge and price incentives, 2011 
   Farmers' response to price and non-price incentives to produce quality cocoa, 2011 
   Improving the production of quality cocoa beans in Ghana, 2012 
   Institutions for improving cocoa bean quality in Ghana, 2012 
   The influence of institutions on the performance of Ghana’s cocoa sector, 2013 
 
Supervision of MSc Student 
 
UoG/CoS-SIS 
 
2011-
2012 
 
2.0 
Total   39.0  
One ECTS on the average is equivalent to 28 hours of course work 
 
Abbreviations 
WGS  Wageningen Graduate School 
UoG  University of Ghana 
CoS-SIS Convergence of Ghana Strengthening Innovation Systems 
CIS  Communication and Innovation Studies 
RDS   Rural Development Sociology 
AEP  Agricultural Economics and Rural Policy 
What is CoS-SIS?  
1 Definition and Purpose Convergence of Sciences-Strengthening Innovation Systems is an action research programme in Benin, Ghana and Mali. It carries out scoping and diagnostic studies, agrarian system analyses and participatory field experiments with innovation platforms at the local, district and national levels. Its purpose is to identify pathways for creating opportunity for smallholder farmers in West Africa. Focusing on the enabling conditions at levels higher than the field and farm, the Programme supports sustainable intensification of smallholder farming for food security.  
2 Partners and Funding CoS-SIS is a partnership among the Université d’Abomey-Calavi at Cotonou, Benin; the 
University of Ghana at Legon, Ghana, and the Institut Polytechnique Rural de Formation et 
Recherche Appliquée, at Katibougou, Mali; and Wageningen University, and the Royal 
Tropical Institute in the Netherlands. It is funded to a total of € 4.5 million for six years (end 2008-mid 2014) by Dutch International Cooperation.   
3 History and future  CoS-SIS is the second phase of CoS. CoS1 (2001-2006) focused on participatory technology development (PTD) in Benin and Ghana. It showed that smallholders can capture only limited benefits from even the best-adapted and appropriate technologies because of their constrained opportunities. Hence CoS1 researchers started to experiment with institutional change (in addition to their agronomic work). Their early results inspired CoS-SIS in that they convincingly demonstrated that institutional change is both important and feasible. CoS-SIS is currently supporting CORAF in implementing its IAR4D strategy with its West African partners.   
4 Personnel CoS-SIS employs eight post-doc Research Associates (RAs), recruited part-time from national research organisations and universities, and nine African Ph.D. researchers. Some of the RAs are graduates of the COS1 programme. The RAs facilitate Concerted action and Innovation Groups (CIGs) (multi-stakeholder platforms composed of key actors in an agricultural domain) at the district and national levels to experiment with institutional change. The Ph.D. researchers work at community level with groups of local people to analyse constraints and experimentally develop livelihood opportunities. The doctoral research feeds into the deliberations of the CIGs. The work is overseen by National, Regional and International Programme Coordinators, who together form the 
Programme Management Committee (PMC).  Responsibility for each country programme rests with a Programme Management Team (PMT) composed of senior representatives of universities, ministries, R&D organisations, the private sector, NGOs and FBOs. The PMTs and coordinators are proving to be high-level networkers and important advocates of the institutional change initiated by the CIGs and PhDs.   
5 Domains reflect national priorities 
• Benin: cotton, oil palm (inter-cropping oil palm and annual crops, and the oil palm seed system) and integrated water management (agro-pastoral dams in the North, and rice production in valley bottoms in the South);  
• Ghana: palm oil and cocoa (work in the domain of small ruminants ended when the RA was promoted to another location by his home organisation); 
• Mali: integrated water management, integration of crop and livestock production (both in the Office de Niger), and shea butter (karité). 
 
6 Key activities 
• Identifying key constraints that specific categories of smallholder farmers and processors experience when trying to improve their livelihoods and incomes through productive or value adding activities. 
• Identifying and researching the institutional reasons for the constraints at the local and higher system levels. 
• Identifying key actors, networks and mechanisms that maintain the constraints, as well as entry points for action to by-pass, or transform the institutional context to overcome them. 
• Assembling multi-stakeholder platforms of key actors who can be expected to engage in institutional change in their respective domains. 
• Enabling platform actors to experiment with institutional arrangements. 
• Institutionalising achievements in university curricula, the programmes of research institutes, government policies, the structure of agricultural industries, and arrangements among enterprises and services and in value chains.  
• Researching the processes of change and the work of the CIGs by means of real-time monitoring and a form of modified causal process tracing, based on two declared theories of change (intervention theory focused on internal and external activities and relationships of the CIGs; and power theory, focused on networks that have power to change or maintain institutional contexts linked to each domain).  
• Ensuring that the outcomes of the action research  are published and disseminated through international  scientific media, and shared with local, national, and regional government agencies and political decision makers.     
